Time and Temporality in Sāṁkhya-Yoga and Abhidharma Buddhism

Braj M. Sinha

Time and Temporality in Sāṁkhya-Yoga and Abhidharma Buddhism is a masterly treatment of the philosophical issues that have incessantly exercised the mind of scholars, both eastern and western, modern and ancient. The author shows remarkable ingenuity in his treatment of the themes under investigation and offers incisive insights into the questions of time and temporality.

Reification of time, Dr. Braj Mohan Sinha maintains, is a metaphysical pre-supposition that hinders a proper understanding of the phenomenon of temporality. Temporality, he suggests, need not be conceived as an adjectival synonym of time. Rather, temporality must be understood in the context of the world involved consciousness which is continually on the go and, as the structure of becoming and phenomenal change, is essentially temporal. Temporality, implies both the fact of change and the finitude of the phenomenal existence as well as the corresponding subjective experience.

The book raises fundamental questions, regarding assumptions of scholars who regard Sāṁkhya-yoga and Abhidharma Buddhism as representing two diametrically opposed philosophical positions. While recognising a certain difference in the basic orientation of the two religious philosophies, the author successfully argues for significant congruence in their ontological and soteriological perspectives. Both the systems appear in close company specially in their articulation of the problem of temporality and its transcendence which can only be typified as a soteriology of the present. The author effectively brings out the philosophico-religious significance of this soteriology of 'present' and its non-eschatological nuances in contradistinction to the eschatological soteriologies of some other religious traditions.

MUNSHIRAM MANOHARLAL
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by

Braj M. Sinha

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To
Ma and Babujee
with love and respect

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PREFACE

The religious philosophies of the Sāṁkhya-Yoga and Abhidharma literature are the two earliest systematic formulations of the philosophical positions of the Hindu and Buddhist traditions. These are studied in the present work in a comparative perspective to determine the degree of their compatibility on the specific issue of temporality and its soteriological significance. The systems under investigation have been selected on the ground that both of them look at temporality as a characteristic built into the structure of things. Reification of time, as an abstract category independent of entities, is alien to both the systems. Temporality is conceived not in terms of time as a transcendent condition of our being and cognition; rather it is conceived in terms of the changefulness and becomingness characteristic of phenomena as such and its relationship to the cognizing consciousness. This, indeed, is the most important perspective that they share against some other religious philosophies of India.

Our interest in the two systems' articulation of the problem emanates from the conviction that the systems under investigation, instead of being diametrically opposed to each other, complement each other and in some significant ways share certain basic perspectives. The fact of their complementarity has been ignored in the earlier studies. There are some occasional statements about the possibility of some similarities between the two. But no study of significance, except that of Stcherbatsky, has been undertaken to see if there is any significant correlation between the two. Most of the time scholars have treated them as representing two diametrically opposed ontological perspectives, T.R.V. Murti being the most prominent proponent of this position. That there are certain important differences between the two, cannot be denied. But it has been our concern to demonstrate that, despite important differences in their ontological perspective, the two systems are in close company, specially in their articulation of the problem of temporality and its soteriological implications.

Both Sāṁkhya-Yoga and Abhidharma Buddhism relativise the category of time. This relativization is part and parcel of their non-cosmological understanding of the temporal process. Temporality is defined as a feature built into the structure of change and becomingness and its subjective experience. Thus, there is no place for a reified category of time in either of the systems under investigation. The realm of the temporal is conceived in contradistinction with Eternity, the two being dialectically related. The temporality is seen in opposition to and yet providing a link with Eternity. The transcendence of temporality is a function of consciousness. Reflection (contemplation) as an act of consciousness is a temporal act. But reflection is seen as having a built-in structure of transcendence. This transcendence of the temporal process takes place in the *present*. Accordingly, both the Sāṁkhya-Yoga and Abhidharma Buddhism are the soteriologies of the present. For both the systems reflection, as a mode of the being of consciousness, is structural to transcendence of temporality. Reflection itself is a temporal act and operates within the confines of the temporal process. But as a mode of being of consciousness, which itself is always given as 'consciousness of,' reflection has a built-in structure of transcendence whereby it steps out of itself and relates itself to the object of reflection. The transcendence of temporality lies within the compass of reflection in terms of its inherent capacity to step outside of itself.

The congruent note that seems to characterise the basic soteriological perspective of the two religious thought relates to the structure of consciousness and its functional value for the process of transcendence. But the difference between the two soteriologies of the present must not be undermined. The basic difference emanates from a difference of ontological orientation. For Sāṁkhya-Yoga, the transcendence of temporality by reflective consciousness (Buddhi-Ahamkara structure) means recovery of the pure transcendental consciousness conceived as a mode of being of Purusa. For Abhidharma Buddhism on the other hand, it implies total extinction or dissolution of consciousness conceived on the model of drying-up of a stream or flow. Phenomenologically speaking, the distinction between the overcoming of temporality in the recovery of consciousness and the dissolution of consciousness is extremely important. For both the systems temporality is essentially an imperfection characteristic of the finitude and ought to be overcome in the mode of being of the non-temporal. However, the mode of being of the non-temporal has drastically different implications for the subject. While for Sāṁkhya-Yoga subject, as pure consciousness (Purusa), regains its undifferentiated substantive identity and is a case of recovery of its original mode of being, for Ābhidharmikas the subject aims at the dissolution of the substantive mode of being.

Within the Ābhidharmika scheme, one can discern two modes of the functioning of consciousness. First is the cognitive mode of consciousness which implies the claiming of the object as the other by the subject (samyoga). The other is the reflective mode of consciousness leading to the disclaiming of this otherness of subject and object (visamyoga). First is the temporal mode of becoming, where the Vijñāna functions as a dharma, as the structure of world involvement of the existentially finite subject. Later is the mode of transcendence of Vijñāna which goes beyond the subject-object otherness of the world of becoming. However, since world involvement is structural to the very being of Vijñāna, the transcendence also implies the dissolution of Vijñāna, the empiric consciousness which operates in the realm of otherness. Thus, the overcoming of temporality, the process of becomingness of the conditioned dharmas (samskṛtatva), is essentially the dissolution of the subjectivity in the mode of otherness. The consciousness which loses the other through which alone could it express itself loses its subjecthood. Thus the eternity of Nirvana, as the stillness of consciousness (sthita), overcomes the flow of temporality through complete extinction of consciousness as the cognitional basis of all temporality. In this lies the dialectical character of consciousness.

The body of the thesis is divided into three major parts. The first part is a critical exposition of the problem in the context of Sāṁkhya-Yoga. Here the problem of temporality is investigated against the background of the basic ontological perspective of Sāṁkhya-Yoga. Part two is a critical exposition of the problem of temporality in Abhidharma Buddhism. We have attempted to show how, according to Abhidharma Buddhism, temporal determination is a feature of reality. An attempt to bring out the correlation between the two systems, with special reference to the soteriological implications of their formulations, is made in the third part of the book. This concluding section looks at the problem in a comparative perspective suggesting how the two systems, despite certain basic differences, have some common structural and thematic congruity.

I would like to express my gratitude to the faculty and the student body of the Department of Religious Studies, McMaster University, Canada where the work was conceived and executed in constant dialogue with them in the scintillating atmosphere of the upstairs coffee room. I specially acknowledge, with deep gartitude, the helpful guidance and encouragement provided by Professor J.G. Arapura. He has helped me think through my methods and goals and a great deal of my thinking is inspired by him in many ways. To him, I owe more than I can tell. I am equally indebted to Professor K. Sivaraman for showing unflagging interest in the project. His constant guidance and constructive suggestions have gone a long way in shaping the present work. I also want to thank Professors Hans Mol and G.B. Madison for their help, cooperation and interest in this work. I express my indebtedness to Professor Mol for his valuable comments, criticisms and suggestions which were of immense help. I am grateful to Professor G.B. Madison for introducing me to relevant French and German literature and for helping me a great deal in clarifying my own thinking. I must acknowledge my deep gratitude to Professor T.R.V. Murti with whom I had the privilege of studying the difficult text of *Abhidharmakoṣa* during his visiting Professorship at McMaster University. Whatever insight I have in Indian Buddhism, I owe to the affectionate and patient guidance of Professor Murti.

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Nageswar Colony,
Boring Road, Patna.

Braj M. Sinha

Time and Temporality in Sāṁkhya-Yoga and Abhidharma Buddhism

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

SETTING OF THE PROBLEM

The significance of time component in the religious symbolism of a cultural subsystem has been noted by scholars. The time element is an integral part, of no small consequence, of any developed system of meaning. The time component of the symbol system may be seen to provide an important clue to the patterns of meaning structures, their emergence and maintenance. A study of religion as a system of meaning cannot remain indifferent to this fact.

What is important, however, is not to look at symbol systems and meaning structures in unidimensional and unilinear terms. Ignoring the complex character and varieties of levels on which the symbol system operates will lead to oversimplification or undermining of the essential elements that go into the making of a symbol system. This will also lead to neglecting the fact of intricate dialectical relationship between different elements and levels of meaning structures. Study of time symbolism in any meaning structure is no exception in this regard. A symbol system dealing with the temporal dimension of reality may, for analytical and heuristic purposes, be broken up and analysed on different levels. It may be analysed in terms of its function on mythic level, or as an element in the ritualistic participation in religious activities.[1] It may also, as well, be seen as a form of choice and commitment of faith.[2] And, it may likewise also be considered in the context of the reflective act of consciousness and its significance for world transcendence.[3]

It is important not to forget that these levels of meaning structure are not mutually independent; rather they interpenetrate. If we emphasise the level on which time symbolism is related to the reflective act of consciousness we do not intend to underestimate the value of the analysis which takes place on another level, nor do we tend to suggest that they do not have any bearing on each other. However, many studies of the problem of time in philosophico-religious thoughts of India have fallen prey to the temptation of underestimating the complexity of the meaning structure and the interpenetration of different levels. It may be profitable to analyse some of these tendencies to situate our own programme in a wider context.

Most studies of the problem of time in the specific context of Indian thought have concentrated on the fact of continual downplaying of the realm of the temporal.[4] Some scholars tend to concentrate on the contrast between the Indian conception of time and the Judeo-Christian understanding of time. The contrast has been brought out in two specific ways. The first in terms of cyclic and linear conceptions of time, the former considered characteristic of Indian religions, including Buddhism and the latter of the Judeo-Christian tradition including that of Islam.[5] The other approach to the problem in comparative perspective emphasises the fact that while Christian evaluation of time places premium on its being the realm of divine creativity and beneficence, the Indian conception tends to zero on time being the realm of the operation of divine's destructive and world obliterating power.[6] Thus it is stated that the contrast of Indian conception of time "with the Christian evaluation of Time is virtually absolute. Instead of Time as the field in which God's beneficent purpose majestically reveals itself, Indian thought has here identified God with the obliterating force of Time."[7]

What these perspectives on the problem of time in Indian thought have missed is the fact that any system of meaning (and conceptualization about time is part and parcel of a system of meaning) involves intricate layers or levels of meaning. What may be obvious on one level of meaning structure may not be the case at another level, and a generalization based on one level may not be applicable to another level. For a comprehensive understanding of the significance of time component in the meaning structures under investigation one must isolate these levels or layers and see them in their intrinsic character. The different levels may be seen in dialectical relationship, each of them influencing and moulding the other, and in turn being influenced and moulded by them.

As an instance of these tendencies to undermine the significance of different layers of meaning structures we may cite from S.G.F. Brandon.[8] Brandon, in his work overemphasised the transcendent character of time in Indian thought. This predisposition towards transcendent time led him to stress on the one hand the identity of time with the obliterating power of the divine and on the other of time being the receptum of all entities. The inevitable result of such predisposition is a complete underestimation of the religious significance attached by the Indian mind to the temporal process itself. While some Indian systems do emphasise the transcendent character of time, that constitutes only one element of the meaning structure and holds true only partially. The other element of the structure remains opaque and consequently Brandon can only see "the Indian fear of time."[9]

On a different level of meaning structure, the level which seeks to exemplify the significance of the temporal process, the fear of time is counterbalanced by the hope of transcendence, the transcendence itself seen as a temporal act pointing to freedom (*Mokṣa* or *Nirvāṇa*). The temporal process which is seen as coincident with pain and suffering is also seen as providing a clue to transcendence. For the generality of Indian philosophico-religious system, the present in which the individual is situated at a specific moment, is the moment of transcendence.[10]

It is important to note that 'moment' (*kṣaṇa* or *nimeṣa*) refers both to the "brief moment" as to measure of time and also to the moment without duration, the ideal condition of freedom, or transcendence. It is in the latter sense that *Nimiṣa* (Twinkling of an Eye) as a synonym for divinity, is implied by the term *naimiṣiyah* (people of the moment).[11] And it is in this sense that Vasubandhu's statement that the great awakening (*abhisaṁbodhi*) is "single instantaneous" (*eka-kṣaṇa*) is to be taken.[12] The notion of "instantaneous awakening" (*ekakṣaṇa'bhisaṁbodhi*) continues to catch the fancy of the *sādhaka* (aspirant). The Yogic emphasis on the contemplation of the moment (*kṣaṇa*) as the means of realising eternity within a single compass of a 'now' only reinforces our thesis that temporal structure is also conceived as the structure of transcendence.[13] It is stated in Kālacakratantra : "The birthplace of the Royal Conquerors is in one constant moment (*ekaṣminsamayekṣare*)."

The identification of time and eternity finds a prominent place in Upanisadic scheme of things.[14] A distinction between two forms (dvi rupe) of *Brahman* is made in terms of "Time and Without Time" (*kālaścākālaś-ca*) : "What precedes the Sun is Without Time (*akāla*) and undivided (*akāla*); but what begins with Sun is Time which has parts (*sakāla*) and its form is the Year."[15] Mircea Eliade interpreting this passage observes :

> The expression "what precedes the Sun" may be interpreted cosmologically as relating to the epoch which preceded the Creation......but its application is above all metaphysical and soteriological : it refers to the paradoxical situation of him who obtains illumination, who becomes a *jivan-mukta*, who is "delivered in this life," and thereby transcends time in the sense that he no longer participates in it.[16]

Mircea Eliade has greatly enriched our understanding of the time symbolism in the Indian tradition. He attaches special significance to mythic symbolism and ritual re-enactment of a sacred temporal moment in the scheme of transcendence. In his thesis Eliade makes a distinction between two conceptions of Time, namely 'le temps sacre' (the sacred time) and 'le temps profane' (the profane time).[17] Myths and rites according to him are the mechanisms of transcending the painful and evil experiences of the profane existence. The rites are, thus, conceived as the mechanisms of re-enactment or renewal of the original act of creation and are supposed to possess the virtue of annulling history with all its misdeeds and misfortunes. Such a symbolic annulment of the past or history of the profane time synchronizes with the return to sacred time of the beginning.

Similarly, Myth too, according to Eliade is a structure of transcendence of the profane time. Through narration of myth, profane time is symbolically abolished. Thus :

> mythical or sacred time is qualitatively different from profane time, from the continuous and irreversible time of our everyday, desacralized existence. In narrating a myth, we reactualize, as it were, the sacred time in which occurred the events of which we are speaking. In a word, myth is supposed to take place in an intemporal time. ...in a moment without duration, as certain mystics and philosophers conceive of eternity.[18]

The importance of the above perspective cannot be overemphasised. Of special merit in his treatment is the recognition of the soteriological significance of time symbolisms. However, we find his treatment deficient in one specific way. While he puts great emphasis on the role of myth and rituals in the process of sacralization, he ignores other elements which may equally be operative in this process.[19] Reflection or contemplation along with commitment can play equally significant role in the process. Just as the narration of a myth or ritual enactment of a sacred act enables the individual to transcend the realm of temporality so does contemplation or reflection enable the individual to realize eternity. The soteriological significance of reflection as an act of consciousness consists in its being the structure of both world involvement and world transcendence. Reflection is basically a temporal act. It is a function of consciousness which reflects upon itself as the structure of temporal becoming. But it is by the same act that the consciousness or the subject also comprehends eternity. Transcendence through contemplation or reflection, at least according to the generality of the Indian philosophical tradition, is the primary and authentic mode of transcendence. While the non-reflective avenues of transcendence are not denied, the contemplative approach is singled out as the true mode of realizing eternity in its limitless and accomplished character.[20]

THE PROBLEMATIC

The central issue for the present work is the possibility of interrogating issues of temporality in terms of its givenness as an objective fact and its relationship to the cognizing consciousness. The term temporality is used to connote both the fact of change and finitude of phenomenal existence as well as its "subjective" experience. It is our assumption that neither of the two can be conceived in isolation from the other. Temporality is a feature of existence as a structure of world involvement. Thus articulated, the problem of temporality then turns out to be the problem of subjectivity as what is implied in the structure of world involvement. It may then be asked : is not temporality a feature of existence conceived in terms of the relation of subjectivity to time? What is the relationship of time to the cognizing subject? or, How is time related to the subject? But then, is time anything other than the relation itself, or to be more precise, the structure of relation of the things to things and things to beings. This aspect of time as the structure of relatedness of things and beings of the empiric world is an undeniable fact. Neither Sāṁkhya-Yoga nor Abhidharma Buddhism would deny the empiric reality of time conceived as the structure of temporal relatedness.

The basic issue, however, still evades us. Granting that the empiric time is the structure of the relatedness of things and beings which are perceived as constantly changing and in a relationship of priority and posteriority, we still have to ask the question of the relation of this structure to the subject as world-involved. Denial of the substantive reality of time as transcendent principle in favour of a conception of structure of temporal relationship does not exonerate us from seeking the answer to the question of the relationship of this structure to the subject which is intricably enmeshed in the structure.

Now the question of the relationship of the subjectivity to temporal structure can be approached in a variety of ways: The structure itself may be conceived in terms of a receptum in which the subject is situated; or the structure may be conceived as a function of a synthetic activity of the subject which is transcendent to it and constitutes the structure; or finally, that the structure of temporality is identified with the structure of subjectivity. In other words the alternatives open to us are either that the subject is contained in the time, or that the time is in the subject, or that the subject is time, i.e., subjectivity is the temporal structure.[21] Both Sāṁkhya-Yoga and Abhidharma Buddhism would contribute to the third alternative on grounds which will become obvious in the sequel during the course of the treatment of the subject. But the following may be said by way of a critique of the other alternatives.

Any attempt to grasp the essence of temporality as a phenomenologically given fact in terms of these two alternatives would lead to some inexorable difficulties and implications for the subject as the structure of world involvement. The first alternative has to be excluded as a philosophically viable alternative perhaps for the very reason that the position makes a philosophical questioning of the problem of temporality impossible. A subject which is essentially in time and is encased in it cannot, by the nature of case, reflect upon the structure of which it is an element. A subject which is contained in time, must of necessity be contained in the moment of present: While time is the structure of the relationship in which stand things and beings in the relationship of priority and posteriority, the subject which is exhausted in this relationship in the moment of present cannot comprehend past and future. If it necessarily and totally is contained in the moment of present, then it cannot contemplate on temporality as exemplifying the relationship of priority and posteriority of past and future. Subject, then, must not be conceived as that which is contained in time; "it is necessary for the subject not to be himself situated in it, in order to be able to be present in intention to the past as to the future."[22]

The other alternative looks at temporal structure as a function of synthetic activity of the a-temporal subject. This alternative suggests that temporality is a constitutive activity of the subject which somehow "unfolds or constitutes time."[23] Now, the difficulty inherent in this position must be clear. A subject which is the transcendental condition of temporal constitution must of necessity remain external to the temporal structure. Total externality of the subject is an ideal condition of the subject the Sāṁkhya-Yoga proposes. The subject as transcendence must be free from all the vicissitudes of the temporal structure. But the subject which is totally external to the temporal structure cannot be the constitutive subject. In other words the constituting subject and the subject which is the transcendental condition of all constitution and reflection must be placed in two different realms.

However, the two subjects cannot be totally separated and be independent if the possibility of the transcendence of temporality as a function of reflective activity is to be retained. If the problem of transcendence is to be explained, instead of being explained away by declaring the realm of temporality as illusory, there is only one option open, namely to admit a dialectical contact between the two realms. The point of that contact, both for Sāṁkhya-Yoga and Abhidharma Buddhism, as we shall show, is the structure of reflection as an act of consciousness. This subject as the structure of temporal constitution must also retain a dialectical contact with the realm of transcendence, which in the case of Sāṁkhya-Yoga is Puruṣa, and in Abhidharma-Buddhism is Nirvāṇa.

The problematic of the relationship of the subject and the temporal structure can only be resolved, if and only if, we can show that subject as the structure of world constitution must be identical with the structuring of temporality. This is the intermediary position, a philosophical alternative which seeks to avoid the two extremes of situating subject in time or placing subject totally transcendent to time. The two alternatives, in a sense exemplify the two approaches to time which may be described in conventional terms, that of realism and idealism respectively. The first position is prepared to grant temporal structure an independent reality of its own, with the capacity of complete subsumption of the subject. The second alternative makes temporal structure a mere synthetic act of consciousness, denying the objectivity of temporal becomingness any reality status. In either case, consciousness of temporality becomes a problematic in the first case because time is transcendent to consciousness, and in the second case because consciousness is transcendent to time. The philosophical position that we argue for takes its point of departure, not merely from the failings of these two positions, but also from the more positive ground of the possibility of dialectical interplay between the two.

The intermediary position operates with the datum of the temporal process as the datum for a cognizing consciousness. In that sense, it partakes the character both of realism and idealism. It seeks to retain the significant element of the first alternative which in effect situates the subject in the present. This situating of the world involved subject in the present is a necessary condition for the temporal experience that the subject will have. It seems to be in answer, specifically, to the requirement underscored in the following statement :

> The subject must in a genuine sense be in the present. Time exists for me because I have a present. If I am able to have access to a past or a future, such access must be gained not by abandoning my present but rather from out of my present.[24]

However, this situating of the subject in the present must be combined with an insight into the possibility of the subject performing the synthetic activity in the present. Only then the present can become the meeting ground of past and future. Only then temporal structure can truly be grasped as the structure of the manifestation of the becomingness of being. If subject is unable to perform this synthetic activity in the present then the subject will remain encased in a block universe with no experience of change and becomingness. Thus the third alternative seeks to identify the structure of subjectivity with the structure of temporality.

This position is considered extremely significant from the point of view of the present study. It seeks to retain the autonomy of the subject as consciousness. Without this autonomy the possibility of reflection or contemplation as structure of world transcendence will have to be ruled out. On the other hand, temporal process itself is not dismissed as a fictitious construction of consciousness. It is an objective fact. Reality of the 'moment' is an objective reality which cannot be reduced to mere projections of consciousness. However, the subject through its synthetic activity enters into an intricate relationship with the world of change and becomingness. In this act of relating the subject assumes the character of temporality. Since this relatedness is intrinsic to the structure of world participation the empiric subject is essentially and intrinsically temporal. At the same time, through this very character of relating to the object the subject also exemplifies transcendence.

A NOTE ON THE METHOD

The problem of method in investigating a theme pertaining to Indian philosophy is a subject of considerable obscurity. Without being unduly dogmatic one can formulate the requirement in this context as under : the method of approach or investigation must be adequate to the nature of the content. In the classical writings of Indian Philosophy this question has received a very careful consideration. The metaphysical differences between the rival philosophical points of view are foreshadowed in the context of a discussion of the problem of methods and criteria. Without going into these issues, and in the present case our task being interpreting Indian Philosophical themes in contemporary setting, we may conceptualize the method that is adopted in the present study as the method of critical reconstruction.

In stating that the method is primarily critical we do not intend to emphasise polemics or set an undue premium on arguments and counterarguments. The latter could, by themselves, be themes for investigation as part of the study of the logical structure of statements and their refutations as understood by the Indian thinkers. But this is not our concern. Critical method is employed with a view to locate, isolate, and situate a particular concept or body of concepts or ideas in the context of the basic ontological perspective of the systems under investigation. As part of this enterprise surely it will be attempted to delineate the major argument of each system in an expository way by situating it against the major objections and challenges to which they are susceptible. Attention will be paid both to the structure and the language of the arguments but always in terms of its basic ontological orientation *vis-a-vis* their ontological positions pitted against it. Critical reconstruction is conceived to involve the imaginative task of letting the system speak for itself by weighing other positions at variance with it.

A critical investigation surely does not have to be an expression of ones own philosophical preferences or biases. But it is not also bias free and completely objective. In the present case it is intended expressly to bring out the bias of the systems under investigation. Our exposition of the problem in specific context will be an attempt to indicate the basic ontological "bias" of the systems that are taken up for consideration in terms, or by means, of an analysis of the directly relevant texts. It is our hope that it is only in that way that we will let the meaning of each system's argument emerge on its own.

To that extent the method of approach may be described as descriptive and non-judgemental. We are not confining ourselves to any specific form of the development of this method. We employ this method in its most generalized form whereby critical reflection, by enabling specific meaning structures to disclose themselves in the light of their intentionality, also enters into a specific kind of relationship with them. It becomes more acutely aware of the meaning structures which it intends to grasp, and by the same token, it becomes part and parcel of that.

SOME CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATIONS

The subject-matter of the present investigation is the problem of time and temporality in the systems of Sāṁkhya-Yoga and Abhidharma Buddhism. For the purposes of this study it is crucial that we make a conceptual distinction between the categories of time and temporality. The category of time is used for reification of time as an absolute category with independent ontological status.

Time is conceived independent of entities and somehow influencing and conditioning the mode of being of all entities. Temporality, on the other hand, is the expression used to indicate the fact of change which characterises entities as their mode. It is not what stands independent of them claiming a co-ordinate status in relation to them, but is constituted of their very mode of existing.

Sāṁkhya-Yoga and Abhidharma Buddhism do not look at temporality as a feature or function of time conceived as a reified category. Temporality is not the adjectival synonym of time understood as the transcendent condition of our being and cognition. More specifically, within the context of these two systems, temporality may be defined in terms of the changefulness and becomingness characteristic of phenomena as such and its relationship to the cognizing consciousness. Thus, in this study, the term temporality is used to connote both the fact of change and finitude of phenomenal existence as well as its subjective experience.[25]

In this work we have used the hyphenated expression of Sāṁkhya-Yoga to bring out the close correlation in the basic ontological perspective of the two schools of thought. The Sāṁkhya system under investigation includes the thought of *Sāṁkhya Kārikā* and *Sāṁkhya Sūtra* and various commentaries thereon. Yoga, in the present context, is used for the classical Yoga or Rāja Yoga as expounded in the Patañjali's *Yoga Sūtra* and the various commentaries on it. In using this hyphenated expression we have tried to zero upon substantial agreement in the basic ontological perspectives of the two systems.[26]

The expression Abhidharma Buddhism is employed in this work to connote the 'school' of Buddhist thought whose ideas are systematically expounded in the *Abhidharmakośa* of Vasubandhu and commentaries thereon. The use of the expression is preferred for various reasons and in the absence of a more adequate label indicative of the scope of this study. Vasubandhu himself uses the term in *Abhidharmakośa* as a proper name to refer to the philosophical standpoint which is the subject-matter of the *Abhidharmakośa*. Moreover, both Vasubandhu and his commentator Yaśomitra seem to be in complete agreement in maintaining that the *Abhidharmakośa* presents in a concise and systematic manner the central ideas of the primary Abhidharma texts which are now lost to the Sanskrit tradition.

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[12] Obermiller, E., "The Doctrine of Prajñāpāramitā as exposed in the Abhisamayālamkāra of Maitreya," *Acta Orientalia*, 11, 1933, pp. 81-82.

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[14] *Bṛhadaranyaka Upaniṣad*, 2.3.1.

[15] *Maitri Upaniṣad*, 7.2.8.

[16] Eliade, Mircea, "Time and Eternity in Indian Thought," *Man and Time*, ed. Joseph Campbell, New York, 1957, p. 178.

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[18] ibid.

[19] Mol, Hans, *Identity and the Sacred*, Oxford, 1976, p. 15.

[20] Further implications of this perspective for consciousness and the temporal process will be worked out in detail at a later stage. see *infra*, chap. 9.

[21] For a detailed treatment of the three philosophical alternatives, see Sallis John, "Time, Subjectivity, and the Phenomenology of Perception," *The Modern Schoolman*, 48, 1971, pp. 347-57. The treatment of the subject in this section draws upon the conceptual apparatus proposed in this paper.

[22] Merleau Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, trans. Colin Smith, New York, 1962, p. 414.

[23] ibid.

[24] Sallis, John, op. cit., p. 351,

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PART I

SĀṀKHYA-YOGA

CHAPTER 2

SĀṀKHYA-YOGA ONTOLOGY AND THE NATURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS

THE CENTRAL ASSUMPTIONS

The present analysis is primarily concerned with articulating the basic ontological perspective of Sāṁkhya-Yoga, which is of crucial significance for developing an understanding of the Sāṁkhya-Yoga analysis of the structure and constitution of temporality. What we understand by the structure and constitution of temporality and how are we to relate it with the nature and structure of consciousness as such is a question that will constantly be present as part of our investigation. Indeed, this is by no means conceivably a settled question for the enterprise of philosophical thinking. Its elusiveness for conceptual clarity constitutes both the rationale and the impetus of the present analysis.[1]

However, it is our contention that a systematic articulation of Sāṁkhya-Yoga's exposition of this dimension of the problem will help to put certain basic concerns of the philosophical thinking in their proper perspective and will be of immense help in developing a philosophical understanding of this crucial problem. More specifically, Sāṁkhya-Yoga's contribution to the understanding of the problem of temporality and its relationship to the transcendental consciousness will constitute the subject-matter of our discussion in the concluding section of this part.

Given this understanding of our task we have to spell out at the very outset what tends to be the distinguishing feature of Sāṁkhya-Yoga ontology. It is only then that a methodologically valid and philosophically sound investigation of the problem of temporality can be undertaken. Such an attempt will inevitably involve delimiting the ontological problems[2] that we consider to be significantly related to the problem of temporality.

For the purpose of this study, it is crucial that we make a distinction between the classical and pre-classical Sāṁkhya-Yoga. The line of demarcation consists of the systematic exposition of the classical Sāṁkhya thought in the *Sāṁkhya Kārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa and of classical yoga in the *Yoga Sūtra* of Patanjali. The treatment of Sāṁkhya Yoga in the literature pre-dating *Sāṁkhya Kārikā* and *Yoga Sūtra* is excluded from our purview. On the other hand, later commentorial literature (*Bhāṣya* and *Vyākhyās*) on *Sāṁkhya Kārikā* and Yoga Sūtra are considered as representing a continuous tradition of the classical Sāṁkhya-Yoga thought. As integral to this classical Sāṁkhya Yoga tradition are considered other later texts and treatises following the first formulation of the basic tenets of the school of thought in the two primary texts mentioned, the justification being that they maintain allegiance to the basic ontological perspectives of the classical tradition.

Over the question of the homogeneity of Sāṁkhya-Yoga tradition, which is the presupposition of the present work, it may not be out of place to make some comments. True, the exact relationship between the pre-classical Sāṁkhya and Yoga remains a matter of pure conjecture. While Sāṁkhya itself seems to contain the two trains of thought: theistic and non-theistic, Yoga always retains the theistic slant. There is no such a thing as atheistic Yoga. However, it is our contention that despite its unmistakable theistic leaning the classical Yoga did not differ fundamentally on the basic question of the nature of *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* and their interrelationship. The present investigation concentrates primarily on this dimension of Sāṁkhya and Yoga systems. The questions of temporality, i.e., the determination of man's existence by the consciousness of the temporal distinctions and its consequences for the reflecting self, falls within the realm of the interrelationship between the *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti*. And in this respect the differences between the two systems is inconsequential. Thus, in this study we have justifiably considered the systems of Sāṁkhya and Yoga as integral and have not addressed ourselves to the question of the possibility of the differences which may be derived from terminological or nominal distinctions.

ONTOLOGY OF CONSCIOUSNESS : THE SĀMKHYA-YOGA PERSPECTIVE

While it is definitely true that the Sāṁkhya-Yoga figures among the earliest of the metaphysical endeavours of Hindu system-building, it is our assumption that Sāṁkhya-Yoga, also transcends the limitations of the traditional Hindu metaphysics[3] by focusing its investigation to that realm which may conveniently be described as the realm of immanent experiences.[4] Of course, in making this claim the present author asks for a critical understanding of Sāṁkhya-Yoga's philosophical investigations demanding a radical departure from the commonly accepted interpretation of Sāṁkhya-Yoga's analysis of the basic issues of human existence. It is the author's conviction that Sāṁkhya-Yoga is primarily an attempt at a transcendental analysis of the facts of human experience[5] : As an analysis it steers clearly away from the issues which demand either an *a priori* decision about the nature of reality or alternately ask for a mere speculative understanding of the status of being. What is accepted as the point of departure is only the fact of human experience. From this is set out a programme leading to an understanding of the essence of being precisely in the context of the realm of consciousness. The concern here is with (what may be described in phenomenological idiom) the eidetic structures of being or its essences which are universally valid and are openly available to the reflecting consciousness which cares to reflect upon itself. The phenomenological overtones of this understanding of the basic task of Sāṁkhya-Yoga is not entirely a superimposition of modern mind; they may be seen to emanate from the basic ontological concerns of the Sāṁkhya-Yoga philosophers.

With these observations regarding the basic assumptions and the direction that the present analysis will tend to follow, we may now embark upon the task of a comprehensive understanding of Sāṁkhya-Yoga ontology. However, we look upon our task not merely as an attempt at cataloguing these tenets of the Sāṁkhya-Yoga thought which seem to corroborate our understanding of the basic philosophical task. Our interpretation of Sāṁkhya-Yoga will seek to bring to the fore the meaning structures and thought patterns of Sāṁkhya-Yoga literature in tune with the demands of the logic of the system itself. Such being our concern the enterprise will inevitably involve certain amount of conceptual clarification especially in view of the confusions and the mystique that seem to surround the meaning of Sāṁkhya-Yoga. This will also involve re-constructing Sāṁkhya-Yoga thought in the light of our findings by providing the missing links. We do not look upon philosophical analysis and investigation as an anatomical autopsy which is primarily interested in identifying the specific fissures or elements of the organism. Indeed, philosophical investigation is aliving, ongoing process of creative understanding directed towards a better comprehension of the problems of human existence.

The Sāṁkhya-Yoga analysis of the problem of the existence and nature of being proceeds from a recognition of the contradictions involved in the natural or the phenomenal realm, i.e., that which is immediately perceived (*dṛṣṭvad*). Both the perceptible world (*dṛṣṭvad*) as well as the one grounded in testimony are equally inadequate in resolving the basic contradictions. To Sāṁkhya-Yoga way of thinking both belong to the realm of impurity, destruction and excesses (*aviśuddhikṣayātiśayayuktaḥ*). The reflecting consciousness is required to renounce this mode of understanding and rise to a more radical understanding or a discriminative awareness of the manifest (*vyakta*), the unmanifest (*avyakta*) and the knowing one or knower (i.e., *puruṣa*).[6]

> The revealed (testified means) are like the visible (i.e., inefficient), for they are connected with impurity, destruction and excess. A contrary method is better, and this consists in a discriminative knowledge of the Manifested (forms of world), the Unmanifested (*prakṛti*), and the knowing (self).

This demand for a radical departure from the pre-conceived notions and prevalent conceptions of reality occurs on the level of cognitional analysis conceived as an analysis of the structure of experience. The Sāṁkhya-Yoga prefers to shift the focus of philosophical investigation from the question of the status and being of the world as such (of the seen variety as well as of the one accepted on trust) to the question of the status and being of the world that is given to us in direct experience. The first datum for the self-reflecting self is nothing but the fact of consciousness which constitutes the ultimate point of departure and the basis, as well as the existential foundation, of our understanding of the real world. The real world is not denied but is accepted as existing side by side with consciousness.[7]

The express concern of Sāṁkhya-Yoga, therefore, is not to ascertain the mode of being of the real world its objects whose existence it does not question but takes for granted. Its primary concern is rather to conduct a transcendental inquiry into the domain of pure consciousness in order to determine (1) the mode of being of pure consciousness and (2) to discern the mode of the givenness of the world in immediate experience. This aspect of Sāṁkhya-Yoga investigation we call transcendental. Now an enquiry is transcendental precisely in the sense that,

> It does not resolve the question of the existence of the world through its being directed towards the characteristics of the world, but in that it takes the domain of pure experience as its point of departure, and attempts, as if by an indirect route, to find the cognitive foundation for the admission of the existence every object - of the real world in particular in the actual state and in the essence of the course of and activities of consciousness.[8]

It is important to note that it is by contrasting both the regions of being (world and consciousness), and discovering concurrently that one of them, the pure consciousness, is given in immanent perception, which guarantees its existence completely beyond doubt, Sāṁkhya-Yoga also points to the method by which the whole question of ontology should be discovered. Ontological and epistemological problems are not two disparate problems. The problem of the existence and nature of being is not derivative in relation to the cognitional considerations; rather both constitute a continuum whereby one overlaps the other and cannot be considered in isolation from it. The *raison-de-etre* for Sāṁkhya-Yoga's involvement with epistemological problems is to be found in its acceptance of both the existential and operational priority of consciousness over the world. Sāṁkhya-Yoga correctly looks at the ontological and epistemological questions in their intrinsic relationship. For the sake of methodological clarity the system attempts to delimit the two realms and discuss the epistemological question as a way back to the fundamental question of ontology which seem to have been obscured by the metaphysicians.

To our way of thinking, the Sāṁkhya-Yoga, in and through a radical approach to the problem of being attempts to comprehend the essence of being in the immediate givenness on the level of consciousness. In Interpreting the system in this way, we are not departing from the spirit and motivation underlying the basic formulation of the Sāṁkhya-Yoga thought. The evidence on which we propose to base our understanding is so conspicuous that one may even say that it is the vogue of an excessive metaphysical tradition of long and reputed standing associated with its name that obscures the original motivation of the Sāṁkhya-Yoga thought.

One striking evidence that readily suggests to our mind in this regard relates to the Sāṁkhya-Yoga doctrine of *Sarga.*[9] The Sāṁkhya philosophy admits 25 categories (*tattva*), which can be grouped into two broader categories, the Self (*Puruṣa*) and the not-Self (*Prakṛti*). It is through the Puruṣa's coming together (*sannidhi*) with the *Prakṛti* that the process of *Sarga* involving the emanation of the 23 categories originates. The *Prakṛti* along with that which is seen to be the modifications of the *Prakṛti* constitute the 24 categories :

Prakṛti (the primeaval ground of manifestation);
Mahat or *Buddhi* (the principle of intelligence);
Ahaṁkarā (the principle of egoity or I-ness);
Five *Tanmātras* (five subtle elements);
Manas (the mind);
Five *Jñānendriyas* (five organs of sense);
Five *Karmendriyas* (five organs of action);
Five *Mahābhuttas* (five gross elements).

The 23 categories (*tattvās*), which are also called modifications (*vikṛti*), are said to issue from the unmanifest ground (*avyakta Prakṛti*), when the *Prakṛti* comes in contact (*sannidhi*) with the *Puruṣa*, the principle of consciousness.

The Sāṁkhya-Yoga explication of this process of *Sarga* has usually been referred to, both in the traditional and modern understanding of the system, as an account of the description of the process of evolution in cosmological terms. The doctrine of *Sarga*, according to the generality of such understanding, invariably refers to 'evolution' understood in strictly cosmological sense.[10] Thus, *Sarga* has been seen as a process of 'evolution,' leading through successive stages (emergence of 23 tattvas being a product of these stages), to the final emergence of the manifest world (*Vyakta*). However, we submit that the understanding of *Sarga* doctrine in strict cosmological terms is susceptible to the charge of misinterpretation. The following considerations may be offered in support of the possibility of a non-cosmological interpretation of *Sarga* doctrine :

1. What is required is what may in contrast be termed as phenomenological understanding of the process. The emphasis should not be on the various stages in the evolution of the cosmos or the world but on the structure of the consciousness in and through which the world is manifested.[11] Sāṁkhya-Yoga theory of *Sarga* acquires a new meaning and a somewhat different orientation if approached from this angle. It is a description of the structural arrangements of the field of the consciousness (*kṣetra*) which the knower of the field (*kṣetrajña*) discovers when it reflects upon itself. The world is perceived as world only as consciousness reflects as what is aware (*kṣetrajña*) of the world.

2. If Sāṁkhya-Yoga theory of *Sarga* is to be interpreted as a theory of cosmological evolution then we run into the problem of explaining quantitative multiplicity of evolution. Since there is a plurality of *Puruṣas* and since evolution starts if and only if the Puruṣa comes into contact with the *Prakṛti*,[12] there must be a multiplicity of the world that so evolves because there will be different evolution for each *Puruṣa*. But obviously this is not the case according to Sāṁkhya-Yoga. While Sāṁkhya-Yoga accepts the plurality of *Puruṣas* it does not subscribe to the view asserting a similar plurality of universes; instead it admits one common cosmos as the common referential point of all *Puruṣas*.

3. Sāṁkhya-Yoga understanding of the *Vyakta-Avyakta* appears somewhat baffling if seen in terms of the evolutionary interpretations of the *Sarga* doctrine. *Prakṛti* is the (unmanifest) *Avyakta*, the material ground of all manifestations of the world and its object (*Vyakta*). According to this interpretation the *Avyakta-Prakṛti* includes in itself the potentiality of all things in the manifest world, both mental and physical. Thus *Avyakta-Prakṛti* is not looked upon as the world but the ground of this manifest world. The 23 principles evolved from Prakṛti are considered as constituting the actual manifest world (*Vyakta*).[13] In this way of looking at Prakṛti in relation to the world one important circumstance which accounts for the precise difference between what is unmanifest and its manifestation seems to be overlooked. The distinction is one of not-being or being in relation to consciousness. *Prakṛti* as *Avyakta* refers to the world of objectivity which has not opened itself up to the presence of consciousness, (*Puruṣa*). And *Vyakta* is the manifest world precisely in the sense that it is the correlate of consciousness. *Vyakta* does not mean the world that is present

out there as opposed to the witnessing consciousness but it is precisely the world of the witnessing consciousness. All the so-called evolutes are not the product of the prakṛti in the usual sense of product. They are to be understood in a very special sense of being the structure of manifestation, the mechanisms through which the world unfolds itself in terms of increasing differentiation to the witnessing consciousness.

4. The first category in the Sāṁkhya-Yoga scheme is *Mahat* or *Buddhi* which is the locus of I-ness or *Ahaṁkāra*. To conceive the Sāṁkhya-Yoga analysis of Sarga in cosmological terms will necessitate an assertion of a Cosmic Intelligence or Buddhi as the first principle of the manifest world of transcendent objectivities. To be sure, such an assertion has been ascribed to Sāṁkhya-Yoga in certain sections of scholarship.[14] But such assertions imply overlooking of Sāṁkhya-Yoga's basic concern with the individual nature of consciousness. Consciousness, for Sāṁkhya-Yoga, is always individual and not an abstract or Absolute principle transcending the individual consciousness. While pure consciousness or *Puruṣa* is individual but not personal, ego or I-consciousness is included in the *Buddhi-Ahaṁkāra* structure. Thus what is commonly considered to be self-consciousness or ego is understood in Sāṁkhya-Yoga to be other than the "*Puruṣa*." Neither of the two, the pure consciousness and the Ego, need be conceived in mere cosmological terms as referring to some world-soul or an Absolute consciousness. The element of individuality is integral to the meaning of consciousness.[15]

The important question that arises in this context is : what is the exact nature of pure consciousness or *Puruṣa* and in what way is it related to empirical consciousness or the psycho-physical conglomeration in the conception of the I-principle. For Sāṁkhya, *Puruṣa* or pure consciousness is what is precisely not characterized by the dispersions and the atomisms characteristic of the world and of the empirical consciousness in which the world is present. Instead of being the agent of action and volition, it is mere witness or spectator of the drama involving willing and activity. It is in a condition of intrinsic isolation from all the manifestations of the world both mental and physical.[16] The best way to comprehend the essence of Puruṣa is to look at it as a mere fact of consciousness.

> It (*Puruṣa*) is the fact of man's experience which is apart from all of his feeling, inclinations, impulses, etc. It is the fact of man's

experience which provides the basic for his freedom precisely because it is not a part of or determined by the world. By referring to *Puruṣa* as the simple fact of consciousness apart from all thought, feeling, etc., this also brings to mind such terms as transparent or translucent. It is only by the 'light' of *Puruṣa* that one sees the world, and it is only the fact of the world which renders Puruṣa aware of itself. The fact of consciousness and the fact of the world are two irreducible realities.[17]

Buddhi along with *Ahaṁkāra* and *Manas* constitute the principle around which the whole personal world is centred.[18] This is the 'I'-principle in the proper sense of the term. And it is this 'I' or the empirical Ego that according to Sāṁkhya-Yoga is the active willing subject of our conscious state.[19] It is this 'I' that posits an attitude and relates itself to the world around itself precisely because the emergence of this 'I'-principle coincides with the moment of the encounter of the world and pure consciousness. Apart from the active spontaneous willing dimension there is also the passive aspect, as may be seen in the circumstance that it is also the recipient of sense data to which it reacts.[20] The personal or the empirical ego is then both 'spontaneous' and 'quiescent,' but in both the aspects it retains the intentional dimension of consciousness since it remains the subject of reference or the subject of intentionality. In the last analysis this empirical subject is essentially the subject of all intentionality and is not to be confused with what is given within the field of its consciousness.

Thus the empirical consciousness is related in cognition to its surrounding world to things and beings which it experiences. The subject bears a necessary reference or relation to object, just as the object stands defined by being in relationship to the subject. The subject is in passive or active relation to object, which is present to the subject as the terminal point of reference. Thus in relation to the personal subject of intentionality, the object in the environment functions as "object" for it. This relation itself is, of course, not external, i.e., as between two terms in relationship, but one of intentionality. Viewed from the side of the object (*prakṛti*) it signifies that the intended object (*prayojya*) motivates the subject (*prayojaka*).

It may thus be seen that the personal subject, i.e., the 'I', is world-involved by definition. It is the subject and the agent in actual or potential relation with the "object," which is either the object of knowledge or 'acquisitive' of action. The question that arises here may be : how does the world-involved 'I' stand in relation to pure consciousness ? What is the relation between consciousness which may be called the transcendental subject (*Puruṣa*) and the personal subject (*Buddhi Ahaṁkāra* structure) ?

We have seen that the empirical ego for Sāṁkhya-Yoga constitutes the essence of the 'I'-ness which is the centre of all positing of attitudes. What is significant about this dimension of existence, i.e., existence of empirical ego, the 'I'-ness is that it serves as the pole which exercises specific acts of positing, and also what is posited, i.e., the object of such positing. So far as this personal Ego is the 'I' of the positing attitudes[21] the world that is posited by the I also proves to be the result of the decision of the subject.

But then the question arises: are the empirical ego (*Buddhi-Ahaṁkāra* structure) and the transcendental subject (*Puruṣa*) two mutually exclusive and distinct principles ? The immediate answer seems to be "yes" for the two are supposed to belong to two different realms. But, on closer examination, it appears that the distinction is more of operational nature than one of the thematic. "I" as a person, and as such belonging to the world of fellow-being and having a world around is in point of essence, the same "I" as the transcendental subject. It is the point of view concerned that separates the two kinds of approaches to the self-same principle. On purely transcendental analysis, the ego sets itself as the "transcendental ego," as the final point of reference which on further analysis may be seen to be the absolute region of pure consciousness, the source of all meaning of being. But when the position of the same transcendental subject is sought to be determined from the point of view of fact or actuality—the position in terms of concrete man and his surrounding world—the same transcendental ego appears to assume the form of the personal, empirical ego. Seen from the perspective of the actual existing person, so far as the latter consciously posits itself in positing attitudes, it is the empirical ego considered in itself, without the perspective it is promoted to the level of transcendental subject. In the mode of discriminative awareness (*viveka*) the world involved person, i.e., the one who acts, motivates and refers to the world, himself is what may be called the transcendental ego (*Puruṣa*). It is not a case of transformation of the one into the other. There are no two existentially distinct entities. The world-involved person in his unreflective attitude proves to be the centre of all positing of attitudes. But the same one in his reflection, i.e., when he reflects on his world involvement, instead of positing attitude towards the world, is the transcendental subject. Thus it may be seen that the personal empirical ego itself provides the key to the transcendental ego-hood of the subject. 'I', namely the person (*Ahaṁkāra*) is given as the object of reflective self apperception in the very wake of the development of the empirical perception of 'I'-ness (the *Sarga* being the process of this development). The stream of experience as pure consciousness is also at once the process by which the pure subject assumes the apperceptive form of the personal ego.

This way of looking at the relationship between the transcendental subject and the empirical ego may be questioned from the perspective of a purely cosmological approach to the meaning of Sāṁkhya-Yoga. It may be asked : how the two subjects respectively referred to as pure consciousness and the one which is an evolute of *Prakṛti*, be in principle one and the same ? The two belong to the two radically different and opposed realms of being[22] so that it is not conceivable that they are identical. The objection rests on the traditional understanding of the Sāṁkhya-Yoga as embodying a doctrine of evolution. The empirical ego is a product of real evolutionary process in the course of which it emerges from the womb of undifferentiated mass called *Prakṛti*. What seems overlooked in this interpretation is the emergence of empirical subject as a specific moment in the dialectical relationship between the fact of consciousness and the fact of the world. The so-called evolution or the *Sarga* is a figurative way of contemplating the fact of the givenness of the world in the immediate or original experience. Of course this fact remains dormant till consciousness stands in a reflective relationship to itself. It is only in and through objectification of consciousness that the true structure of the givenness of the pure consciousness can be grasped. The *Sāṁkhya-yoga* has made this point very clear.

The *Sāṁkhya Kārikā* is quite specific on the question of the functional difference but substantive identity of the empirical subject and the transcendental ego. The fact of the substantive identity is clearly assumed in the passages enlisting the grounds for the existence and plurality of selves (*Puruṣas*). A careful reading of the text shows that the transcendental subject and the empirical ego are existentially determined by the same set of factors. It is on the same considerations that the existence of *Puruṣa* as the transcendental ground of all conscious willing and activity is established.

To explain. The argument offered by the Sāṁkhya in favour of the existence of the *Puruṣa* runs as follows:[23]

1. Since the combinations (things existing as aggregation of three guṇas) must have another as the one whose purpose is served, and since there must be something different from the three guṇas, there exists Puruṣa as this other (*saṁghāta-parārthatvāt-trigunādi-viparyayād*).
2. Since, there must be control (of the world of things constituted of guṇas) there must be a presiding power or controlling being, that being is Puruṣa (*adhiṣṭhānāt*).
3. Because there must be someone to experience and enjoy, that experiencer is *Puruṣa* (*bhoktṛ-bhāvāt*).
4. Since there is the activity for the same of isolation or freedom there is *Puruṣa* who is free (*kaivalyārtham*).

The arguments adduced for the plurality of the *Puruṣa* must be read in conjunction with what has been stated earlier. There is plurality of *Puruṣas*;[24]

1. because there is separate regulation of birth, death and faculties;
2. because activities or functions (of beings) do not occur simultaneously; and
3. because beings differ on account of varying *guṇas* (attributes).

Thus, the main argument for plurality is based on the fact of natural diversity inherent in three *guṇas* (attributes or aspects). Vācaspati Miśra puts it in these words:

> The diversity or differentiation due to the distribution of the *guṇas* in the various entities, could not be explained if the *Puruṣas* were one and the same in all. On the hypothesis of plurality, however, there is no difficulty.

It is interesting to note that in all these arguments offered for the existence and plurality of the *Puruṣa*, the transcendental subject, it is assumed as if it were existentially identical with the empirical ego.[25] Not only this, but Sāṁkhya-Yoga also goes even to the extent of implying admission of *Sukṣma Śarīra* (subtle body) constituted of the empirical subject as the vehicle of the transcendental ego.[26] Moreover the existential equation of the transcendental ego and the empirical ego is further assumed in the Sāṁkhya-Yoga postulation of dialectical understanding of their relationship. While empirical ego or *Buddhi* is regarded as mirroring the luminosity and the consciousness structure of the transcendental subject,[27] the *Puruṣa*, it in its turn also may be said to depend on the self-reflection of the *Buddhi* to understand and comprehend the essential difference between itself and the world of *Prakṛti*.[28] It seems to us that this orientation of Sāṁkhya-Yoga understanding of reality with respect to the question of existence necessitates conceiving of the relationship between the transcendental and the empirical subject in dialectical terms.[29]

Sāṁkhya-Yoga does not concern itself with the absolute rupture between the world and the self; its point of departure is always the self in the world, the one that experiences the contradictions of the world, but at the same time is capable of transcending them by remaining neutral to it.

In viewing the personal ego (*Buddhi*) in the context of its development the other moment of the ego besides that of the higher stage of free transcendental subject, i.e., the subject of free act of witnessing, has also to be considered. The character of this so-called "unfree ego" is grounded in the passivity of sensuousness, i.e., natural dispositions, etc. Thus the transcendental subject or the spiritual 'I'—in the specific sense of the subject of autonomous acts of witnessing—finds itself dependent on a dark background of natural dispositions.

Here we should take note of the fact that Sāṁkhya-Yoga makes a clear distinction between the neutrality of Puruṣa and the passivity of Manas. Spirit or *Puruṣa* is the foundational ground of all conscious acts and Prakṛti exists for the sake of *Puruṣa*, for it is to the transcendental subject that the world orients itself and for which the world exists.[30] As such it stands ever against *Manas* (mind) at the lower stage of sensibility. It must however be noted that at the same time, for Sāṁkhya-Yoga the *Manas* or mind of the lower sense level is one with the empirical subject of attitude, the *Buddhi*. Both form an unbroken empirical unity. And it is precisely at this level that the problem of temporality becomes enigmatic.

Buddhi-Ahaṁkara structure, according to Sāṁkhya-Yoga, is both created and creative. It is the structure of world-involvement as well as the possibility of world-transcendence.

It is temporal, both in the sense that it has a beginning and an end as well as that it is the basic condition for the cognition of things in their temporal mode of being. In and through cognition the Buddhi-Ahaṁkāra structure constitutes temporality as well as it is constituted as temporal. The temporal order on the phenomenal level is a conscious creation of the empiric subject (*Buddhi-Ahaṁkāra* structure). Time-order as the principle of continuity is constituted by the empiric subject (*Buddhi parikalpita*). Time is nothing but the relational mode of being (sambandhamātropakāri); and as such is a function of *Buddhi* (the empiric subject). But in the constitution of the temporal structure the empiric subject does not act as a principle independent of the objective flow or the flux of events characteristic of the world of change. The empiric subject, in the world involvement, is out and out-temporal.

What we see in the empiric subject as the principle of change and creativity (*vikṛta*) is an essential drive, a lived tension and a continuous turning to new events and activities. As temporal, the empiric subject does not merely observe the flow of temporal events, but it participates in it. Thus the empiric subject (*Buddhi-Ahaṁkāra* structure) both constitutes and is constituted in and through temporal becoming. However, essentially temporal, the empiric subject is also the basic condition for the transcendence of temporality. Transcendence of temporality is a function of *Viveka* (discriminate knowledge). *Viveka* is the mode of cognitive awareness of the essential 'thisness' of *Puruṣa* (pure consciousness as unchanged and unmoved) and *Prakṛti* (the permanent ground of all change and movement.

The transcendence of temporality is possible through *viveka* (the discriminative knowledge), a function of *Buddhi*. *Viveka* is the mode of cognitive awareness of the 'thisness' of *Puruṣa* (pure consciousness as unchanged and unmoved) and *Prakṛti* (the permanent ground of all change and movement). Thus, *Buddhi* is both the structure of world involvement as temporal as well as the condition of world transcendence as eternity. More on this later.

REFERENCES

[1] Problem of time has been one of the urgent concerns of Philosophical investigation in both the western and eastern traditions. For a concise but

comprehensive analysis of the problematic of time in the history of western thought refer to Fraser, J.T., "The Concept of Time in Western Thought," *Main Currents*, 25, Mr-Ap. 72, pp. 115-24.

For an excellent and insightful approach to the problem of Time within India philosophical tradition see Pannikar, Raymond, *Philosophy: East and West*, Vol. 24, no. 2, April 1974.

[2] The present work does not look at philosophical investigation as an attempt at compartmentalization of issues. Rather, the metaphysical, epistemological and ontological problems are seen in an intricate and complex interrelationship. The ontological problems are seen to play an important role in articulating the basic issues which revolve around the Sāṁkhyan delimitation of the realm of consciousness and the world. see Larson, G.J., *Classical Sāṁkhya*, p. 230.

[3] The *Nyāya Sūtra* of Gautama and the *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra* of Kaṇāda may be cited as examples of providing categorial schemes typifying 'Hindu' metaphysical traditions. The ontic approach characteristic of these traditions may be contrasted with the existential-ontological nature of the enquiry with which *Sāṁkhya Kārikā* commences its treatment.

[4] Expressions and notions like *Svataḥgrāhyatva* (spontaneous apprehension of validity), Sen Gupta, Anima, *Classical Sāṁkhya*, 1969, p. 70, are instances in point.

[5] Here attention is drawn to the underlying supposition of the introductory *kārikās*. Proceeding from the fact of suffering as an integral part of the world of experience, the *kārikās* point to that which is beyond the givenness of experience. Experience presupposes the experiencer and the experienced. The experienced world is constantly undergoing change. This changing world of experience finds its ground in something which is of fundamental nature and is the transcendental basis of the experience of the world. It is not the existence of the world as such that is the concern of Sāṁkhya-Yoga analysis. Rather it is the world given in our experience that is the point of departure. (dṛṣṭavadānuśrāvikāh sa hy aviśuddhikṣayātiśayayuktaḥ tadviparītāh śreyān vyaktāvyaktajñāvijñānāt), *The Sāṁkhya Kārikā*, op. cit., Kārikā 2.

[6] dṛṣṭavad ānuśravikah sa hy aviśuddhiksayātiśayayuktaḥ tadviparītahśreyān vyaktāvyaktajñāvijñānāt, *The Sāṁkhya Kārikā*, op. cit., Kārikā 2.

[7] mulaprakrtiravikṛtirmahadādyāh prakṛtivikṛtayaḥ sapta ṣoḍaśakastu vikāro na prakṛtir na vikṛtiḥ puruṣaḥ, ibid. Kārikā 3.

[8] Ingaradenen, Roman, *Time and Modes of Being*, Springfield, 1964, p. 15.

[9] The term *Sarga* is derived from the root *sṛj* (to create) which is also the root of *Sṛsti* the Sanskrit term for world or universe as creation. The term carries with it the cosmic connotation. But within the Sāṅkhya-Yoga scheme of things the meaning of *Sarga* loses its strict cosmic reference and the term is used in a rather specific sense.

[10] see Radhakrishnan, S., *Indian Philosophy*, II, 1927, p. 226; Dasgupta, S.N., *A History of Indian Philosophy*, I, 1951, pp. 245-48; Mookerjee, Satkari, "The Sāṁkhya-Yoga" in *History of Philosophy Eastern and Western*, ed. S. Radhakrishnan, 1952; Hiriyana, M., "The Sāṅkhya" in *The Cultural Heritage of India*, III, ed. Haridas Bhattacharyya, 1969, pp. 41-52; Sen Gupta, Anima, op. cit., Hiriyana, M., *Popular Essays in Indian Philosophy*, 1952, p. 55.

[11] Larson, G.J., op. cit., p. 193.

[12] tasmāttat-saṁyogādacetanam cetanāvad iva liṅgam/guṇakartṛtve pi tathā karteva bhavatyudāsīnaḥ//puruṣasya darśanā'rtham kaivahyā'rtham tathā pradhānasya/paṅgvandhavadubhayorapi saṁyogastatkṛtah sargaḥ// *The Sāṁkhya Kārikā*, op. cit., Kārikās 20 and 21.

[13] Mookerjee, op. cit., p. 244.

[14] see Bhattacharya, K.C., *Studies in Philosophy*, I, 1956, pp. 195-96.

[15] *Mahat tattva*, the Great Principle, is intelligence in an individual sense which contains the possibility of the next evolute viz. *Ahaṁkāra*, the sense of personal individuality which in turn precedes man's psychic-empiric life consisting of the working of his senses and manas which is the precursor of the world of matter. The world of experience is the outcome of the 'Puruṣa' confronting himself with the 'Prakṛiti,' i.e., the permanent possibility of pleasure, pain and dullness of knowledge, action and even inertness (contrary to the belief that the world issues from prakriti as effect does from cause and that puruṣa as a teleological factor comes into picture as an after-thought).

[16] tasmācca viparyāsāt siddham sākṣitvaṁ asya purusaṣya kaivalyam mādhyasthyam draṣṭṛtvam akartṛ-bhāvaśca. *The Sāṁkhya Kārikā*, op. cit., Kārikā 19.

[17] Larson, J.G., op. cit., p. 185.

[18] Antaḥkaraṇam trividhamiti buddhyahaṁkāramanasām grahaṇam etat trividhamantaḥ karaṇasamjñitam. *The Māṭharāvṛtti*, op. cit., p. 49; sāntaḥkaraṇetyādi buddherupāttatvāccesamahaṁkāro manaśchāntaḥkaraṇam/tābhyām yukta buddhiḥ. *The Jayamangalā*, op. cit., p. 41.

[19] Antaḥkaraṇasya tadujjvalitatvāllohavadadhiṣṭhātṛtvam. *The Sāṁkhya Pravacana Sūtra*, op. cit., I. 99.

[20] *The Sāṁkhya Kārikā*, op. cit., 35, 23 and 24.

[21] *The Sāṁkhya Kārikā*, op. cit., Kārikā 23 and 24.

[22] Radhakrishnan, S., op. cit., pp. 287-291; also, Mookerjee, Satkari, op. cit., pp. 242-257.

[23] saṅghātaparārthatvāt triguṇādiviparyayāḍ/puruṣesti. bhoktṛbhāvāt kaivalyārthaṁ pravṛtteśca. *The Sāṁkhya Kārikā*, op. cit., Kārikā 17.

[24] Jananamaranakaraṇānaṁ pratiniyamādayugapatpravṛtteśca puruṣabahutvaṁ siddhaṁ traiguṇyaviparyayāccaiva. ibid, 18.

[25] *Tattva Kaumudī* by Vācaspatimiśra, op. cit., p. 66.

[26] *The Sāṁkhya Kārikā* distinguishes between three kinds of bodies: subtle (*sūkṣama*), born of parents (*mataprtṛjaḥ*) and the body of gross elements (prabhutais). Only sūkṣama body is constant or permanent, i.e., which passes from birth and acts as the vehicle of consciousness. Others are perishable. see *Sāṁkhya Kārikā*, op. cit., Kārikā 39; also the *Sāṁkhya Pravacana Sūtra*, op. cit., 3.16; *Jayamangala* on Kārikā 39, op. cit., p. 44; and *Maṭharavṛtti* on Kārikā 39, p. 53.

[27] Catalina, F.V., *A Study of the Self Concept of Sāṁkhya-Yoga Philosophy*, p. 68.

[28] sarvaṁ pratyupabhogaṁ yasmāt puruṣasya sādhayati buddhih/saiva ca viśinaṣṭi punaḥ pradhānapuruṣāntaraṁ sūkṣmam. *The Sāṁkhya Kārikā*, op. cit., 37; Kṛtsnam puruṣasyārtham prakāśya buddhau prayacchanti. ibid, 36.

[29] see Commentaries on Kārikā 36.....,puruṣasyārtham sukṣmasthūla viṣayalakṣaṇam prakāśyābhivyaktim nītva...,tasyām ca viṣayopādhānoparaktāyam buddhau puruṣa upalabhate. tatredamucyate-buddhyadhyavasitamartham puruṣaścetayata iti. *Jayamangalā*, op. cit., p. 42.

[30] itya eṣa prakṛtikṛto mahadādiviśeṣabhūtaparyantaḥ/pratipuruṣavimokṣārtham svartham iva parārtha ārambhaḥ//vatsavivṛddhinimittaṁ ksīrasya yathā pravṛttirajñasya/puruṣavimoksanimittaṁ tathā pravṛttiḥ pradhānasya//autsukyanivṛttyarthaṁ yathā kriyāsu pravartatelokah/puruṣasya vimokṣārtham pravartate tadvadavyaktam//*The Sāṁkhya Kārikā*, op. cit., 56, 57, 58.

CHAPTER 3

TIME AND TEMPORALITY IN SĀṀKHYA-YOGA

THE CATEGORY OF TIME: GROUNDS FOR ITS REJECTION

The Sāṁkhya-Yoga ontology can be best grasped in the context of the relationship of mutual otherness between the real world and the cognising subject. Real objects belonging to the real world are distinguished by the fact that they can be, at least in principle, given originally to the cognising subject. This subject knows them through a number of conscious acts of a determinate kind, namely through acts of direct "experiencing." Direct experiencing remains the touchstone of objective reality is Sāṁkhya-Yoga understanding of the world.[1] Time as a single, all-pervading objective reality, if it were to be admitted, must be experienced directly. The question that Sāṁkhya-Yoga asks is : where is the experiential basis for admitting a single, infinite all-pervasive time ? What is given in direct experience is the fact of change. While admitting the reality of change in the real world, and also granting that the fact of change is universal, the Sāṁkhya-Yoga philosophers do not find it necessary to admit the existence and independent reality of time as the ground of all change.[2] The postulation of Time as an independent reality is based upon a misunderstanding of the nature of change. According to Sāṁkhya-Yoga the acceptance of time as an independent reality, providing the ground for continuity and succession accounting for the relation of priority and posteriority, is gratuitous. There is no such thing as an infinite all-pervasive time.[3] The notion of an infinite dimension extending through the phases of past, present and future, without beginning and end is a fictitious construction of *Buddhi*.[4]

According to Sāṁkhya-Yoga, the idea of a trancendental or objective time is not the constitutive ground of all temporal determination in our cognition of an object. On the contrary, it is the very product of our experience or cognition of "limitedness" intrinsic to all the objects present within the field of the experiencing subject. Thus the idea of time must be conceived in the context of the 'finitude' or the 'limitedness' of actions or events. Whatever has a beginning and end, according to Sāṁkhya-Yoga, is finite or limited. We find that various events that take place within the purview of the experiencing subject, are essentially limited in this specific sense. Thus according to *Yuktidīpikā* "time is the means of conceiving such limited existence or persistence of events" (kriyānām viśiṣta-avadhi-svarupa-pratyaya-nimittattvam).[5]

The denial or non-acceptance of the so-called transcendent Time as the eternal background of all temporal determinations remains the running theme throughout the deliberations of Sāṁkhya-Yoga philosophers. The reality of a unitary Time is only a thought construct whose essential unreality is disclosed to the reflective self only in the moment of self-reflection. Accordingly, then, the discriminative self comprehends the true essence of the moment, and in the process also knows what it is that the self in the natural setting tends to identify as the transcendent background of all temporal determinations.

It comes to see that it is the sequence of the moments that gives rise to the notion of a continuous Time, ubiquitous and one. As Vyāsa puts it:

> The continuous flow of these (moments) is a sequence (*krama*). Moments and the sequence of these cannot be combined into a real (*vastu*). Thus time being of this nature does not correspond to anything real, but is a product of mind, and follows as a result of (knowledge) by words; but the moment is objective and rests on the sequence. The sequence (*krama*) has for its essence an uninterrupted succession of moments which is called Time (*kāla*) by experts.[6]

To argue that pure time notions are ultimately dependent on our experience of finitude or limitedness is another way of saying that time does not have an independent status. It is not admitting the independent status of time. Without subscribing to the metaphysical position of accepting an independent reality of Time

Sāṁkhya-Yoga remains confined to its original intention of clarifying basic epistemological or cognitional problems as a way of explicating an original ontological perspective. Without positing the reality of Time as the explanatory factor, how do we explain our temporal concepts? What is the origin of our temporal concepts, and not positing the reality of Time, is the task to which it addresses itself:

> For our knowledge of anything we must ultimately refer to our experience. In our experience we find events or actions but never time as such. Therefore, we may say that pure or empty time as such is nothing nor is non-existent. It is nothing apart from actions or events that are revealed in experience. If it is anything it is one with them.[7]

The position stands in radical contrast to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika's[8] acceptance of Time as an eternal substance existing by itself, extending from the past through the present to the endless future.[9] True to their metaphysical realism, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy accords independent status to Time. Time is considered as essential to the concrete changes of nature, such as production, destruction and persistence of things. Arguing from the facts of motion and change in the perceptible world, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika concludes that since the discrete things are devoid of any power of self-improvement, the fact of change and motion requires positing an independent reality as the ground of the ordering of change and motion.[10] Thus, time is posited by Nyāya Vaiśeṣika as the independent real, pervading the whole universe and rendering ordered change and movement possible. The relations of priority and posteriority, simultaneity and non-simultaneity, as well as the notions of before and after have their basis in kāla.[11] For there is only one time which is omnipresent and possesses the character of individuation and the quality of conjunction and disjunction.[12]

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika looks at time as a substantive reality which is the eternal basis of all our experiences. Though time is never given in our perception it constitutes the objective ground of all our cognitions. Thus:

> According to Vaiśeṣika, time is said to have as its characteristic sign (by which its existence can be proved) the relation 'prior',

> posterior,' etc., (Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra 2.2.6), it is all-pervading, single, formless and for this reason, because it is not produced, eternal, different from activity, the dividing factor of things by means of activity such as creation, etc., (creation, existence, transformation, growth, decay, and destruction).[13]

It is in their understanding of the nature of change and its cognitions that the Sāṁkhya-Yoga and *Nyāya Vaiśeṣika* systems disagree fundamentally.[14] While both of them agree that the distinguishing feature of time determinations is the action or the activity that characterizes each moment of existence, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika regards association of activities with time as a limiting adjunct or a superimposition on the essentially unitary, indivisible reality of time. Against the Sāṁkhya-Yoga conception of the temporal determinations the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika would maintain that the distinction in time such as moments, etc., depends on some adjuncts (kṣaṇādih syādupādhitaḥ).[15]

The Sāṁkhya-Yoga point of view involving a rejection of the position of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is best maintained by Vyāsa. Vyāsa points out that the moment itself is conceivable as the absolute and irreducible unit and that apart from the reality of those moments, there is no infinite time. True, these moments are always presented to us together with the activity, admits Vyāsa, but it does not follow from this that they are determinations of unitary time in conjunction with this or that activity.[16]

It would be wrong to argue that moments determined by activity's association with time exists as parts existing in a whole. It is wrong because, as Vyāsa says, the two moments, by their very nature, cannot co-exist and hence a series of moments does not exist in reality. What constitutes the essence of order in time is not a unitary indivisible reality, nor is it the fact of antecedence and subsequence between the moment that is existent and the moment that has just ceased to be. Thus, a series of moments is an ideal construction. The intellect pieces together these discrete moments. There exists only one moment, the moment of present, which contains in it the moments of past and future, which are real but inexistent.[17] Vyāsa says:

> Just as atom is the smallest particle, similarly the moment (kṣaṇa) is the smallest limit of time. (Moment) is the period of time

taken by an atom to traverse the span between one point of space and the other. The continuous flow of these (moments) is a sequence (*krama*). However, there is no real (basis) for the combination of the moments and their sequence......(Thus), time has no real (objective) existence, it is only a creation of buddhi, and follows on account of knowledge by words......(However), the moment is objective (it has a basis in the real) and it is the basis (of ground) of sequence; the sequence (*krama*) consists in the continuous (uninterrupted) succession of moments, and it is this that is called time (*kāla*) by yogins who know time (its real nature).[18]

Now for *Sāṁkhya-Yoga*, activity, instead of being an external adjunct giving rise to our conceptions of temporal determinations, is the very mode of temporal being.[19] To be determined temporally, i.e., to be given in momentary existence is a special kind of being that constitutes the essence of autonomy of a temporal moment. The autonomy in this context refers to the fact that the cognition of a temporally determined being does not depend on the independent existence of unitary time as the eternal background of all such cognitions. Rather the existential autonomy of the moment consists in the very activity that constitute each moment of existence. In other words, temporal determinations are self-constituted in the process of cognition.

Objection may be raised that if temporal determination of moments is constituted in and through our cognitive process then how can one legitimately hold that the moment is the time taken by an atom to traverse its own unit of space as indeed Vyāsa clearly maintains. It is important to remember that in Sāṁkhya-Yoga understanding space does not refer to the objective space existing independently and transcendent to consciousness. Indeed both Time and Space as transcendent realities are mere abstractions. Space, according to Sāṁkhya-Yoga, is another name for the phenomenon manifesting itself in our immanent perceptions. The atom too, here, does not refer to physical atoms as such but to subtle elements (tanmātrās) as it were appearing to the consciousness.

The problem with Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is that it sees activity as somehow externally related to existence, so that it appears as an external adjunct. On the contrary, activity for Sāṁkhya-Yoga is the very mode of temporal existence. Existing temporally and being active are not two different modes of being, but are one and the same. If we accept the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika interpretation of activity as separate from existence and thereby standing in an independent relationship to existence then we are forced to postulate another category as the relational term that relates the activity with existence. This will inevitably lead us to an *regressus-ad-infinitum*. However, Sāṁkhya-Yoga by insisting on the ultimate inseparability of existence and activity is able to underscore a sharp-edged polemic against a realistic reification of time as transcendent to change and activity.

THE QUESTION OF ETERNAL AND EMPIRICAL TIME

Some commentators on Sāṁkhya-Yoga literature seem to suggest that the Sāṁkhya's theoretical position admits a distinction between eternal and empirical time. That, in other words, (at least according to some interpretations) Sāṁkhya also reifies time. Vijñānabhikṣu in his commentary on the *Sāṁkhya Sūtra* has suggested that the distinction between the eternal and empirical Time has been accepted by Sāṁkhya-Yoga. Thus he writes:

> Eternal space and time are of the form of *prakṛti*, or the root-cause of *ākāśa*, and are only the specific modification of *prakṛti*. Hence the universality of space and time is established. But these, space and time, which are limited, are produced from *ākāśa* through the conjunction of this or that limiting object (*upādhi*).[20]

Thus, according to Vijñānabhikṣu, there is a distinction between the eternal and omnipresent (all-pervading) Space and Time and the empirical space and time which appears to be limited and finite. The former appears to be of the nature of *ākāśa*, and are nothing but particular modifications of *Prakṛti*. On the other hand, the empirical Time which is limited and finite is produced from *ākāśa* and as such is an effect of *ākāśa*. The empirical Time is essentially *ākāśa* itself, but as particularized by this or that *upādhi*. Thus, the finite space and time are conceived as the qualities of *Prakṛti* and to be all-pervasive and eternal. The eternal time and space are conceived as the eternal background of our empirical notion of space and time.[21]

However, there is hardly any evidence in the classical Sāṁkhya-Yoga literature to lend support to this classification of Vijñānabhikṣu. Text does not offer any basis for introducing the category of eternal time and much less for an omnipresent, self-identical one to be contrasted from a limited and finite time due to the particularization of the former. We tend to agree with A.B. Keith when he maintains that any such distinction between the eternal and empirical time is inconsistent with the basic Sāṁkhya position. Expressing his disapproval of this approach he writes:

> "in the empiric world both (space and time) appear as limited, and are explained in a quite inconsistent way by origination from either (*Ākāśa*) through its qualification by the masses of corporeal nature on the one hand, in the case of space, and by the movement of the heavenly bodies in the case of time."[22]

It may be appropriate to look for the textual context in which the distinction between the Eternal and the Empirical time is proposed by Vijñānabhikṣu. It is in his commentary on the *Sāṁkhyasūtra* 2, 12 that Vijñānabhikṣu proposes the above distinction. The *Sūtra* states that the (notions of) "direction and time (arise) from *Ākāśa*" etc., (*dikkālāu ākāśādibhyaḥ*). Aniruddha proposes a less radical interpretation of this *Sūtra* than Vijñānabhikṣu, when he explains it in the following way: "It is *Ākāśa* itself which, by different *Upādhis* or external conditions, is denoted by the term Space and Time. They are therefore included in *Ākāśa*."[23] The explanation lacks in conviction as it does not sound plausible. Aside from the obscurity of the notion of *upādhi*, it fails to explain what these *upādhis* are that constitute such limitations on the *Ākāśa* causing it to give rise to space and time.

It seems to us that both Vijñānabhikṣu and Aniruddha tend to look at Sāṁkhya-Yoga understanding of *tattvas* in cosmological terms. The notion of eternal time is invoked to account for the cosmological procession of *tattvas* from the *Prakṛti*. It is perhaps this pre-occupation, one which he shares with many of his predecessors, responsible for concluding that the *sūtra* in question is concerned with the origin of the transcendental or eternal space and time. What the Sāṁkhya-Yoga seems really concerned with, in our way of understanding, is explaining the origination of the sense of time. The *Sūtra* under consideration can be understood as an attempt to explain at what specific moment in reflective consciousness the essence of the idea of space and time shows forth.[24]

The reflective self, reflecting on the given structure of extension[25] as what is implied in the idea of *ākāśa*, also recognizes that extension gives rise to the idea of space and time. The emergence of the idea of *Ākāśa* is the specific moment in the reflective consciousness when the true essence of temporality as the finitude of moments and their sequence (*krama*) is disclosed to the reflective self. The reflective self comes to see the structure of the sequence (*krama*) of moments as they are, i.e., as mere sequence of moments without any extension or duration, which it sees as being the essential mode of the being of *ākāśa*. It is precisely in this sense that the *Sūtra* seems to refer to *ākāśa* giving rise to the idea of Time and direction.

This fact is disclosed to the discriminative self only when it has come to grips with the essential structure of *ākāśa* as extension. Discrimination (*viveka*) is as much a reflective activity as the arising of the notion of time and space as a function of the *Buddhi*. Thus emergence of *Viveka* in the *Buddhi* is the termination of the process of *Sarga*. We will return to this point later. One final exegetical comment in this connection should not be out of place. The expression, etc., (*ādi*)[26] in the aphorism cited above, though insignificant, may be of some exegetical import. It refers to the fact that according to the author of the *sūtra* it is only when the discriminating self has reflected upon the nature of the phenomenal world in terms of its essential structure being constituted of other (*ādi*) *tattvas* along with the specific dimension of *Ākāśa* that the true understanding of the essential nature of space and time can arise. This way of looking at the *sūtra* in question seems to us to be more plausible and more consistent with the basic Sāṁkhya-Yoga ontology. It goes without saying that to our way of understanding the problem of two times in Sāṁkhya-Yoga as envisaged by Vijñānabhikṣu[27] is a fictitious problem arising from a misinterpretation of *sarga* as cosmological evolution.

Our contention that the notion of transcendent time is inadmissible in the Sāṁkhya-Yoga scheme of things is further substantiated by another important consideration. It is significant to note that within Sāṁkhya-Yoga scheme of things the element of eternity in this sense of non-finitude or trans-temporality is applicable only to *Puruṣa* as the transcendental consciousness and to *prakṛti* as the transcendental ground of all phenomenalization.[28] Apart from *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti*, no other tattva is accepted as infinite and trans-temporal.[29]

THE CONSTITUTION OF MOMENT AND THE STATUS OF PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE

Having established the reality of 'moment' and discerning it as the ground of all temporal determinations, Sāṁkhya-Yoga is now faced with the problem of explicating the material and the formal structure of the moment in terms of which alone one can comprehend the temporal determinations of past, present and future. The problem that Sāṁkhya-Yoga faces is: if the moment alone is real and that an entity is always given only in the moment of existence then how do we distinguish between the moments of past, present and future ? What is there in the moment that will distinguish it as present in relation to the moments of past and future? In other words, is there anything in the structure of moment which enables us to grasp the relationship between the moment determined as past and present or future? Does the moment depend on something external to itself for these temporal designations? Denying the reality of transcendental or cosmological time, Sāṁkhya-Yoga is faced with the problem of accounting for temporal determinations.

To begin with, it must be acknowledged that Sāṁkhya-Yoga does not deny the reality of the distinctions of past, present and future. Thus temporal distinctions indeed have an ontological basis. What grounds them or provides basis for their being the reality existing as moment? Thus observes Vyāsa on the reality of past, present and future:

> The past and the future exist in reality since the qualities of things manifest themselves in these three ways. The future is the manifestation which is yet to be. The past is that form which has already been experienced. The present is that which is still active. If these three did not exist in reality, then knowledge would not have been possible. Knowledge is not possible in the absence of the object of knowledge.[30]

It would be wrong to assume that Vyāsa here is endorsing the views of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika who also grants that past, present and future possess objective reality. According to the latter these moments are characterized by independent existences which are mutually exclusive. Past, present and future surely are different modes of being. But, as Sāṁkhya-Yoga would put, these modes do not exclude each other materially. They coincide and comingle in the same being.[31] Past, present and future are not three points of time in which things exist. They are the three ways in which things pass from unmanifest to manifest and vice versa. Since being of a thing is not different from the moment in which things exist and since there is no coming of being from non-being it will be wrong to assume as the Vaiśeṣika does that the three moments of being imply their mutually exclusive existences. It is this existential inseparability and functional distinguishability of the three moments that is recognized and asserted by Vyāsa when he maintains that past, present and future exist in reality.

The fundamental difference between Sāṁkhya-Yoga and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika lies in the latter's acceptance of the reality of non-being (*abhāva*) as a self-subsisting mode of existence. For Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika past and future possess reality in the mode of non-being (*abhāva*). However, *Sāṁkhya-Yoga* convincingly argues that such existence in the mode of non-being is inconceivable precisely because there is no non-existence, in a literal sense, of an existing being. The present is nothing else but the manifested form of the unmanifest past. The future, which has not yet come to be manifested exists in the present in unmanifest form. Thus the past subsists in the body of the present and future also is contained there in the fullness of being. Supporting this existential comingling or the dialectic of past, present and future it is pointed out by Vacaspati Miśra:

> If the past and future (the existence of being in sublatent and unmanifest form) are non-existent because they are not in the present, then the present (existence of being in the manifest form) also would be non-existent, because it is not in the past or future. The existence is applicable or characteristic of all the three forms, for it is real irrespective of the characteristics of these.[32]

A more comprehensive and clear understanding of *Sāṁkhya-Yoga* position on this important issue warrants a somewhat lengthy but extremely important citation in the same tenor as above from *Vyāsa* where he has tried to present the *Sāṁkhya-Yoga* position in a very clear way. *Vyāsa* puts his views in the following words:

> ...And the mutation of time-variation is the restriction having the three time-variations, (that is) connected with the three time forms (*adhvan*). This (restriction) one may say puts aside the first time-form whose variation is yet to come, and passes into the present time-variation, without however passing out of its state as external aspect. But in this (condition) it becomes manifest as being what it is. This is its second time-form. And it is not completely severed from past or future time-variations. Likewise emergence has the three time-variations; it is connected with the three time-forms. Having put aside the present time-variation it passes over into the past time-variation, without however passing out of its state as external aspect. This is the third time form. And it is not completely severed from the future and the present time-variations. In the same manner, emergence completing itself again (as a phenomenalized form) having put aside the future time-variation, and not having passed out of its state as external aspect, passes into the present time-variation. *In which (time), since this (emergence) manifests itself as it is, it obtains its functional activity.* This is the second time-form of this emergence. And it is not completely released from the past and future time-variations (emphasis added).[33]

Thus, according to Vyāsa what distinguishes the present mode of being from the past and the future is not existence in the mode of being (*bhāva*) and non-being (*abhāva*) as the Vaiśeṣika maintains, but the "functional activity" (*vyāpāraḥ*) that characterizes the present moment of existence. Now, we have seen that according to Sāṁkhya-Yoga activity and existence are identical in the strictest sense of the term. If the two are identical, what is the justification for asserting that the functional activity belongs only to the present mode of existence? At this precise point that a careful understanding of the two kinds of activity or change that the Sāṁkhya-Yoga speaks of seems in order.

The Sāṁkhya-Yoga distinguishes between two kinds of change that the being undergoes. (1) *svarūpa pariṇāma* (homogeneous change) and (2) *virūpa pariṇāma* (heterogeneous change). The being in its unmanifest state (Prakriti) undergoes the first kind of change. It is the stage where being has not entered the realm of consciousness, i.e., it remains unmanifest. Changes or activity that characterizes this mode of existence does not involve encounter with the cognizing self. As such existence in this mode remains inoperative or functionally neutral. It is only when existence assumes the present form, i.e., enters into the field of consciousness (*kṣetra*) that it becomes functionally active.

An objection may be raised at this point with regard to the existence of being in the mode of past moment which is described as devoid of functional activity. The problem here, as it is stated by a classical commentator, is:

> If only the being, which performs efficient activity alone is real, or ultimate, then how can (a being remaining in the past course) be real, for it (the efficient activity) is absent in the past course.[34]

Sāṁkhya-Yoga answer of the dilemma consists in their assertion that the existence of thing is not contingent upon their performing a purposeful action or possessing the quality of functional activity. Sāṁkhya-Yoga does not consider the existence of a thing on account of the purposeful action that it performs. Rather they understand activity in its purest form as characterizing the existence of a thing *per se*. It is the principle of activity discernible in a thing in its purest state (*pralaya*) that ultimately constitutes the ground for functional activity in the manifest world.

The existence of material objects according to Sāṁkhya-Yoga possesses three strata namely *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. Thus:

> Just as the three *guṇas*, characteristic of serenity (*sattva*) activity (*rajas*) and inertia (*tamas*), though existing simultaneously on account of their eternity, acquire the subordinate and principal relation and give rise to peculiar modifications in a way of their own splendour, same way, (the three) time divisions, by the magnificence of their own power, effect sequence in the difference (of beings).[35]

Thus, *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* are considered as the three powers constitutive of the very existence of being.[36] It is on account of these powers that a being is capable of maintaining itself as existent in both the manifest and the non-manifest states. Past and future moments of being, on account of the preponderance of *tamas* are responsible for the enclosing of the being. Enclosing is the nature of inertia precisely because it is discerned as the one which is heavy and obstructing (*guru varaṇakam eva tamaḥ*).[37] The present moment is equal to illumination that shows or manifests being and as such is characterized by *sattva*, for sattva is considered to be the principle of illumination (*sattvam laghu prakāśakam iṣṭam*).[38] But it is activity which is characterized by *rajas* (*upastambhakam calaṁ ca rajaḥ*)[39] and as such belongs to all the three moments of existence. As Helarāja comments in this context: "It (*rajas*) is a peculiarity of time and it is connected with everything. *Rajas*, being the inciter through suspension and permission, conformable to function is indeed the soul of time."[40] Further it is pointed out that the temporal status of the moment is determined by the predominance of the powers of the gunas. Thus:

> Just like the three ingredients, having the characters of serenity (*sattva*), activity (*rajas*) and inertia (*tamas*), though existing simultaneously due to their eternity, acquire the subordinate and principal relation and effect beings through their peculiar evolution, in a proper manner in the splendour of their own course of action, so also, these (three) time-divisions, by the magnificence of their own power, (become) capable of effecting sequence in external aspects (lit. in the difference of beings).[41]

However, Helaraja insists that this position of Sāṁkhya-Yoga reflects inconsistency in as much as it tends to differentiate between the external aspects (*dharma*) and the possessor of the external aspect (*dharmī*). Basing his argument on Patañjali's Yogasūtra stating that the "external aspects possess three courses (*dharmas tryadhvānaḥ*)" Helarāja concurs with Bhartṛhari that Sāṁkhya-Yoga too like Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is susceptible to the charge that temporal determinations have as their referrent the external limiting adjuncts.[42] However, it seems to us that the charge is not quite fair and even tends to obscure Sāṁkhya-Yoga's basic theoretical position.

It may be appropriate at this point to reproduce the passage on which the aforesaid charge of Bhartṛhari is based. The passage under consideration reads as follows:

> The bearer of the external aspect (*dharmi*) does not possess the

> three courses, the external aspects (*dharma*) possesses the three courses; they (i.e., the external aspects) characterized by them (i.e., the three courses) and obtaining different states, are referred to as different. (And this reference is) due to the alien state (of external aspects) and not due to the alien substance. Likewise (an external aspect), having forgone its future character, obtains the present character. *But (it is) not separated from (its) future and past (characters).*[43]

It is in the statement that "it is not separated from the (its) future and past (character)" that the clue to the basic position of Yoga-Sūtra lies. If Vyāsa were to agree that temporal determinations have as their referrent the external limiting adjuncts then he would not be able to hold the position that the present moment is inseparable from the moment of past and future. The statement, the *dharmas tryadhvānaḥ*, must be read in the context of their discussion as to the origin and ground of sequence perceptible in the phenomenal world. It is true that the dharmas seem to pass through three courses and that as such they give rise to the notion of sequence in objectivities. But it is precisely this appearance of sequence in the phenomenal world that the Sāṁkhya-Yoga tradition tend to question. The point is made in the Bhāṣya 3.13 and is further clarified and illustrated in 3.52 where it is pointed out by Vācaśpati that the succession as such is only a conceptual product without any ground in reality.

> In the present there is a single moment and there are no earlier or later moments. There is no combination of them. But those moments which are past and future are to be explained as inherent in the mutations. Accordingly, the whole world passes through a mutation in a single moment.[44]

According to Sāṁkhya-Yoga there is no togetherness of moments and there is no synthesis of them with succession either; a moment and its succession do not co-exist. It hardly makes any sense to speak of the succession of a single moment. Succession does not belong to any moment.[45] It is rather the relation (of priority and posteriority) or order of moments. But the relation is here no part of the relata. Moments do not possess succession as their constituent. Succession, therefore, is conceptual rather than real.[46] Each moment is real, which is neither a combination of moments nor their combination with succession. For combination is possible only of co-existing entities, and co-existence here, from the very nature of the case, is impossible.[47]

GROUNDS OF TEMPORAL DETERMINATIONS

A realistic philosophy, which Sāṁkhya-Yoga is, denying the reality of one independent, transcendent unitary Time and accepting the reality of the Moment (*kṣaṇa*) alone is faced with the problem of explicating conceptually the ontological status of the moment as Now and its relationship to the moments which are described as the past and the future.

Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika advocates the fundamental oneness and conditional manyness of the Time.[48] Time, according to them, is one, unitary and indivisible in its essence but it acquires temporal distinctions on account of its association with external limiting adjuncts. However, these temporal determinations far from being unreal possess a conditional or relative reality and are to be located within Time constituting its perceptible limitations from which alone the reality of a single unitary. Time is to be inferred. Bhartṛhari and Helarāja, find it difficult to concede to the acceptance of the reality (even conditional or relative) of temporal determinations. According to them, these temporal determinations are not constitutive of time, even though they are consequent to Time's association with extraneous factors. *Kāla* by its own power by 'hindrance' (*pratibandha*) and 'let' (*abhy-anujñā*) produces the semblance of time-succession in action.[49] Hence Time though essentially one appears as many. *Kāla* according to them is a power (*Śakti*)[50] of Brahman. This Time (*Kāla*) as the power of Brahman is one, independent and indivisible, and all-pervasive. Bhartṛhari declares unequivocally that all other generated, dependent subject forces are pervaded by *Kāla*, which alone is independent and follow the operation of this *Śakti* in their working.[51] It is further maintained that "*Kāla* is the instrumental cause in the creation, persistence and destruction of all things that have an origin, etc.…*Kāla seems* to be itself diversified by the diversity of limiting adjuncts, (but) things are diversified in conjunction with it."[52]

Thus the fundamental difference between Bhartṛhari and Nyāya Vaiśeṣika lies in their understanding of the nature and structure of temporal determinations. While Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika admits that it is because of the conjunction with the external adjuncts such as the solar motion, activity, and change that the one, undifferentiated time becomes differentiated into mutually exclusive determinations. For Bhartṛhari, Time though itself unchangeable, is the cause of all change, motion and order. Thus he writes: "The division of the "Sun's" progress to the north and to the south (*āyana*), the fixed movement of the heavenly bodies and the destruction and creation of all beings are due to time."[53] Commenting on this Kārikā Helarāja elucidates:

> Why the sun rises and sets at regular hours, why the moon shines for the night and not for the day, why the sun moves for six months along the southern path (*dakṣiṇāyana*), and for six months along the northern path (*uttarāyana*), why the planets and stars move in particular order—all these can be explained as being due to the all-pervasive and all-powerful nature of *Kāla*. The coming into existence and passing out of existence, the appearance and disappearance of all objects is caused by time alone.[54]

Thus the solar motion, activity and change, the so-called external adjuncts are ascribed the function of limiting the infinite dimension and constituting the Time determinations as part and parcel of Time according to Vaiśeṣika. These are conceived by Bhartṛhari as the very product of the power of Time. It is equally important to note that only after having established the nature of the adjuncts which in association with the unitary Time give rise to the semblance of multiplicity, and further by articulating the status of these temporally distinct adjuncts, that both Bhartṛhari and Vaiśeṣika embark upon a conceptual clarification of the nature and status of temporal determinations comprehended as past, present and future.

Sāṁkhya-Yoga questions the validity of the assumption that temporal determinations are the product of conjunction of Time with external adjuncts.[55] Activities, change or motion which are supposed to be the external limiting adjuncts by the Vaiśeṣikas, giving rise to the notion of temporal determinations themselves, Sāṁkhya-Yoga would say, cannot be conceived in any other way except in terms of their identity with the moment in which that said activity or change takes place and is cognized. What is given in our perception is the activity or the change as such taking place in one specific moment. No activity or change can be conceived in abstraction from activity or change.

Yuktidīpikā maintains that all activities or change is constituted of a series of events or uninterrupted flow of events, each moment of the series containing in itself the previous moment in it sublatent form and the forthcoming moment in its potential form.[56] These moments in the series do not depend on any substantial reality of Time. The moments in themselves are the ultimate unit existing independently of any substantive reality conceived either as an infinite ubiquitous substance or as an ubiquitous power. It does not have a secondary or derivative reality as the Vaiśeṣikas maintain.

The Vaiśeṣikas are mistaken when they maintain that change cannot be explained without the postulation of Time as the eternal background of change. For them the postulation of an eternal background of change is a necessity for accounting the continuity and succession for the reason that it is of the nature of the effect to arise anew. All events and actions, according to Vaiśeṣikas, have a totally fresh origination and are liable to total annihilation. As such they need the category of Time to account for continuity and succession. But, for Sāṁkhya, Time is not a factor which brings change in any entity. All entities are subject to change every moment; for the entity in itself contains the potentiality of the would-be state of itself. Change is only the manifesting of what is unmanifest. In and through change the thing is constituted in its diverse phases.[57]

Thus, Sāṁkhya-Yoga rejects the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas acceptance of Time as the material cause which in conjunction with external adjuncts give rise to temporally determined or distinct entities, a sequence or succession which is regarded by them characterizing the process of Change. "According to the Vaiśeṣika time is one and cannot account future (distinctions) etc. According to them division of future, etc., is caused or originate from the superimposition of the distinction of adjuncts. According to Sāṁkhya teachers, (these distinctions of adjuncts alone can be the cause of future, etc., (divisions) etc., in need for another tattva in the form of time."[58] The author of *Yuktidīpikā* emphasises this point when he maintains that time is not a factor which brings any change in any entity. If at all it may only be conceived as a concept enabling or helping the intellect in comprehending the relation among the moments of change, but not as a reality or entity existing for the sake of change, i.e., causing change (*kālastu sambandhamātropakāri na vikrīyahetuḥ*).[59]

Upto this point, our analysis of Sāṁkhya-Yoga understanding of change has enabled us to see the theoretical inconsistencies inherent in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika's postulation of the absolute reality of Time and limited or relative reality of the moment of change conceived as a product of the external limiting adjunct. But we have not succeeded in meeting the challenge posed by Bhartṛhari and Helarāja who, instead of ascribing a relative status to the moment of change, totally deny any status of reality independent of time, whatsoever. Their challenge to Sāṁkhya-Yoga understanding of the reality of the moment is of a more serious order and has far-reaching consequences. It is in their criticism of Sāṁkhya-Yoga understanding of change and causation that Bhartṛhari and Helarāja's greatest merit lies; and it is on Sāṁkhya-Yoga's success or failure in defending its theory of change and the reality of the moment that the viability of the theoretical foundation of Sāṁkhya-Yoga depends.

Bhartṛhari tends to agree with the Sāṁkhya-Yoga criticisms of the Vaiśeṣika proposition that the ground of temporal determinations is to be located in the external conditioning factors. Bhartṛhari unequivocally declares that any attempt to explain the reality of temporal determinations on the basis of the conditioning factor is bound to land itself in self-contradiction.

However, despite this initial agreement as to the untenability of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thesis of the conditioning factor being the ground of temporal differences, Bhartṛhari and Sāṁkhya-Yoga part company on the further question of the ground of such temporal differentiations. While both of them agree that the locus or the source of temporal differentiations, change, and activity must not be sought in the external conditioning factors, they radically differ in their discernment of the locus.

For Bhartṛhari, the locus of the temporal differentiation is Time itself. According to Bhartṛhari Time possesses the power of *pratibandha* and *abhyanuja* through which it gives rise to the semblance of temporal differentiations. But despite the fact that it is *Kāla* itself which is responsible for the temporal differentiations it also remains the eternal background of continuity and permanence. For Bhartṛhari this *Kāla Śakti* is identical with *Brahman* which alone is the transcendental ground of all phenomenalization.[60]

This interpretation of the ground of temporal determinations is in congruence with the Sabda Brahmanvādins understanding of the nature of causation and change. While agreeing with Sāṁkhya's *satkāryavāda* that it is the cause itself that undergoes change and the entity retains its essential identity through change, Bhartṛhari modifies the *satkāryavāda* to assert that the change as such can only be an appearance (*vivarta*), since the reality remains essentially identical in and through change. All the temporal differentiations then are nothing more than an appearance of it precisely because in and through these temporal differentiations it is the permanence of Time as the *Kāla-Śakti* of *Brahman* that is revealed. Moreover, since for Bhartṛhari and Helarāja *dharmi* is not different from *dharma*,[61] *Brahman* is not different from his power and as such it is *Brahman* that constitutes the ground of all change and causation.

Now, Sāṁkhya-Yoga philosophers would find this understanding of causation and change quite unacceptable. Starting from the datum presented to the cognizing self, Sāṁkhya-Yoga thinkers conclude that the fact of change and causation becomes intelligible only in the context of the reality of the entities undergoing change. The permanence or the continuity through the moments of change of that Bhartṛhari and Helarāja seek to account for by postulating Time as the eternal background of change actually is inherent in the very nature of things, for nothing which is existent can cease to be and the non-existent can never come into being. That which provides the continuity and permanence through change is nothing but the being itself which is undergoing change, and which retains its identity in and through change.[62] The entity which is constituted in and through its non-manifest and manifest phases itself is the ground of continuity and permanence. Temporal differentiations conceived by Sāṁkhya-Yoga as moments of existence do not imply a transcendental reality of Time as the ground of this change and the basis of permanence and continuity.

SOME CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

There are fundamental points of disagreements between Sāṁkhya, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, and Bhartṛhari on the question of the reality of Time and the ground and nature of temporal sequence and change. There is, according to the Samkhya, no unitary, transcendent and single entity which is given to us in our cognitions as the ground of all temporal change and succession. There is no such thing as a transcendent time, which in conjunction with some external factors, conditions change and sequence. Change is inherent in the very nature of things, and the continuity or permanence through change is accounted for by the persistence of that which changes. Thing or the being itself is the ground of both the change and permanence.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, on the other hand, maintains that it is plausible to speak of transcendent time. Time is essentially indivisible and unitary. Temporal differentiations or multiplicity of the empirical time notions are product of some external factors or adjuncts that somehow limit the unitary, single and essentially indivisible time. These external factors are the facts of change and activities such as solar motion that operate as the limiting adjuncts on Time and therefore give rise to a temporal experience of change and continuity. According to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, while the transcendent Time is essentially unitary and indivisible temporal differentiations and succession are introduced into its structure on account of its conjunction with the external limiting adjuncts. These temporal determinations are accorded a limited but independent reality.

Bhartṛhari is in agreement with Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika in accepting the reality of one, unitary, indivisible and transcendent time. However, he disagrees with Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika on one important point Temporal differentiation according to Bhartṛhari is not a product of external adjuncts which tend to constitute a limitation on one and essentially indivisible Time. Change or activities are not independent realities over against the reality of Time. They cannot constitute any limitation on Time. How then are we to account for the fact of change and continuity in the manifest world ? Bhartṛhari's answer is that Time has certain powers on account of which it gives rise to the appearance of change. Continuity is accounted by the fact that through all the changes Time continues as the eternal and transcendent background of all activities.

The Sāṁkhya differs from both Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Bhartṛhari fundamentally. It does not accept the reality of one, unitary indivisible Time as the transcendent background of all change and continuity. Against both of them it maintains the reality only of the moment of change. The idea of change does not necessarily involve the notion of Time. Postulation of Time as the transcendent background of all change and motion is only a construction of intellect. More specifically, against Bhartṛhari it would argue that we do not need the category of Time to account for continuity either. Ground for continuity and permanence through all changes and motion is present in the very structure of being or thing. The thing itself persists through all change and motion, and that explains the element of continuity.

Significantly, for Sāṁkhya-Yoga existence and activity are not two different things. Existence is invariably characterized by change, and even in the so-called *pralayāvasthā prakṛti* (the world) is constantly undergoing change. Change is the very nature of objective being and as such temporal determinations as various moments of change are not adventitious to its being. It is wrong to look for continuity and permanence outside the structure of change. Our notions of one eternal unitary indivisible Time is a product of such misconceptions.

The confusion of permanence with the Time arises from one's inability to see the possibility of change being inherent in the very structure of being. But Sāṁkhya-Yoga proposes a strictly dynamic conception of reality where change is the very mode of objective being. In consonance with this conception it is quite feasible to conceive of 'timeless change' or change without Time. Sen in a recent article has successfully argued in favour of Sāṁkhya-Yoga that time is not a necessary component in our notion of change and that the concept of 'timeless change' is not self-contradictory: He makes the following point:

> We are interested to know whether the concept of change (which signifies a very common and well-known phenomenon) invariably or necessarily contains the idea of time. Change as such means any kind of alteration and transformation, which may be said to be one of the commonest facts of experience. It may be thought that the mere idea of alteration or transformation need not necessarily include the concept of time. Time may be thought to be necessary for the understanding or explanation of change, but that would be going beyond change to the intellectual comprehension of its possibility.[63]

Our discussion of Sāṁkhya-Yoga understanding of the problem of time and temporality, thus far, attempted to comprehend the objective element in the experience of temporality. We tried to show that for Sāṁkhya-Yoga temporality is intrinsic to the structure of change as exemplifying essential finitude of phenomenal existence. However, according to Sāṁkhya-Yoga, finitude and change are only one aspect of reality, the other is infinitude, or eternity of pure consciousness being the dialectical counterpart of the sphere of objectivity characterized by change and transformation. How is this principle of pure consciousness or eternity related to the sphere of objectivity and change ? What is the exact nature of their relationship ? What are the implications of this relation for the subject or pure consciousness ? These are the questions to which we will address ourselves in the following chapter.

REFERENCES

[1] The whole analysis of *Buddhisarga* in the *Sāṁkhya Kārikā* bears testimony to Sāṁkhya's pre-occupation with the realm of human experience as it is immediately and directly available to the reflecting self. The very point of departure for the *Sāṁkhya Kārikā* is the fact of suffering or pain as an integral part of man's life experience. Yoga, too, is in total agreement with the basic Sāṁkhya postulation on this specific question. Rather, in Yoga, the analysis of the realm of experience is even more rigorous than in Sāṁkhya. For both of them the analysis of the cognitive experience is the basic *modus operandi* in approaching the ontological and metaphysical issues:

"A thorough analysis of human experience is also the starting point of the Sāṁkhya Philosophy. Experience is the felt result of the operating of the subtle tattva which is ordinarily imperceptible... Experience is not possible unless there are objects of experience, body, organs, egosense, mind, etc., which will constitute the instruments and objects of experience....these are also not enough to bring about experience. Experience presupposes consciousness... the fundamental principles and categories of Sāṁkhya were not dogmatically postulated, but they were discovered and accepted after proper analytical study of experience."

Sen Gupta, Anima, *Classical Sāṁkhya: A Critical Study*, 1969, pp. 74-75.

[2] *Sāṁkhya Tattva Kaumudi of Vācaspati Miśra*, ed. and tr. Ganganath Jha, Poona, 1965, p. 112.

[3] Here it must be borne in mind that in Sāṁkhya system there is no category called Time. Time and Space are only relations between events. There are only the events and not something external to them to relate them to one another. Raja, C. Kunhan, *The Sāṁkhya Kārikā of Iśvarakṛṣna: A Philosophical Exposition*, Hoshiarpur, 1963, p. 123.

[4] sa khalavyam kālo vastuśunyo buddhinirmāṇaḥ. *Vyāsa Bhāṣya on the Yoga Sutra of Patanjali*, ed. Ramasankara Bhattacharya, Varanasi, 1963, p. 151.

"The appearance of Kāla as a separate entity is a creation of our Buddhi (*baddhinirmāṇa*) as it represents the order or mode in which *Buddhi* records its perceptions." Dasgupta, S.N., *History of Indian Philosophy*, I, p. 310.

[5] na hi nah kālo nāma kaścida (padārtho) asti, kim tarhi kriyamāna kriyānāmeva (ādityagatigodohaghatastanitadinam) viśiṣta avadhisparūpa pratyaya nimitiattvam; *The Yuktidīpikā*, ed. R.C. Pandey, Delhi, 1967, p. 73.

Kalpyat iti kālah, viṣaya evatīto nagato vartamanaścocyate na tadyavatirekena kālo'sti; *The Jayamangala*, ed. H. Sharma, Delhi, 1926, p. 40.

[6] tatpravāhāvicchedastu kramaḥ. Kṣaṇatatkramayonāsti vastusamāhāra... ...sa khavalyam vastuśūnyo buddhinirmānaḥ śabdajñānāupātī.... kṣaṇastu vastupatitah kramāvalambī. Krāmaśca kṣaṇanantaryātma taṁ kālavidah kala ityācakṣate yoginaḥ: *Vyāsa Bhāṣya on Yoga Sūtra*, 3.52.

[7] Sen, Sanat Kumar, "Time in Sāṁkhya-Yoga," *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. 8, September, 1968, p. 412.

[8] Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika are the realistic-pluralistic Hindu darśanas, independent in their origin, but because of their common ontological outlook have come to be amalgamated in the course of history by their exponents. The formal synthesis of the two systems seems to have taken place around 10th century. See Hiriyanna, M., *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*, London, 1956, p. 225.

[9] Kālakhātmadiśaṁ sarvagatatvaṁ paramam mahat; *The Kīranāvalibhāskara, Padmanabha Miśra*, Varanasi, 1920, p. 137.

[10] Idānīm gacchatītyādipratītistu idānīm ravītityādipratītivat kālikasambandhāvacchinnādhārādheya bhāvamavagāhate na tu samavāyasambandhavacchinnamiti. *The Vaiśeṣika Sūtra*, 5.2.26.

[11] ibid, 2.2.6.

[12] ibid, 7.1.25.

[13] *The Kālasamuddeśa of Bhartṛhari's Vakyapadīya*, ed. and trans., Peri Sarveswara Sharma, 1972, p. 43.

[14] Vaiśeṣika matvat trikālamābhyantaraṁ karaṇa mityanena sāṁkhyācāryaih kālaḥ tattvāntaram svikriyate iti nāśaṁkanīyam tasyopādhāva ntarbhāvāditi darsajyati-kālaśceti; *The Kiraṇāvali on the Tattva Kaumudi*, Haran, Swaminarayana, 1937, p. 321.

[15] Vaiśeṣikas postulate following as adjuncts that constitute temporal limitations.

1. *Upādhibhedātakṣaṇādivyavahāraviṣayah* : The first adjunct consists of the moment of Time that characterizes the interval between the action or activity and the resulting appearance of disjunction in time. Contributing to the theory of Asatkāryavāda, Vaiśeṣika maintains that the limiting action is the cause or the reason for the production of the previous non-existent disjunction in Time.
2. *Upādhiṣtu Svajanyavibhāgaprāgabhāvācchinnam Karma*: The disjunction so produced by an activity becomes the cause of the destruction of the previous conjunction. The interval between the disjunction and the dissolution of the conjunction is the second moment of Time produced by the activity constituting the limiting adjunct on the unitary Time. In other words, the disjunction determined by the antecedent conjunction is the second limiting adjunct.

3. *Purvasaṁyoganāśavacchinnottarasaṁyoga-prāgabhāvo-vā*: As the conjunction so produced ceases, this cessation of the conjunction becomes the cause of the subsequent conjunction. As such there must be an interval between the two. Thus there is the previous non-existence of that conjunction, and this constitutes the third moment in the activity constituting the limiting adjunct of the one unitary Time.

4. *Uttarasaṁyogāvacchinnaṁ Karma*: Again, subsequent conjunction arises, and the time associated with the action in this moment is further limited in interval in terms of the limiting function of the activity in the question. *Sidhāntamuktāvalī*, Visvanatha, Calcutta, 1940, 46. Kalastvako'pi upādhibhedātkṣaṇādivyavahāraviṣayaḥ upādhiṣṭu svajanyavibhāga-prāgabhāvacchinnam karma, purvasaṁyoganāśavacchinottara-saṁyoga-prāgabhāvo vā, uttarasaṁyogāvacchinnaṁ Karma. ibid.

[16] *Vyāsa Bhāṣya on the Yoga Sūtra of Patanjali*, op. cit., pp. 150-151.

[17] Tasmādvartamānaḥ evaikaḥ kṣano na purvottarakṣaṇāḥ saṇtiti tasmānnāsti tatsamāhāraḥ. ibid.

[18] yathāpakarṣaparyaut dravyaṁ paramaṇurevaṁ paramākarṣparyantaḥ kālaḥ kṣaṇah. yāvatā vā samayena calitaḥ parmānuḥ purvadeśaṁ jahyāduttaradeśamupasaṁpadyate sa kālaḥ kṣaṇaḥ, tatpravāhā vicchedastu kramaḥ. kṣaṇatakramavorṇāsti vastusamāhāra....sa khalvayaṁ kālo vastuśunyo buddḥinanirmaṇaḥ sabdajñānānupāti....kṣaṇaṣṭu vastupatitaḥ kramāvalambi. kramaśca kṣaṇānantaryātmā. taṁ kalavidaḥ kāla ityācakṣate yoginaḥ. *Yoga Bhāṣya*, 3.52, op. cit., pp. 150-51.

[19] Kim tarhi kriyamāṇakriyānāmevādityagatigodoh aghatāstanitādīnām viśiṣṭāvadhisarūpapratyayanimittatvam. We owe this clarification to Yuktidīpikā, *The Yuktidīpikā*, op. cit., p. 73.

[20] nityāu yāu dik-kālāu tāvākāśa prakṛti bhūtāu prakṛterguṇa viśeṣāveva. ato dikkālayorvibhutvopapattih; (ākāśa vat sarva gataś ca nitya) ity ādi śrutiy uktaṁ vibhutvaṁ cā 'kāśasyo'papannam. Yāu tu khaṇḍādik kālāu, tāu tutattadupādhi saṁyogād ākāśad utpadyete ity arthaḥ. *The Sāṁkhya Pravacana Bhāṣya of Vijñānabhikṣu*, ed. Richard Garbe, Cambridge, (Mass.) 1943, p. 77.

[21] Concurring with this way of looking at the Classical Sāṁkhya understanding of the problem of time Radhakrishnan maintains that the Sāṁkhya assertion of the infinite eternal time as a thought construct is a mere attestation to the fact that we do not have any perception of the infinite time. He seems to suggest that there is no real denial of the eternal time by Sāṁkhya-Yoga. All that Sāṁkhya has to say that since we have no perception of infinite time or infinite space, so they are said to be constructed by the understanding. Radhakrishnan, S., op. cit., p. 277.

[22] Keith, A.B., *The Sāṁkhya System*, Calcutta, 1924, pp. 121-22; While concurring with Keith in disregarding the distinction between the eternal and empirical time one may have reservations regarding the explanation adduced. It is extremely doubtful of the Akasa of which time is taken to be differentiation by Vijñānabhikṡu refers to the bhūta. It is more likely that he means by it an aspect of Prakṛti itself, in which case nitya kāla would be another name for eternal becoming of Prakṛti. However, on the basis of the text we are not quite sure about the exact import of his statement. For a philosophical estimation

of Vijñānabhikṣu's view on time refer to Bhattacharya, K. C., *Studies in Philosophy*, Vol. 1, 1956, p. 235.

[23] tattadupādhibhedādākāśameva dikkālāśabdavācyam tasmādākāśe' ntarbhūtau, *The Sāṁkhya Sūtra Vṛttiḥ* by Aniruddha, p. 94

[24] This exegesis is in conformity with the general standpoint taken by us from which to approach the problematics of the Sāṁkhya-Yoga. For arguments and defense see *supra*, pp. 18ff.

[25] The term extension is used in the sense of '*Prakṛti*' in its aspect of omnipervasiveness, the contention being the part of the basic Sāṁkhya doctrine that the *Prakṛti* persists along with the *tattvas*.

[26] Aniruddha dismisses the term 'ādi' as occurring by accident in the Sūtra; ādiśabdaḥ saṅpātāyātaḥ, etc. *The Sāṁkhya Sūtra Vṛttiḥ*, op. cit., p. 98; Vijñānabhikṣu maintains that the expression 'ādi' in the sūtra means that from the apprehending of this or that limiting object (the notion of relative space and time arise): ādiśabdenopādhigrahaṇāditi, *The Sāṁkhya Pravacana Bhāṣya*, op. cit., p. 77.

[27] It is important to note that Vijñānabhikṣu himself in his Yoga-Sāra-Saṁgraha admits that the Sāṁkhya does not accept a separate entity as infinite time (Mahākāla) as the one all-pervading reality or the basis of temporal determinations of moments, etc. Moreover, Vijñānabhikṣu goes to a great length even to criticise the views of Sāṁkhya expressed in the Sāṁkhya Sūtra. We are also aware of his Vedantic leanings and his occasional attempts to reconcile Sāṁkhya-Yoga with the mainstream of Vedantic thought. This leads us to approach cautiously his interpretation specially when it seems to go against the basic ontological perspectives of the system under investigation.

Kṣaṇa rūpah kālo vyavastthāpyate . . . . . Sāṁkhyistu 'dikkālāvākāśādibhyaḥ' iti sūtrānimahākālo vā kṣaṇādirvāpṛthakpadārtho nāsti, kiṁ tvākāśamevopādhibhirviśiṣṭaṁ kṣaṇādimahākālānt vyavahāraṁ kurut iti manyate. *The Yoga-Sāra-Saṅgraha* of Vijñānabhikṣu, ed. and trans., Ganganath Jha, 1933, pp. 73-74.

[28] In view of the above stipulation regarding the trans-temporality, even to cosmological way of understanding the sarga doctrine, the problem of two times (eternal and empirical) in Sāṁkhya-Yoga is inappropriate. Sen, who seems to accept a cosmological interpretation of sarga, also considers the anomalous character of the situation.

In fact, since the Sāṁkhya admits the possibility of regression (pratisancāra) of all the evolutes (the entire universe) into their ultimate ground, Prakṛti, nothing save Prakṛti and Puruṣa can be called eternal (in the accepted sense of being without beginning and end). Thus if even Ākāśa is not eternal, how can time, which is no distinct entity at all be so. Sen, op. cit., p. 410.

[29] On the Sāṁkhya-Yoga conception of eternity, see *infra*, chapter 4.

[30] atītānāgatāmsvarūpato'styadhvabhedāddharmāṇām, *Yoga Sutra*, op. cit., 4.12; Bhaviṣyadvyaktikamanāgatam, anu bhūtavyaktikamatītam, svavyāpāropā rūḍham vartamānam trayam caitadvastu jñānasya jñeyam. Yadi caitatsvarupato nābhaviṣyannedam nirviṣayam jñānamudapatsyata, tasmādatītānāgatam svarūpato'stīti, *Vyāsa Bhaṣya on Yoga Sūtra*, 4.12.

Also see Sāṁkhya Kārikā 33 and commentaries on it: trikālamābhyantaram mano'haṁkārabuddhirūpam karaṇam pravartate buddhirvartamānam ghatam buddhyate atītam bhaviṣyantam ca smarati . . . . yat evam tasmāducyate trikālamābhyantaram karaṇam iti; *Māṭharavṛtti*, ed. V. P. Sharma, Varanasi, 1922, p. 50.

triṣvapi kāleṣu vyavasthitam viṣayamavagāhate gṛhṇāti yasmāt, tasmāt trividhamantaḥkaranaṁ būddhyādi dvāri bhavati . . . ebhidvārabhūtairantaḥkaranaṁ vīṣayān gṛhṇāti. *Jayamangalā*, op. cit., p. 42.

[31] tadetkālatattvasya padārthāntarātakhandanārthamaḥ santu ta iti; Svāminarayan's *Kirnāvali on the Tattva Kaumudi*, p. 321.

[32] yadi tu vartamānatvābhāvādātītānāgatayorasattvaṁ hantabho vartamānasyāpyabhāvotītānāgatvābhāvāt, *Tattva Vaiśāradi*, Vācaspati Miśra, Ramasankara Bhattacharya, Varanasi, 1963, p. 166.

[33] Woods, J. H., *The Yoga System of Patanjali*, Varanasi, 1966, pp. 212-13.

Lakṣaṇapariṇāmaśca nirodhaḥ tṛlakṣaṇaḥ tribhiradhyabhiryuktaḥ. Sa khalvanāgatalakṣaṇamadhvānaṁ prathamaṁ hitva dharmatvamanatikrānto vartamānlakṣaṇaṁ pratipanno yatrāsya svarupeṇābhivyaktiḥ. Esoṣya dvitiyo'dhvāna cātītānāgatābhyāṁ lakṣṇābhyāṁ viyuktaḥ.

tathāvyutthānaṁ trilakṣaṇaṁ tribhiradhvabhiryuktaṁ vartaṁānaṁlakṣanaṁ hitvā dharmatvamantikrāntamatitalakṣaṇaṁ pratipannam. eṣosya tṛtiyodhavā. Na cānāgatavartamānābhyāṁ lakṣaṇābhyāṁ viyuktam. Evam puṇaḥ vyutthānamupasam-padyamānamanāgatam lakṣaṇam hitva dharmatvamanatikrāntam vartmānaṁ lakṣaṇaṁ pratipannam, yatrāsya svarūpābhivyaktau satyāṁ vyāpāraḥ. Eṣosya dvitīyo'dhvā na cātitānāgatābhyāṁ lakṣaṇābhyām viyuktamiti. *Vyāsa Bhāṣya on the Yoga Sūtra*, 3.13, op., cit., pp. 110-11.

[34] nanu yadevārthakriyākāri tadeva paramārthasadityatiteadhvi tadabhāvātkatham sattvam; *The Vākyapadiyam by Bhartṛhari with a commentary by Helarāja*, Varanasi, 1928, 3.9.55, p. 363.

[35] This discernful understanding of the *tri-guṇas* relating it to the three divisions of time is attributed to Kapila by Helarāja in his commentary on Vākyapadiyam: Pāramarṣaṇye satataparināmiṣu sattvarajastamasāṁ śaktimātramātitadikālabhedasamākhyam, tathā ca sarveṣām bhavanam gunatryarūpattvācchaktitrayayogitve yathāyatham śaktyudbhavānubhyām sadasattvena vyavahārah.

[36] 'Being' here is used in the sense of objective being, i.e., Prakṛti. When we speak of existence being characterized by *sattva*, *tamas* and *rajaṣ*, we, of course, refer to the existence of the being which is existentially grounded in *Prakṛti*. *Puruṣa* or the transcendental consciousness is in principle untouched or unaffected by these *guṇas*.

[37] *The Sāṁkhya Kārikā*, op. cit., 13.

[38] ibid.

[39] ibid.

[40] Rajastu pravṛttisāmānyamkālasvarūpam sarvatrānvayi pratibandhābhyanujñābhyām pravarttamānam preraṇārūpam rajaḥ kālātmakameva. Helarāja in *the Vākyapadīyam*, p. 361.

[41] Tadyathā trayaḥ sattvarajastamolakṣaṇā guṇo nityatvādyugapadavasthāna api . . . . . yathāyatham svavṛttyullāse vicitrapariṇāmān bhāvānāmuparacayanti, tatheme kālabhedaḥ svaśaktimāhātmyādbhavabhedeṣu kramoparacanacaturā ityarthaḥ. ibid, p. 361.

[42] ibid.

[43] Na dharmī tryadhvā dharmāstu tryadhvānaḥ. te lakṣitā alakṣitāśca tam tamavasthām prapnuvanto'nyatvena pratinirdiśyante'vasthāntarato na dravyantarataḥ. *Vyāsa Bhaṣya on the Yoga Sūtra*, 3.13.

[44] Tasmādvartmana evaikaḥ kṣaṇo na purvottarakṣanāḥ santīti. tasman nasti tatsamāhāraḥ. ye tu bhutabhāvina kṣaṇās te pariṇāmanvitā vyākhyeyāḥ. tenaikena kṣaṇena kṛtsno lokaḥ pariṇāmamanubhavati. ibid, 3.52.

[45] tasmānnāsti tatsamāhārāḥ . . . ibid.

[46] . . . . . ayam kālo vastuśunyo pi . . buddhinirmāṇah śabdajñānanupati . ., ibid.

[47] Kṣaṇastu vastupatītaḥ kramāvalambī, kramaśca kṣaṇ ānantaryātmā . . . na ca dvau ksnau asahabhavataḥ. Kramaśca na dvayoḥ sahabhuvoḥ asambhavāt, pūrvasmāduttarasya bhāvino yadānantarya kṣaṇasya sa kramaḥ, ibid.

[48] There is only one time which is omnipresent in dimension, individual in character, and has the qualities of conjunction and disjunction. Conventional notions, as moment, minute, hour, etc., are derived by abstraction from concrete time. According to the Vaiśeṣika time is an eternal substance and the basis of all experience . . . . .

Temporal relations are dependent on the terms related. There is no sooner or later, before or after, apart from events and actions. Time is perceived as a qualification of objects, and is therefore a substantive reality. Radhakrishnan, S., op. cit., p. 191.

[49] tamasya lokayantrasya sutradhāram pracakṣate patibandhabhyanujñābhyām tena viśvam vibhajyate //4//

pratibaddhāś ca yās tena citrā viśvasya vṛttayah tāh sa evānujānāti yathā tantuḥ śakuntinaḥ //15//

pratibandhābhyanujñābhyām vṛttir yā tasya śaśvatī tayā vibhajyamāno'sau bhajate kramarūpatām //30//

Bhartṛhari, *The Vākyapadīyam*, pp. 343, 347, and 352.

[50] Kalākhyā svātantryaśaktirbrahmaṇa itiḥ, tatra Bhartṛhareràbhiprāya . . . Helarāja, ibid, p. 365.

[51] Kālākhyena hi svātantryena sarvaḥ paratantra jamavtyaḥ śaktayaḥ samāviṣṭaḥ kālaśaktivṛttimānupatanti. ibid.

[52] Utpattau ca sthitau cāpi vinaśe cāpitadvatām nimittam kālamevāhur vibhaktenātmanā sthitam //3//

Saṁsargiṇām tu yo bhedo viṣeṣās tasya te matāḥ saṁbhinnas tairavasthānām kālo bhedaya kalpate //8// ibid, pp. 343 and 344.

[53] Ayanapravibhāgaśca gatiśca jyotiṣām dhruvā nivṛttiprabhavāścaiva bhūtānām tannibandhanāḥ. //43// ibid, p. 357.

[54] Dakṣiṇāyanamuttarāyaṇamiti kālakṛtamaryādāyattaḥ pravibhagaḥ, nakṣatrāṇām ca niyatā gatirudayāstādirūpā kālamanupatati, mahābhūtānām ca sargapralayasamaye janmavināśāvāvirbhāvatirobhāvalakṣaṇau kālāyattāviti . . . Helarāja, ibid, p. 357.

[55] *The Tattvakaumudī of Vacaspati Miśra* and also Swaminarayana's *Kirṇāvali*, p. 351.

[56] *The Yuktidīpikā*, op. cit., p. 74.

[57] see Dasgupta, S.N., *History of Indian Philosophy*, p. 310.

[58] kālaśca vaiśeṣikābhimata eko na anāgatādivyavahārabhedaṁ pravartyitumaharti tasmādāyaṁ yairupādhibhedairanāgatādibhedaṁ pratipadyate santu ta evopāyāh, ye'nāgatāvyavahārahetavaḥ, kṛtamatrantagaḍunā kāleneti sāṅkhyācāryāh. tasmānn kālarūpatattvāntarabhyupagamaiti. *Sāṁkhya Tattvakaumudī of Vācaspati Miśra*, p. 112.

[59] *Yuktidipikā*, op. cit., p. 74.

[60] Kālākhyā svātantryāśaktirbrahmaṇa itiḥ; tatra Bhartṛharerabhiprāya . . . And also . . . . . brahmatattvaṁ vidyāmayaṁ kālakalitamavidyāvaśatkramarūpopagraheṇa . . . . . Helarāja, op. cit., pp. 365 and 366.

[61] Bhartṛhari, op. cit., 3.29.54, p. 362; Helarāja, ibid, 362.

[62] *Vyāsa Bhāṣya on Yoga Sūtra*, 3.13.

[63] Sen, S.K., op. cit., pp. 410-11.

CHAPTER 4

TRANSCENDENTAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND TEMPORALITY

SUBJECT AND SUBJECTIVITY

We have reached a stage in our analysis where the question of the relationship of the transcendental subject (*Puruṣa*) and the subject as world-involved (*Buddhi-Ahaṁkāra* structure), which is the ground of all temporal constitutions, demands our immediate attention. Within Sāṁkhya-Yoga frame of reference, *Puruṣa* may be described as the pure subject or the transcendental consciousness which is the formal, ontological ground of all conscious acts and experiencing.[1] This pure subject is not the experiencer or the agent of any activity or willing. However, in its embodiment (*Śarīri*)[2] as the subject which is at the same time world-involved, it is none other than the agent of all activity and willing. As such the world-involved subject is essentially 'subjectivity'[3] (subject as activity). Subjectivity as embodiment is essentially the existent. Pure subject or transcendental consciousness is real, but is not exhausted by existence. The existent is that which is both real and active.[4] Actuality (being existent and active) is the mark of subjectivity. Pure subject (*Puruṣa*) however transcends the mode of actuality. The mode of being of pure subject or transcendental consciousness (*Puruṣa*) is, thus, inherently to be distinguished from that of subjectivity (*Buddhi-Ahaṁkāra* structure).

THE EMPIRIC SUBJECT AND TEMPORALITY

To maintain this essential difference in the mode of being of subject as embodiment (*Buddhi-Ahaṁkāra* structure) and of being of pure subject (*Puruṣa*) is important within Sāṁkhya-Yoga ontological frame of reference. For Sāṁkhya-Yoga the former constitutes the core of our empiric being as the manifold of world-experience (*adhyavasāya*)[5] and is what is pre-thematically aware of itself.[6] It is in and through the mode of reflection that *Buddhi* comes to be self-aware and constitutes as such the core of the I-ness (*Ahaṁkāra*).[7] It declares its essential I-ness (*Ahaṁkāra*) as that which is possessed of thematizing capacity and is aware of itself as such (self-awareness). It is in this mode of reflection that it also discovers itself as that which is world-involved through its 'faculties' (*Manas* and *Indriyas*).[8] Thus subjectivity as existent is the structure of world-involvement which has its material ontological basis in embodiment. The empiric subject (*Buddhi-Ahaṁkāra*) is, definitionally, world-involved and includes both bodily acts or behaviour and different forms of acts of consciousness as modified by the structure of embodiment. Subjectivity, (subject as activity) then, is neither more nor less than these bodily acts and modes of consciousness as they are experienced by the "I" (*Ahaṁkāra*), as they are 'lived' concretely and immediately by the subject aware of itself as such (self-aware).

It is true that our bodily existence is not devoid of awareness. A certain amount of awareness is built into the very mode of our being as an embodiment. However this awareness in itself (being of *Buddhi*) is prethematic and pre-reflective, but constitutes the phenomenal condition of thematization and conscious reflection. An implicit, non-thematic awareness attends experiential behaviour and acts of reflective consciousness (self-awareness) belonging to subjectivity (*Buddhi-Ahaṁkāra*). A more explicit act of self consciousness is conditioned by an experiential priority of the non-thematic awareness (the being of *Buddhi*).

However, it is precisely in the subject's act of reflection (the being of *Buddhi*) that the possibility of the recovery of the transcendental subject (subject transcending the act of self-consciousness and the realm of subjectivity) opens up. The mode of being of self as reflection (*Buddhi*) is also the mode of acquiring the discriminative awareness (*Viveka*) by the self-reflecting self.[9] In the mode of self-reflection, the self-reflective self makes the pre-thematic awareness of bodily acts and conscious acts thematically conscious, i.e., as object to the self-reflecting self. This is the mode of transcendence or objectification (making other) of the realm of subjectivity. This structure of transcendence by reflection (being of *Buddhi*) has its phenomenological correlate in the discriminative awareness (*viveka*) which is the condition for the recovery of the transcendental consciousness. Reflection is the rational mode of otherness. The relationship of otherness of the pure subject to the realm of subjectivity (subject as embodiment) is also the primary mode of the being of pure consciousness or the transcendental subject (*Puruṣa*) as a 'relation' of no relation bereft of all contents.[10]

Thus, the relationship of the transcendental consciousness (*Puruṣa*) to the things and beings of the world (including the being of *Buddhi* and *Ahaṁkāra* as constitutive of subjectivity is of a peculiar kind, i.e., it is a relation of no-relation or otherness (*anyayoga*)—it is precisely what things of the world are not.[11] The relationship is not external but dialectical.[12] It is a relationship of mutual opposition and co-operation, of thematic exclusion but operational dependence.[13] Transcendental consciousness or the pure subject is not internally and necessarily related to the world of subjectivity, rather it is a relation of no-relation (or otherness). It is this relationship of otherness that gives rise to the emergence of subjectivity (*Buddhi-Ahaṁkāra* structure) as a specific moment in the dialectical relation between the world and pure consciousness. This subjectivity, the principle of I-ness, also constitutes the core of temporality.[14] It is a being which is essentially temporal. The actuality of our concrete experiential existence also provides the mode of the discernment of temporality. Herein we discover that the past is my past in my present. This synthesis of temporality as the mine-ness of subjectivity (*Ahaṁkāra* structure) is an ontological relation which unites the past to the present. The Sāṁkhya-Yoga ontology would not claim that the past and present are identical. Evidently past is not present, i.e., there is a radical distinction between the two dimensions of temporal existence. But despite this fact that they are not identical, they are internally related through *my* subjectivity as *my* past and *my* present, i.e., they manifest a lived unity.[15]

THE TRANSCENDENTAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE TEMPORAL STRUCTURE

What then is the relationship of the transcendental subject (*Puruṣa*) which is, ontologically speaking, other than the world-involved subject (*Buddhi-Ahaṁkāra* structure), to the temporal structuring of this world-involved subject? Within the Sāṁkhya-Yoga framework time and temporal relations of past, present and future cannot, ontologically speaking, be grounded in pure-consciousness or the transcendental subject (*Puruṣa*) which is intrinsically non-temporal.[16] Any attempt to locate the ontological, ground of temporal relations in the transcendental subject (*Puruṣa*), which is essentially non-temporal, will imply the reduction of the temporal dimensions of being to pure duration or, not-endurance which is not a case of endurance, but will be a thorough past, present and future, or trans-temporal unity. In such an event one will have to face the question of how the temporal determinations can emerge from the unity (of pure consciousness) *per se*. It may be argued that a pre-supposed unity alone is the context in which the change or temporal determination can be grasped and understood. However, Sāṁkhya-Yoga points out that only a unity which has a built-in structure of differentiation can account for temporal performance and temporal change. *Prakṛti* is postulated as the realm of being which has such a structure.[17] This indeed is precisely the point that emerges in our analysis of Sāṁkhya-Yoga understanding of temporality. Within the Sāṁkhya-Yoga frame of reference the subjectivity as the principle of I-ness is the ground of the ontological distinction of past, present and future (as *my* past, *my* present and *my* future) precisely because this principle has its objective reference point in *Prakṛti* (the world) which is the ground of temporal permanence and change.[18]

The empiric subjectivity is not an a-temporal identity.[19] Nor can it be described as a series of atomistic elements of consciousness which are contained in time. The best way to look at subjectivity (*Buddhi-Ahaṁkāra* structure) is to conceive it in its concreteness of the experiential order : it is the structural unity or an identity which holds together the structural whole of temporal becoming. It must not be conceived in substantive terms. Subjectivity is not a substance underlying our experiences in different moments of existence. The substantive existence, the element of constancy and non-temporality belongs to the realm of pure subject or the transcendental consciousness (*Puruṣa*). Subjectivity (*Buddhi-Ahaṁkāra* structure), on the other hand, is continuously on the go. It is the structure of continual unfolding or manifestation of what is unmanifest.

Within the temporal structure, subjectivity (*Buddhi-Ahaṁkāra* structure) is not so much a subject present throughout any moment or a sort of substance. For according to Sāṁkhya-Yoga it is a continuous unfoldment or manifestation of that which has a relation of otherness with the transcendental subject as the constant witness of this unfoldment. The subjectivity then, is a kind of structure of temporal experience—the structure of the disclosing of the fact of change and movement within the very being of subjectivity. Thus subjectivity is a self-constituting synthesis of the temporal dimensions, a unification or identity of experience within the flux of that experience itself. It is the self-constituting unity of temporal experience itself.

Pure consciousness or the transcendental subject, however, is separated from this self-constituting unity of temporal experience in a radical way. *Puruṣa* is not temporal (either as change or as permanence).[20] It is immovable constant (kūtastha). It is not affected by past, present and future mode of being, for it is what it is: unaffected, self-identical, unchanged and unmoved.[21] There is a past for a being who is what he is not and is not what he is, i.e., for a being who is in a state of dialectical relation to something which is of the nature of an other to it. This being in dialectical relation of otherness with *Puruṣa* is the necessary condition for the possibility of the strange experience of lived time as both unity and disjunction.[22] Pure consciousness or the transcendental subject on the other hand is a unity unto itself, a unity in isolation of its own being.[23]

While this phenomenon of subjectivity in the sense in which it is distinguished from the transcendental subject may be described as a case of identity in difference, the latter, i.e., the transcendental subject may be described as pure identity.[24] The former has a mode of being which contains at the very heart of it elements of dispersion and atomisms.

Subjectivity as the centre of egoity and individuality (*Buddhi-Ahaṁkāra* structure) is a self-constituting synthesis of the temporal dimensions. It is the no-structure of temporal experience itself. On the contrary, the pure subject or transcendental consciousness is given fully constituted from the very beginning.[25] *Puruṣa* does not emerge with time; it, rather, exists without beginning beginninglessly as a fully constituted being. More concretely, there never was a moment when it was not there. Not less significant is the fact that it may be discerned as existing in the fullness of its being in every subsequent instants of its existence. Its being contains all the properties that pertain to it in particular instants. It exists with its nature fully determined as already constituted—not just being constituted, i.e., becoming with the passage of time.[26]

Subjectivity, on the other hand, refers to the aspect of being that is constituted in a manifold of phases. Thus in the realm of subjectivity one phase of actualization passes into another phase, the two phases not being disjunct and extends continually into further phases of actualization. This continuous passage from potentiality to actuality[27] is an on-going process in and through which the subjectivity as temporal is constituted.

Puruṣa as the transcendental subject, however, remains self-identical through the constantly arising new instants in which it exists. Subjectivity as being constituted on the basis of the developing phases that are pure activity, is transitory and passes into continual new phases. As such it requires to be grounded in some other being that remains identical despite the passage of time, and which, therefore, surmounts the diversity of constantly emerging new moments and by virtue of this is enduring and permanent. This being is *Prakṛti* which has the temporal mode of permanence (*pariṇāmi nityatā*).[28]

Thus temporality of subjectivity implies a secondary mode of being, a fissuration and dispersion taking place at the very heart of it. This fissuration and dispersion can be overcome only in the mode of discriminative awareness (*viveka jñāna*). Ironically, however, the self-reflecting mode of being leading to discriminative awareness intensifies the problem for the world-involved subject (*Buddhi-Ahaṁkāra* structure). In the very act of overcoming dispersion the mode of being of the subjectivity comes to be dissolved. To be in the mode of discrimination is also to regain the original ground of subject as principle of pure consciousness.[29]

REFERENCES

[1] It is important to note that according to Sāṁkhya-Yoga agency does not belong to the *Puruṣa.* Agency and activity belongs to the *antaḥkaraṇa* (the internal organs). But agency and activity, in as much as it involves conscious reflection, choice and decision, is contingent upon the *antaḥkaraṇa's* reflection of the consciousness that is *Puruṣa-Buddhi-Ahaṁkāra* structure seems to involve the form of consciousness on account of its proximity to the transcendental subject. Equally important to note that even though *Puruṣa* is not the agent or actor, it remains the *bhoktā* (enjoyer) of the results or effects ensuing from these acts. Thus it is said : Akarturapi phalopabhoga anādyavat, *The Sāṁkhya Sūtra*, op. cit., 1.105; ahaṁkāraḥ kartā na puruṣaḥ, ibid, 6.54; also, buddhyadhyavasitamarthaṁ puruṣascetayata, *The Jayamaṅgala*, op. cit., p. 42.

[2] The empiric subject, the subject which is the agent of all activity and willing is always associated with a body. The Sāṁkhya-Yoga makes a distinction between three kinds of body. The empiric subject (*Buddhi-Ahaṁkāra*) cannot be conceived in isolation from subtle body or the *Sukṣma-Sarīra*.

[3] The distinction between subject as subjectivity and the transcendental subject is an important distinction. Transcendental subject is that which essentially is not involved in the world. Subject as subjectivity (*Buddhi-Ahaṁkāra* structure) is the subject that orients itself to the world. To be more precise, world is the project of this subject, for it is the principle of activity and agency. Pure subject (*Puruṣa*), on the other hand, transcends the realm of activity and agency. It is pure consciousness, without any subject-object distinction.

[4] We consider this distinction between real and existent to be central for an intelligible articulation of the temporal mode of being. Temporality is constitutive of existent whereas it is not intrinsic to the real. Existent is always real, but real is not necessarily existent. The distinction, it may be noted, is not (contra Advaita Vedanta), as between real and what is not-real, but between different grades of reality. There is no ontology of counter reality in Sāṁkhya-Yoga.

[5] adhyavasāyaśca niścayā'khyastasyāsādhāraṇī vṛttirityarthaḥ......asyāśca buddhermahattvaṁ sve'tarasakalakāryavyāpakatvan-*mahaisvaryacca* mantavyam, *The Sāṁkhya Pravacana Bhāṣya*, Vijñanabhikṣu, 2.13.

[6] *Buddhi* is the structure of the emergence of consciousness without any self-awareness. It has innate possibility of all merits as well as the opposite. But it is not aware of its own possibilities nor does it identify itself as such. That is the function of *Ahaṁkāra*.

dharmajñānavairāgyaiśvaryāṇyapi budhaupādānakāni, nahaṁkāradyupādānakāni; budhereva niratiśayasattvakāryatvādityartha, ibid, 2.14.

[7] abhimāno ahaṁkāraḥ; *The Sāṁkhya Kārikā*, op. cit., 24; ahaṁ karotītyahaṁkāraḥ......buddhyā niścita evā'r the hamkāramamakārau jayete; Vijñanabhikṣu, *The Sāṁkhya Pravacana Bhāṣya*, 2.16.

[8] In the use of the term there is no suggestion of a psychological understanding involved. The use of the expression faculty is to indicate functional differences within one psyche. *The Sāṁkhya Kārikā*, op. cit., 24-26; *The Sāṁkhya Sūtra*, op. cit., 2.16.

[9] kṣaṇatatkramayoḥ samyamāvivekajaṁ jñānam, *The Yoga Sūtra*, op. cit., 3.52, see *Vyāsa's Bhaṣya* and Vacaspati Miśra's *Tattva Vaiśaradī* on the aforesaid Sūtra; "......when by true wisdom the gunas are perceived as they are both the illusory notions of time and space vanish." Dasgupta, S.N., *Indian Philosophy*, 256-57, n. 2.; For a comprehensive analysis of the mechanisms of reflection and the different planes on which it operates see Dasgupta, *Yoga as Philosophy and Religion*, Delhi, 1973, pp. 150-65.

[10] The paradoxical expression of relation of no-relation or otherness is employed to suggest that even total otherness is given to reflection as a species of relation, rather than as no relation at all. In the discriminative self-reflection pure subject is understood with the help of the notion of the inoperative presence (*sanniddhi*) which constitutes the condition of the bondage and its

absence which marks its freedom. Either way for reflection it is a mode of relation.

[11] see *Sāṁkhya Sūtra*, op. cit., 2.8; Larson, G.J., op. cit., p. 188; Radhakrishnan, S., op. cit., pp. 287-291; Dasgupta, S.N., *History of Indian Philosophy*, pp. 238-41.

[12] see Jayamangala: etāni kimātmārtham svaṁ svaṁ vṛttiṁ pratipadyante, kimanyārthamityāha-puruṣārtha eva heturiti, puruṣasyārtho viṣayopa-bhogaḥ kaivalyaṁ ca sa vṛttihetuḥ, *Jayamaṅgalā*, op. cit., p. 38; Also see *Māṭharvṛtti*: kim svārtha viṣayaṁ pratipadyante ahosvit parārthamityat rocyate parārthamgamyate yasmādāha-puruṣārtha eva hetuḥ purusārthaḥ kartavya eva iti guṇa nām pravṛttịh, p. 48.

[13] The point emerges very clearly in the *Sāṁkhya Kārikā* itself. Kārikā 55 expresses the contradiction and pain suffered by *Puruṣa* on account of its association with the body : tatra jarāmaraṇakṛtaṃ duḥkhaṃ prāpnoti cetanaḥ puruṣaḥ liṅgasyāvinivṛtteḥ tasmād duḥkhaṁ svabhāvena, *The Sāṁkhya Kārikā*, op. cit., Kārikā 55. Kārikā 56 brings out the element of co-operation by stating that it is on account of *prakṛti* that *puruṣa* can gain liberation: ityeṣa prakṛtikṛto mahadādiviśeṣbhūtaparyantaḥ pratipuruṣa vimokṣārtham svārtha iva parārtha ārambhaḥ, ibid, Kārikā 56.

The same idea of the thematic exclusion and operational dependence is continued in Kārikās 57, 58, 59, 60, 20 and 21.

[14] Temporality is defined as a function of internal organs which are the structure of the manifestation of the unmanifest *prakṛti*. These are *Buddhi Ahaṁkāra* and *Manas*. Thus *Sāṁkhya Kārikā* says : antaḥkaraṇaṁ trividhaṁ... trikālamābhyantaraṁ karaṇam, *The Sāṁkhya Kārikā*, op. cit., Kārikā 33.

Gauḍapādabhāṣya on the Kārikā, reads as follows : trikālamābhyantaraṁ karaṇaṁ. Buddhyahaṁkāramanaṁsi trikālaviṣayāni buddhirvartamānaṁ ghataṁ budhyate atītamanāgatam ceti. ahamkāro vartamāne' bhimānaṁ karoti atīte'nāgate ca. tathā mano vartamāṇe'saṁkalpaṁ kurute atīte'nagate ca. evam trikālamābhyantaraṁ karaṇamiti, *The Gaudapādabhāṣya*, ed. and tr. T.G. Mainkar. Poona, 1972, p. 132.

[15] The three internal organs of *Buddhi*, *Ahaṁkāra* and *Manas* operate as unity. As such they constitute the internal relations of past, present and future. Together these three constitute the empiric self, both in its impersonal and personal dimensions. However, it must be noted that *Buddhi* is primarily impersonal though individual. But this *Buddhi* is a necessary condition for the operation or functioning of *Ahaṁkāra* and *Manas* as the structure of temporal constitution.

[16] Catalina, F.V., op. cit., p. 60.

[17] pariṇāminityatā guṇānāṁ, *Vyāsa Bhaṣya on Yoga Sutra*, Sutra 4.33.

[18] see *infra*, note 20.

[19] Only *Puruṣa* as the transcendental subject has an a-temporal identity. A-temporal identity refers to the intrinsic unchangeability characteristic of *Puruṣa* as the principle that transcends the realm of change and temporality. This may be described as permanence without change, i.e., kutasthanityatā (vide *Vyāsa bhāṣya on Yoga-Sūtra*, Sūtra 4.33).

[20] The Sāṁkhya-Yoga makes a distinction between two types of permanence: the absolutely unchanging permanence (the principle of eternality which is

essentially non-temporal in the sense that it is not subject to change) and the permanence in mutation. Permanence of the *Puruṣa* falls in the first category whereas the permanence of the *guṇa* which constitutes the essence of *Prakṛti* falls in the second category : Dvayī ceyamnityatā kūtasthanityatā pariṇāminityatā ca. Tatra kūtasthanityatā puruṣasya, pariṇāminityatā guṇānām, *Vyāsa Bhāṣya on Yoga Sūtra*, 4.33.

[21] Kūtasthanityeṣu svarpuamātra pratiṣtheṣu muktapuruṣaṣu svarupāstitā,

[22] Past, present and future as temporal determinations of empiric being apply only to *Buddhi-Ahaṁkāra* structure. This is the structure of the manifestation of *Prakṛti* (the unmanifest world) which has a character of permanence in mutation. Thus *Buddhi-Ahaṁkāra* structure is the realm of the experience of time as both unity (permanence) and disjunction (change).

[23] see *supra*, note 1.

[24] This is a particular kind of *bhedābheda* which must be distinguished from tha Vedāntic conception of *identity-in-difference.* The concept is employed here to bring out the fact that this being is also the structure of becoming which accounts for a continued identity through the specificity (*vaiśiṣtya*) and differentiation (*bhedānām parimānāt*) that gives rise to the tattvas.

[25] What in the language of Vedānta would be described as bhuta or pariniṣṭhita vastu—i.e., the accomplished being given in all its fullness. (vide *Saṁkara's Commentary on Brahma Sūtra*, 1.11).

[26] The language employed here (fully constituted, existing in fullness, fully determined, etc. etc.) must be understood in respect of its negative emphasis-l.e., denying the opposite. It is analogous to descriptive statements about *Brahman*, like non-duality, etc., whose function as Samkara rightly points out is to negate its opposite. (*ananyatvam vyatirekeṇa abhāvaḥ*).

[27] The expression here is used as rough translation of *Vyakta* and *Avyakta* in relation to *Prakṛti* Puruṣa being outside the point of this polar relation.

[28] see *supra*, note 20.

[29] It is important to remember that *Buddhi* as the mode of being of reflection or as the reflecting mode of being is also the locus of discriminative awareness: saiva ca viśinaṣṭi punaḥ pradhānapuruṣāntaram sūkṣmam, *The Sāṁkhya Kārikā*, op. cit., Kārikā 37.

PART II

ABHIDHARMA BUDDHISM

CHAPTER 5

ABHIDHARMA ONTOLOGY AND THE PROBLEM OF TEMPORALITY

THE ONTOLOGY OF NON-BEING (ANĀTMA)

Anātma is the Alpha and Omega of Ābhidharmika Buddhism. Non-substantiality of being, and the essential impermanence and impersonality of the empirical ego constitute the cornerstone of Ābhidharmika ontology. The radicality of this ontological perspective built upon what is empirical and is open to reflective verification consists of a concern with the dynamics of change. The phenomenal world, the world that we dwell in and deal with, the world which is the constant reference point for all our thought, actions and feeling is constantly changing. It is not only the world around us, but also the "I," the ego which belongs to the world is subject to incessant change. The ontology on non-being (*anātma*) is not a mere rejection of the existence of self,[1] as it has been understood by many students of Buddhism; it implies an all-embracing world perspective which tends to reject the substantiality of being in any form, material or immaterial. Thematically, it is an extension of the notion of impermanence or (*anitya*) which is seen not as a mark (*lakṣana*) of being but the very mode of being, an element of its very structure.[2]

The significance of the *Anātma* doctrine for early Buddhism, in its twin aspects of non-substantiality and impermanence, cannot be overemphasised. In its specific formulation the *Anātma* as the assertion of non-egoity remained the central concern of Ābhidharmika Buddhism.[3] Ādhidharmikas have constantly retained the idea of *Anātma* as enunciated in the other two *Piṭakas* recording basic insights of Buddha into the nature of phenomenal existence.

In the *Saṁyukta Nikāya* we have the words of Buddha to the effect that that which is embodied is *not the self*: "rupa is not the self........whatever form there is—past, future or present, inner or outer gross or subtle, low or exalted, near or far away—all that form is not mine, I am not this, this is not my self."[4]

The same assertion is made with regard to four other aggregates (*skandhas*) considered constituting the essential core of human existence; the feeling (*vedanā*), perceptions (*samjñā*), impulses or dispositions (*saṁskāra*), and, intellect or consciousness (*vijñāna*). The analysis that is made is to the effect that none of these can be the self; that all these are in reality, not merely in appearance, *Anātma* i.e., devoid of self-hood or ego-hood.[5] The same insight underlies the systematic analysis of the idea of *satkāyadṛṣṭi*, the false view of individuality. The *Satkāyadṛṣṭi* or the false view of individuality consists in considering the five-skandhas as the self just as one tends to identify the flame of a lamp with the lamp. *Satkāyadṛṣṭi* consist in viewing self as what owns or possesses the five *skandha's* just as one may say that the tree has (possesses) its shadow. The five *skandhas* may be looked upon as being or residing in the self just as the fragrance resides in the flower. Or alternately the self may be seen as being in the *skandhas* just as we may speak of a gem in the casket. All these ways of apprehending the self, according to the *Anātma* doctrine, are essentially erroneous in as much as they tend to identify self with the five *skandhas*, one way or the another.[6]

While these insights into *Anātma* constitute the basic ontological perspective present in the other two piṭakas, *Adhidharma Piṭaka* makes special effort to work out the implications of the *Anātma* doctrine in terms of their understanding of dharmas. The non-substantiality and the impermanence of the self, is only considered an instance of the lack of substance and permanence characterising all phenomena. This is the original sense of the word. Thus no phenomenon possesses any substantiality or permanence. Phenomena as such are reduced to a mere conglomeration of independently existing distinct moments of existence called '*dharmas*.' The *dharmas* are not some transcendent reality behind or beyond the appearance of phenomena; rather they are the only mode of reality. A *dharma* is 'a truly real event'[7] constituting the irreducible, unique datum of the phenomenal world presented to the reflective consciousness in the moment of critical awareness. Consciousness itself when objectified i.e., when it turns to itself in the moment of critical reflection, it finds itself as nothing but a conglomeration of momentarily existing distinct *dharmas* without any *substantial* continuity. Thus the Ābhidharmika Buddhism may be described as :

> a radical pluralism erected on the denial of Substance and the acceptance of discrete momentary entities. Dharma is the concrete conception in this, as it is in the other systems of Buddhism. Change, becoming, is the central problem here.........The characteristic standpoint of the Ābhidharmika system can be expounded as a polemic against substance, the permanent and the universal conceived as real in the systems of the ātma tradition. The real (*dharma*) is momentary; it is simple, unitary; it is particular, unique.[8]

The Ābhidharmika conception of *dharmas* as the unique, ultimate and irreducible limit point of existence needs to be distinguished from normal understanding of reality in terms of idealism or realism. Realism takes commonsense things at their face value and is prepared to grant it a status independent of cognizing consciousness. Idealism, on the other hand, ultimately reduces the elements of existence to a mere ideal construction or manifestation of the cognizing consciousness.[9] *Dharma* theory, however, transcends the inherent metaphysical constructions incident to a popular understanding of reality by viewing the *dharmas* as 'real events' perceived by the reflexive consciousness. The *dharmas* are perceived by the reflexive consciousness as constituting the reality of the common sense-world and also of itself; the specific combinations of these *dharmas* go into the making of the empirical consciousness or give rise to the variations of empirical consciousness. Thus, *dharmas* are not real in the sense that they are the objects confronting the subject nor are they ideal in the sense that they are constituted of or produced by the consciousness. Rather, they are the ultimate limit-points of existence which go into making of the phenomenal world that the subject encounters and to which it (the subject) belongs. Thus in Ābhidharmika Buddhism:

> the common sense data are thus retraced to, transformed into or replaced by concepts which are both more intelligible and fundamental. The world therefore is perceived as composed of an unceasing flow of simple ultimates. called dharmas, which can be defined as (1) simple. (2) momentary, (3) impersonal, (4) mutually conditioned events.[10]

Given this understanding of the phenomenal reality and its constitution, our enquiry must next direct itself to the Ābhidharmika understanding of the nature and constitution of consciousness. What are those *dharmas*, conglomeration of which, tend to give rise to a conception of Self or Person as embodiment of empiric consciousness? If empiric consciousness or person is nothing more than a conglomeration, i.e., only a name for what are momentary and exist only for a limited duration, then how are we to account for the phenomenal continuity in the world?

THE STRUCTURE OF EMPIRIC CONSCIOUSNESS

Ābhidharmikas propose a threefold classification of *dharmas* which together go to constitute the phenomenon of empiric consciousness.[11]

A. *Five Skandhas*: (1) Form, *rūpa*, is the material essence of the phenomena; (2) Feelings (*Vedana*) can be pleasant, unpleasant or neutral; (3) Perceptions (*Samjña*) are six corresponding to the six sense organs; (4) Despositions or Impulses (*Saṁskāra*) are all tendencies, impulses, volitions, strivings, emotions, etc.; (5) Consciousness (*Vijñāna*) determines and superintends the other mental *skandhas*.

B. *The Twelve Sense-Fields* (*Āyatanas*): These are : eye; sight-objects; ear; sounds; nose; smell; tongue; taste; body; touchables; mind; mind-objects. *Āyatana* is used in the sense of *āya-dvāra*, which literally means the 'door of coming into' or 'the door of arrival.' It can also mean gaining as opposed to *vyvya* (loosing).

C. *The Eighteen Dhātus* : These are the six sense-organs, the six sense objects, and the corresponding six sense consciousness.

Person as the empiric consciousness or the subject of the world experience is constituted of five *skandhas* or constituents which "define the limits of the basis of grasping after self."[12] Whatever the individual comes to comprehend as constituting self, as the ultimate reference point of his world-experience, whatever he looks at as belonging to or somehow concerning the self, all the facts of experience of individuals and objects in relation to individuals are ultimately traceable to five *skandhas*. Similarly sense-field (*āyatanas*) is concerned with the origin of the mental *dharmas* of 'thought and its concomitants.' The reflective consciousness in its discriminative stance is able to see that thought and its concomitants are nothing but collocation or conjunction of sense-organs and sense-objects.

Thus, as Edward Conze puts it: "The sense-field are the reason (*kāraṇa*) why mental events originate or take place, and are their birthplace, as the Deccan is the locality where cattle are born."[13] Further elaborating the role of *Āyatanas* Conze writes:

> It is wrong for me to regard 'my' thoughts as free creations of 'my' self or 'consciousness.' Manifestly they are in bondage of organs and object, which must be in contact for any act of consciousness to arise, and both of which are alien to me, for I cannot claim to have made either my biological constitution, or the objects of my thought. Both are given and imposed upon me.[14]

While these observations of Conze regarding the role and place of *Āyatanas* in the Buddhist understanding of the constitution of the phenomenal world are quite perceptive and essentially correct, we tend to disagree with his further observation to the effect that "the subjective components have an overwhelming influence in shaping the appearance of an object, which, as a 'thing in itself,' is quite inaccessible."[15] The Ābhidharmika ontology does not resort to the notion of subjective factors shaping the world of phenomena. And, likewise, it does not accept the idea of a 'thing in itself' or 'noumena' which remains inaccessible to us. The Ābhidharmika ontological framework steers clear of these approaches to the reality. *Dharmas*, which are real, are neither a product of nor projection of our consciousness which has a free hand in the construction of reality, nor are they the 'things in themselves' of which the phenomenal world is a mere appearance. Rather, *dharmas* are the ultimate constituents that go into the making of the phenomenal reality and are disclosed to us as such only when we acquire a discriminative stance which sets out to see the reality in its 'functional' aspect rather than in substantive terms. *Anātma* is an attestation to the non-substantiality of the reality both as subject and object. Subject and object are essentially placed on the same ontological footing.

This functional understanding of reality in terms of discrete momentary *dharmas*, without any substantive support raised some problems in certain areas of early Buddhism. In reaction to the theory of *dharmas* as proposed by Sarvāstivādins there arose the school of Vatsiputriyaș who advocated the reality of *Pudgala* (person) over and against the reality of impersonal *dharmas*. *Pud-*

galvādins, who may be described as personalist Buddhists, maintained that the Sarvastivādin explication of the empirical ego in terms of five *skandhas* etc. suffered from the inexorable difficulty of explaining the continuity on the phenomenal level.[16] If the self were a mere appearance and the phenomenal being a mere conglomeration of incessantly changing *dharmas* (*skandhas*, etc.), how are we to account for those aspects of phenomenal existence which implies a continuity through the fleeting moments. The fact of memory, of karmic action and consequent retribution, the idea of agency and the realm of inter-subjective world exemplified in the friendly dispositions are some of the reasons proposed by Vatsiputriyas in support of their unequivocal assertion of individuality, called *Pudgala*, which according to Satkari Mukherjee "has the metaphysical virtue of explaining the continuity of the empirical ego to the avoidance of the fallacy of eternal self posited by the heretical thinkers."[17]

Significantly, for the Pudgalvādins, *Pudgala* as the psychophysical complex which maintains its identity through the changing moments of empirical existence did not imply positing a self over and against the five *skandhas*. They seem to be eager to maintain their allegiance to the *Anātma* doctrine and as such tried to define the relationship of *Pudgala* to *skandhas* in a way that would exclude an 'erroneous belief in a self.' *Pudgala* is neither identical with nor different from the five skandhas.[18] And yet the "*Pudgala* can be conceived in correlation with the *skandhas* which have been appropriated at any given time inwardly."[19] According to Pudgalvādins just as fire is always found in correlation with the fuel it burns and on which it thrives, and is never apart from it, by itself, nevertheless, it is real, so does *pudgala* "manifests itself through the psycho-physical elements, and therefore co-exists with them, not as a separate thing, but as a kind of 'structural unity."[20]

The position of Pudgalvādins has received favourable treatment at the hands of some keen students of Buddhism, such as Edward Conze and A.B. Keith. Not only have they considered the pudgalvāda as consisting of great philosophical significance, but have also maintained that the notion of *Pudgala* is in strict accord with the basic formulations of Buddhism. Keith commends the theory of *Pudgala* in following words:

> Its merits, however, are obvious, it mediates in the best Buddhist

manner, between phenomena with a basis and the permanent self of the Brahmanic tradition. It accords also, though the point seems not to have been noted, with the position asserted by Sariputta in his discussions with Sati for there we find that Tathāgata is declared neither to be the five aggregates nor to be different from them. In truth the doctrine of the purely phenomenal self was one which presented interminable difficulties.[21]

Edward Conze too finds that the theory of *Pudgala* was a necessary antidote to the damage caused by the Ābhidharmika understanding of self as a mere conglomeration of isolated momentary events or existences called dharmas. Conze maintains that Pudgalvādins corrected the errors of Abhidharmist in at least two significant ways:[22]

> 1. It was clearly a mistake of lesser minds to deny categorically that the self exists. As the personalists pointed out, it had been said that to say that the self does not exist, in truth and reality (*satyatah sthititah*), is a wrong view. The Buddha, as a matter of fact, in a famous dialogue with Vatsogotra had refused to commit himself on the question of the existence of the self.
> 2. In another respect also the one-sided philosophizing of the Abhidharmist was bound to produce its own opposite......The Abhidharmists by insisting that only isolated momentary events are real, held on to processes to the exclusion of all substance, and gloried in denying the relative permanence of objects as well as their relative unity.[23]

Whether Ābhidharmikas or Pudgalvādins remained true to Buddha's teaching is a purely historical question and lies beyond the scope of this investigation. However, the charge of one-sidedness of the theory of Ābhidharmikas and its inadequacy in explaining the facts of phenomenal existence is one that needs careful consideration. Whether the postulation of *Pudgala* is a necessary pre-requisite for explaining the elements of continuity in the realm of phenomenal existence and whether this postulation of *Pudgala* is compatible with the *Anātma* doctrine as indeed the Pudgalvādins claim, are the questions that require our immediate attention.

The irreconcilability of *Anātma* doctrine with the postulate of *Pudgala* has been amply demonstrated by Vasubandhu.[24] Of course

Vasubandhu's repudiation of *Pudgala* as proposed by Vātsīputrīyas is basically from Sautrāntika position. It is in Sautrāntika that the notion of Ego as series of durationless momentary existences crystalizes in its clearest and maturest form. The idea is not consistently worked out in Sarvāstivāda or Therāvāda. But Sautrāntikas, while in general dissociating themselves from Ābhidharmikas, did accept *Anātma* or non-substantiality of the Ego as the cornerstone of Buddhist thought and took a stand against the Vātsīputrīyas notion of person. In a nutshell the argument against *Pudgala* takes the following form:

> "......any self (*pudgala*) which really exists must be something over and above the impermanent factors of empiric individuality. But such a self, which must be uncaused, eternal, and without change, would be without activity or practical efficiency (*artha-kriyākāritra*) which is the essential characteristic of reality... there in the consciousness nothing more than the fact of a series of thought moments which are in causal relation...But there is continuity in the individual though not a self."[25]

The urge to account for continuity in the phenomenal existence, despite a clear rejection of an abiding self as a substance or a structural unity as person is constantly present in the post-Sarvāstivāda Buddhist literature. Thus the later Therāvādins proposed a theory of a 'life-continuum' (*bhāvānga*) which is subconscious and subliminal.[26] The continuity is accounted for by taking recourse to the notion of a subconscious region where the mind is unceasingly functioning as the source of all continuities. Mahāsanghikas too, incorporated this idea in their theory of a basic (*Mūla*) consciousness. Relegating the function of continuity to the realm of this basic consciousness they maintained that karma matures in the subconscious mind where thought has a definite object.[27] Mahisasika even proposed a distinction between three kinds of *skandhas: skandhas* which are instantaneous, *skandhas* which has a span of one life, and *skandhas* enduring until the *Sansāra* i.e., realization of *Nirvāna*.[28] Noticing these tendencies in Ābhidharmika Buddhism. Conze observes:

> Concepts like these were designed to escape from the straight jacket of the Abhidharma, and try to establish the equivalent

> not only of an empirical but also of true self...All these theoretical constructions are attempts to combine the doctrine of 'not-self' with the almost instinctive belief in a 'self' empirical or true.[29]

One must pause here and consider if Conze is right in maintaining that these notions run counter to the Ābhidharmika *anātma* doctrine. Are not these tendencies conspicuous in the Ābhidharmika formulations as indeed in other cannonical literature? It seems to us that while Conze is right in noting that these tendencies are efforts to bring Ātma doctrine from the backdoor, he is wrong in maintaining that they run counter to the basic tenets of Ābhidharmikas. Our contention is that the tendencies are conspicuously present in the Ābhidharmikas too.

The Ābhidharmika Buddhism, far from being a simple and naive process philosophy, is dialectical in its approach to reality. If it is not strictly a vindication of a theory of reality as pure flux, it is not also correct to say that it affirms the reality of a true abiding self. True, elements of a self-theory are discernible in the Ābhidharmika Buddhism, possibly under the impact of the Sāṁkhyan model or view. What, however, should not be overlooked is the prominent place given alongside these elements to the pre-Ābhidharmika denial of the self in it. Both subject and object, as we already noted, are placed on the same ontological footing. In this respect the Ābhidharmika formulations must be differentiated from the Sāṁkhya-yoga, where subject and object are distinguished in terms of *Kūtastha* (unaffected by change) and *Pariṇāmi* (the principle of change and movement). We will return to the problem of the relationship between Sāṁkhya-yoga and Ābhidharmika Buddhism later. Suffice it to say at this point that the tension of the permanent and the changing, of continuity and discontinuity, of being and becoming is integral to the Ābhidharmika Buddhism.

We have seen that *dharmas* are ultimate, irreducible units of existence, which can best be described as 'real events.' The term '*dharma*' has been often rendered as elements of existence. Such renderings smack of atomism which may be true of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and other such realistic systems, but are alien to the basic ontological perspective of Buddhism. There are good reasons for rendering 'dharma' as 'real events.' While events can be instantaneous, elements cannot. And this instantaneousness or momentariness is constitutive of the very existence of dharmas. The occurrence of a certain state of affairs or of a certain objective situation constitutes an event. The characteristic of event is that they have no duration. This point has already been made in the context of *dharmas*.

The question is: does the 'coming into being' and the 'passing away' of dharmas as real events imply that the existence of dharmas is 'punctual'? Is the existence of dharmas punctual? The existence of *dharmas* are called punctual only if it were the case that the instants (*kṣaṇa*) of their 'coming into being' and 'passing away' are but mere "positions" in a one-dimensional temporal continuum. If the instants in question are individual units of time which stand out distinctly in a time-sequence then charge of 'punctuality' of existence of dharma as an *actual* event does not extend beyond the span of a *single* concrete now. A *dharma* having come into being does not endure awaiting to be dislodged by other *dharma* from being 'actual.' After having occurred once, the said *dharma* as a real event does somehow belong to the world series (*saṁtāna*) in which it has occurred. But it can be detected exposed only by taking the actual present as our point of departure because they are limited to one instant of effective existence. The essence of time is only partially revealed in the dharma's present mode of being, i.e., only in the actuality, which distinguishes the present.

The 'actuality' that events of *dharmas* are suffused with, permeates all events, but more specifically whatever is 'now', and in this respect what is actual for Ābhidharmika transcends the autonomy of an object. Though self-existence is a necessary condition for actuality, it is not sufficient to make something present i.e., actual.

Thus, there are no events in the realm of *Nirvāna* and *Ākāśa* (the *Asaṁskṛta dharma*) precisely because they are non-actual and timeless.

It may be noted that within Ābhidharmic framework the actual is characterized by being directly active, or, expressed differently by action or being operational. The actual may be said to "exist" precisely on account of the fact that it is active i.e., efficient. And it is in terms of this efficiency or activity that it conditions the emergence of what is to follow into being. The ground for the occurrence of a causal connection within the compass of a present must be looked for in this function of what is actual.[39]

But a *dharma* does not cease to be real or does not become unreal when it ceases to be actual by losing its operancy. The relegation of a *dharma* into the past mode of existence means that the *dharma* as a real event has ceased to be operative in its immediacy. In other words, it is condemned to an 'absence' forever from every new 'present', and no recollection, not even the most vivid and accurate, can succeed in extracting it from that absence and in making it present again. At the same time a past dharma, although it has ceased to be strictly actual, has not been completely annihilated. It does not break off with each new instant of time, but retains a special mode of being extending into the continuation of the same process. Thus, according to Ābhidhārmika thinkers it is actuality or being operative, and not existence, that distinguishes the present dharma from the past and the future ones.[31] Neither the past nor the future is an absolute void. That, which is past, is past by virtue of having been actual. That dharma which is future has not yet been realized, i.e., lacks actuality.[32]

The transience as a mode of being thus may be seen to be contingent upon a *dharma* becoming actual and displacing a *dharma* which was just present but is no longer present. Transience, above all consists in perpetual transformation of the actuality of something present into that enigmatic "no-longer-being-present-anymore." This perpetual transformation, in which consists the essence of temporality, ontologically speaking, is an imperfection (*saṃskṛtatva*) which is constitutive of the nature of *dharmas*. It must be kept in mind, that it is not an accidental feature of the *dharmas* brought about by some extraneous considerations. The 'imperfection' relates to the impossibility of persisting in actuality without sliding into the past. This, to some degree, partially discloses the peculiar Ābhidhārmika way of accounting for continuity and permanence in the phenomenal world. The logical and semantical difficulties involved in expounding the Buddhist theory of instantaneous reality can be illustrated by the following observations of Frauwallner :

> the becoming and arising of dharmas is not a real arising and disappearing, but a wandering of always existent entities from one period of time into another, Entities which seem to have newly arisen, in fact wander from the future into the present and when they perish, they are transferred into the past period. In

> the personal continuity also events do not arise and perish, but the continuity is a stream which flows from the future into the past.[33]

Thus from Ābhidhārmika's point of view, Persons or *Pudgala* as a specific conglomeration of certain dharmas, may undergo change; but the *fact* of this conglomeration, '*once-having-been*' and maintaining its '*once-having-been*' *mode* of reality does not undergo complete annihilation. It acquires a somewhat different mode of reality which may provisionally be classified as, retrogressively, derivative mode of being. The pudgala, the existential base of once-having-been conglomeration of psycho-physical skandhas, being radically transcendent in relation to an 'actual' existent conglomeration of psycho-physical skandhas capable of acting in the present, remains in the realm of being, because it conditioned and inter alia caused the present reality. But the something past remains in existence only as—so to speak—a retrogressively derivative being—namely as secondarily derivative, proceeding, "backwards" from a certain actuality subsequent to it. The present, as actual and active, is ultimately grounded in the past, which has a being characterized by the mode of non-actuality.

We will have occasion to work out the implications of this position in detail in our discussion of Ābhidhārmika notion of time and temporality. Suffice it to point out at this juncture that the problem of continuity and persistence is integral to Abhidharma ontology and any suggestion to the contrary stems from a lack of appreciation of the fuller import of Ābhidhārmika notion of impermanence and from an under-estimation of their concern with the problem of permanence and continuity in the phenomenal existence. A somewhat more detailed investigation of this aspect of Ābhidhārmika thought and its relationship to the Ābhidhārmika understanding of time and temporality will be the subject-matter of the following section.

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[1]see Bhattacharya, H.D., 'Early Buddhism,' in *History of Philosophy Eastern and Western*, ed. S. Radhakrishnan, I, 1967, pp. 161-63 ; Radhakrishnan, S., *Indian Philosophy*, II; Thomas, E.J., pp. 92-106; Keith, p. 64.

[2] see Murti, T.R.V., pp. 69-76.

[3] Conze, 1962, p. 39. "In its core the mark of not-self is a simple corollary of the impermanence of everything. There can be no lasting individuality because Skandhas have neither permanence or unity."

[4] Anattā-lakkhana-Sūtta, *The Samyukta Nikāya*, 23.59.

[5] ibid.

[6] ibid, 3.66; 4.34.

[7] We use this interpretation of *dharma* after Conze whose defence of it is extremely convincing. see Conze, 1962, pp. 92-106. For other interpretations of *dharma* see Stcherbatsky, *The Central Conception of Buddhism*, Calcutta, 1961.

[8] Murti, T.R.V., p. 69.

[9] The epistemological distinction of Realism-Idealism is not applicable with respect to our understanding of the philosophical schools under investigation. In sharp reaction to the ontologically oriented speculations of the *Upaniṣads*, Buddhism, as it is well known, inaugurates the critical phase of knowledge orientation, thus setting the stage for the later pramāṇavāda. The generality of Buddhist schools, though biased in favour of an idealistic theory of knowledge, include also a pronouncedly "realistic" predilection for understanding reality without reference to its mind-dependedness, as may be seen, for example, in the case of Sarvāstivāda which is under discussion in this chapter.

[10] Conze, 1962, p. 97.

[11] The following presentation is primarily based on Conze. For detailed analysis of the dharma doctrine of Sarvāstivādins see, Stcherbatsky, 1961.

[12] ibid, p. 107.

[13] ibid, p. 108.

[14] ibid.

[15] ibid, p. 110.

[16] For detailed analysis of the Pudgalavāda, see *Abhidharmakośam*, ed. Swami Dwarikadas Sastri, IV, pp. 1189 ff.

[17] Mukerjee, Satkari, *The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux*, Calcutta, 1935, p 186.

[18] *Tattvasamgraha*, verses 343-344.

[19] Pratyutpanna-adhyātmika upātta-skandhān upādāya pudgalaḥ prajñapyate. *Abhidharmakośa*, 9.233. vide Edward Conze, 1962.

[20] Conze, Edward, 1962, p. 128.

[21] Keith, 1923, pp. 83-84.

[22] Conze, 1962, p. 25.

[23] ibid.

[24] *Abhidharmakośam*, IV, pp. 1189ff.

[25] Keith, 1923, p. 175.

[26] see Saratchandra, E.R., "Bhavānga and the Buddhist psychology of Perception," *University of Ceylon Review*, I, 1943, pp. 94-102; also by the same author, *The Buddhist Psychology of Perception*, Ceylon, 1958.

[27] see Silburn, L., *Instant et Course*, Paris, 1955, pp. 237-43.

[28] Conze, 1962, p. 133.

[29] Conze, 1962, p. 133.

[30] *infra*, pp. 98-9.

[31] ibid.

[32] ibid.

[33] Frauwallner, E., *Die Philosophie des Buddhisimus*, 1956, pp. 140-41; Conze, 1962, p. 139.

CHAPTER 6

ABHIDHARMA CONCEPTION OF TIME AND TEMPORALITY

THE CATEGORY OF TIME AND THE THEORY OF DHARMA AS TEMPORAL

It is in early Ābhidhārmika literature of Sarvāstivāda that we find the first attempt to understand temporality as a process. The Ābhidhārmikas of Sarvāstivāda tradition disregarded the question of the substantive reality of time as a factor in the temporal determination. The basic issue for them was not, whether Time exists as an independent reality, which in conjunction with other realities or events constitute temporal determinations; their primary concern was to account for the knowledge of things as temporally determined and that they could do by acknowledging the reality of dharmas as past, present, and future. Thus *Mahāvibhāṣā* on *Jñānaprasthāna* declared that everything is real, the past (*atīta*) and the future (*anāgata*) are as much real as the present (*prattyutpanna*).[1] The theory proposed here does not make any distinction between things in themselves, such as, past, and future matter, and the representations one has of them. It is here that we find the realism of Sarvāstivāda present in its most undeniable form. It is not the reality of past, present, and future as three points of time that is posited by *Mahāvibhāṣā*; rather, it is the reality of things or *dharmas* as past, present, and future that is admitted here. Time is no factor in the determination of things or *dharmas* as past, present, or future. Rather it is the operation of the *Saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* of *jati*, *sthiti*, and *jarā* that accounts for a dharma being past, present, or future. In early Ābhidhārmic literature we come across an alternative to *Kālavādins*, when *Sarvāstivādins* point out that the temporal determinations of things are built into the very structure of the becomingness of a being. Thus *Mahāvibhāṣā* points out:

> If all the three saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas have not yet been active, the *dharma* is called future. If one of them has already finished its activity and thus are just active, then the *dharma* is called present. If they have already finished their activity, the *dharma* is called past.[2]

It is important to note, that early Ābhidhārmic literature never considered the determination of *dharma's* temporal quality to be a function of transcendental-eternal Time, which, somehow contains things in three receptacles of time, and is responsible for temporal designations of past, present, and future. Thus *Mahāvibhāṣā* clearly rejected the option which would seem to suggest :

> the svabhāva of Time is *nitya*, but the svabhāva of the *saṃskṛtadharmas* is *anitya.* The *saṃskṛtadharmas* wander across the times just as a fruit from one pot to another, or as a man from one house into another. This is also the case with the *saṃskṛtadharmas* : going out of the future they enter into the present, and they go out of the present and enter into the past.[3]

In this rejection of the receptum notion of Time, is implicit the basic Buddhist denial of the substantiality and permanence, a model set by *Mahāvibhāṣā* which is consistently adhered to by Sarvāstivāda. All Sarvāstivādin statements about the reality of past, present, and future must be interpreted in correspondence with this understanding of temporal determinations. It is true, that in *Ābhidhārmic* literature we come across Sarvāstivādin statements, which state : "*dharmas* wander across the three Times; *nirvāṇa* lies beyond the three Times; there exists a Future, a Past, etc..." But all these statements, as Schayer has already noted, are expressed in colloquial sense and must be interpreted as metaphorical statements, rather than literally. Thus in the statement "each *dharma* exists in the three Times as future, present and past" the term 'Three times' is, consequently, only a synonymous denomination (*adhivacana*) for Sanskrtadharma.[4] Early *Ābhidhārmic* literature clearly rejected any distinction between a *dharma* and its temporal determination. Temporal determinations, instead of being a function of an eternal transcendent Time, are built into the very structure of the becomingness of a *dharma*. Accordingly, they argued that there is no distinction between the temporality of a *dharma* and its conditionedness (*saṃskṛtatva*). What is given as temporal flow is nothing but an incessant flow of conditioned *dharmas*, apart from which time does not have an independent reality. In other words, time consists of conditional *dharmas*, and conditional *dharmas* are time, and that the time is that, the growth of which consists of the manifestation of *saṃskṛta dharmas*. The theory, then, considers time as a mere modality of the conditioned *dharmas*, apart from which it does not have any reality.

Given this understanding of time and temporality in early Ābhidhārmic thought one feels intrigued to discover in later Buddhist literature a tendency to describe Sarvāstivādins either as *Kālavādin* (upholder of the reality of time) or *traikālyavādin* (upholder of the reality of past, present and future). It is important to remember that for early Ābhidhārmikas or Sarvāstivādins, time can only be conceived in terms of the functionality of a *dharma*, apart from which they do not have any independent status. It is not surprising, then, that in their technical discussion of the temporal qualification or determination of *dharma*, the terms time (*kāla*) never occurs.

Pāli *Abhidharma* literature disagrees fundamentally with Sanskrit Ābhidhārmic understanding of temporality. Herein we find an extensive refutation of the Sarvāstivādin view that everything exists, understood in the sense that past, present and future equally exist.[5] Their very starting point it seems, therefore, erroneous. However, this fact is immaterial in determining the true import of Therāvādins own exposition. They denied the reality of past and future and came to the conclusion that present alone exists.

The debate between Therāvādins and Sarvāstivādins is presented in *Kathāvatthu* as a debate on the reality status of things existing in past, present, and future. The Sarvāstivādins are credited with accepting the existence of all *dharmas*, but not always and everywhere in the same form. The Therāvādins, however, take the Sarvāstivāda on its face value and confront them with the problems inherent in the proposition of *sarvam asti*. If everything exists, then "does the right view (*sammaditthi*) which looks upon your wrong view (*micchāditthi*) as wrong, exist ?"[6] The acceptance of simultaneous existence of the views only points to the contradiction to which 'everything exists doctrine' can lead.

The Therāvādins attack Sarvāstivādins for accepting the existence of past and future dharmas. By equating past, and future to present, the Therāvādins propose that the existence of past and future should be predicated in the same way as of the present. This, however, is not admissible to Sarvāstivādins who propose a distinction in the mode of existence of past, present, and future *dharmas*. Therāvādins follow their argument by pointing out that if a *rūpa-kandha* (material-aggregate) becomes past by giving up its presentness (*paccuppannbhāve*), then it is also possible to conceive it as giving up its materiality (*rūpa-bhāva*).[7] Sarvāstivādins reply to this consists in their demonstration of the untenability of Therāvādins argument as outlined above. They point out the lacunae in Therāvādins argument in the following way : let a piece of white cloth be regarded as one inseparable object; when this piece of cloth is coloured, it abandons its whiteness, similarly past *dharma* gives up its *paccupannabhāva* (its existence as present).[8] Now can it be said of this piece of cloth that it also gives up its clothliness in abandoning its whiteness when coloured ? Therāvādins do not accept the alternative offered here. Accordingly, Sarvāstivādin's position that a *rūpa-dharma* is changing its temporal qualification does not abandon its materiality or the being of *rūpa-dharma*. However, Therāvādin is not prepared to give in, and follows his argument in a different way. He points out that if the material aggregate (*rūpa-dharma*) does not give up its materiality (*rūpa-bhāva*), then the *rūpa-dharma* becomes permanent, eternally existing like *nibhāna*—a conclusion not acceptable to Sarvāstivādins either, for they categorically deny that rūpabhāva and nibbānabhāva are identified. Only *nibbānabhāva* can be eternal, not the *rūpa-bhava*.

The debate is carried on in *Kathāvatthu* and *Kathāvatthu-prakarṇa Aṭṭhakathā* further. One specific problem that Therāvādin raises is, whether past (*atīta*) gives up its pastness (*atītabhāva*) ? The Sarvāstivādins answer is in negative. They point out that in asserting the existence of *atītabhāva*, they mean that *anāgatabhāva* (futurity) and *paccupannabhāva* (presentness) do not exist in the same way as the *atītabhāva*. And similarly when they predicate existence of *anāgatabhāva*, they mean *atītabhāva* and *paccupannabhāva* do not exist like *anāgatabhāva*.[9] Thus Sarvāstivādin specifically deny that a *dharma* passes from one state into another. This Therāvādin construes to mean that *atītabhāva* too (the being in the mode of past) acquires a permanence or eternity, and therefore, is subject to the earlier question about its likeness with the *nibbana* or *nibbāna-bhāva*.

Therāvādins come up with another problem which they think that Sarvāstivādins, asserting the existence of everything, will have to face. They point out, the Sarvāstivādins will have to accept the existence of past (*atīta*) and of non-past (*navatīta*) as well as future (*anāgata*) and non-future (*navanāgata*). They argue :

1. if the existence of past and non-past as also future and non-future is denied, then Sarvāstivādins should not assert that past, and future exist; and, also
2. if they do not accept the identity of *atīta*, *paccupana*, and *anāgata*, they cannot say that *atīta* and *anāgata* exist.

The second argument is considered more elaborately, whereby applying the dialectic of this being, that is, this not-being, that is not (hutvā hoti hutvā hoti; na hutvā na hoti, na hutvā na hoti), Therāvādins show the untenability of Sarvāstivādins' acceptance of temporal distinctions. The Therāvādins emphasise the inter-penetrability of past, present, and future and conclude that both past and future can be cognized only as that which is present to the cognizer.[10] This being so only present exists; past and future, if they exist at all, they can exist only as present.

The following points emerge from this brief re-capitulation of Sarvāstivādin and Therāvādin debate on the question of temporal qualifications :

1. According to Sarvāstivādin, the past or future, as usually understood, as the two slices of empty time in which dharma reside, do not exist; what we discern is the reality of a dharma which has already past (*atīta*) as well as that which has not yet come (*anāgata*);
2. It is wrong to assume that *dharmas* or *Khandhas* persist in the past, present and future. What persists may be the *bhāva* or the mode of being of a *dharma* which is constantly changing.
However, according to Therāvādins. The mode of being of a thing is not separable from the thing itself, and as such if the *bhāva* of a *dharma* or *skandha* persists through past, present, and future, then it is permanent or eternal, and possesses same

status of reality as the *nibbānbhāva*. This, of course, would be an heresy unacceptable to Sarvāstivādins;

Secondly, for Therāvādins the time distinctions are only conventional without any basis in the reality itself; there is no ontological basis for temporal qualifications, and that past and future can exist only as given in the present; therefore, present alone exists.

In view of the above articulation of the Sarvāstivāda understanding of temporality, it is surprising to note a tendency among some modern scholars to suggest that Sarvāstivāda contributed to a view of time which conceived time as an ontological reality containing change. Drawing upon Pāli sources, David J. Kalupahana maintains : "the Sarvāstivāda represented a school of realism and . . . . . they upheld the independent reality not only of things, but also of time."[11] John M. Koller agrees with Kalupahana's interpretation of the Sarvāstivāda and maintains that Nāgārjuna's critique of Time[12] is "directed primarily at the Sarvāstivādin, who took time to be an ontological container of change and divided the container into three segments, (past, present, and future)."[13]

In the first place, both Koller and Kalupahana are mistaken in assuming that Nāgārjuna's critique of time is directed against the Sarvāstivāda. There is nothing in Nāgārjuna's *kāla parikṣa* to substantiate their contention that the view of time criticised by Nāgārjuna is in fact the one held by the Sarvāstivādins.[14] As a matter of fact, it may be gathered from the Candrakirti's Vṛtti on *Mūlamādhyamikakārikā* that the target of Nāgārjuna's attack is a certain Kālavādin who does not subscribe to the views of Buddha. The Kālavādin (the upholder of the reality of time) under attack of Nāgārjuna's relentless dialectic refers to Buddha as the teacher of his opponents.[15] It is equally interesting to note that while Nāgārjuna specifically rejects the reality of time, his critique never mentions the concept of *dharma* that is so central to Sarvāstivāda articulation of the problem.[16]

In arguing that the Sarvāstivādin believed in the reality of time, both Koller and Kalupahana seem to be victims of confusion between a view which takes the reality of things or dharmas as past, present, and future as the ontological givenness and a view which accords time a primary ontological status as the container of things or *dharmas*. That, the Sarvāstivāda position is not the latter will be set forth in the ensuing discussions. It may be noted here that there is no evidence from the Ābhidhārmika sources to support the contention that the Sarvāstivādins believed in the reality of time. Time as an ontological category is conspicuously absent from the Sarvāstivāda scheme of things. Secondly, as we will show, they are primarily concerned with the reality status of *dharmas* or elements of existence which are either relegated to a non-actual mode of existence or which are still to achieve actuality. Accordingly, the doctrine is primarily concerned with postulating the reality of *dharmas* as past, present and future rather than the reality of *dharmas* in past, present and future as three distinct slices of time which somehow contain these *dharmas*.

The Sarvāstivāda is an attempt to provide a coherent picture of reality in terms of a whole conceived as a process, and at the same time retaining the uniqueness of the irreducible events which go into the making of the process. In asserting the reality of all (*sarvam asti*), Sarvāstivāda insisted that *dharma* is the ultimate constituent of all phenomena, meaning by *dharma* what is discerned to be existent and real in all the three temporal phases. The reality, as such, of the conglomeration of these *dharmas* is specifically denied. The basis of this denial is our experience which consists only of a succession of *dharmas*. There is no warrant from experience to believe that cognition reveals such a thing as a continuing 'being' or 'self', the ultimate reference point being only the discrete *dharmas* which constitute as such the nature (*svabhāva*) of reality. Our cognition reveals only the being of *dharmas* (*svabhāva*) in the three temporal phases. The existence of reality of *dharmas* as past, present, and future is present to cognitional experience without any mutual contradiction, experience being itself structured in terms of succession. It is significant that the Sarvāstivāda does not recognize the existence of *dharmas* in past, present, and future moments of time, but recognizes their existence as past, present, and future. There is no transcendental or empirical time in which real events may be conceived to take place or reside. Time is not an empty mould in which *dharmas* are deposited as they arise, stay, and pass away. Time, conceived as a transcendental background of our cognition, or as an over-arching receptum of entities, is totally unacceptable to any school of Buddhist thought, Sarvāstivāda being no exception in this regard.

The Sarvastivādin's discussions are conducted on the level where the concern is with lived time. The *dharmas* are temporal in the sense of possessing reality by virtue of their own intrinsic nature in the three modes of temporal existence.

IS THERE A PRE-ĀBHIDHĀRMIKA NOTION OF TIME AS RECEPTUM

Scholars have noted the opaqueness of the course of development that the time conception in early Buddhism followed.[17] But, more often than not, the time conception in early Buddhism has been misunderstood. Schayer is a case in point. He suggests that the theories of time in pre-Ābhidhārmika Buddhism tend to look at Time as the great container of all changes, a true reservoir of the changing entities or the phenomena.[18] According to Schayer, though we do not have any direct evidence to the effect that the pre-Ābhidhārmika Buddhism contributed to the notion of Time as receptum of entities, a close study of some Ābhidhārmika passages clearly indicates that this indeed was one of the immediate contexts of the Ābhidhārmika enunciation of the notion of three Times.[19] In *Mahāvibhāṣā*, we come across a passage which mentions the ideas contained in the following as an erroneous view to be guarded against :

> The *svabhāva* of Time is *nitya*, but the *svabhāva* of *saṃskṛta-dharmas* is *anitya*. The *saṃskṛta dharma* wander across the times just as a fruit from one pot to another, or as a man from one house into another. This is also the case with the *saṃskṛta-dharmas* : going out of the future they enter into the present, and they go out of the present and enter into the past.[20]

It is important to remember here that *Mahāvibhāṣā* mentions this position as an erroneous view to be guarded against. However, Schayer takes this to be a representative position of early Buddhism and draws the untenable conclusion that this theory of time as reservoir is only a later development of "the more primitive conception of Time as a unique, universal reservoir in which future, present and past entities are placed in layers, one upon another."[21]

However we must not forget the fact that *Mahāvibhāṣā*, traditionally, is assigned to the Buddhist Council held during the reign of Kaṇiṣka,[22] and one of its specific purposes was to record various alternative Ābhidhārmika positions and, finally, to evolve a standard Ābhidhārmika formulation on the fundamental ontological and doctrinal concerns of *Abhidharma.*[23] What Schayer takes to be a reference to some pre-Hinyānistic Buddhist Theory of Time, was perhaps one of the current Ābhidhārmika positions, which *Mahāvibhāṣā* takes to be a wrong interpretation of the true Ābhidhārmika understanding of temporal differentiations.

Another evidence, that Schayer adduces in support of his contention that pre-Ābhidhārmika Buddhism proposed a spatial understanding of Time as the reservoir of entities, comes from the *Abhidharmakośa.* The *Abhidharmakośa* mentions a certain version of the *traikalyavada* which maintains that the actualization in the sense of bringing into present (*vartamānikaraṇa*) of a future effect consists in 'dislocation' (*deśāntarakarṣaṇa*).[24] Reaffirming his contention that early Buddhism contributed to the reservoir ideal of Time conceived after a spatial understanding of it, Schayer finds that in the pre-Ābhidhārmika doctrine, "the theory of spatial dislocation totally fulfils its object, thus corroborating its archaic character."[25]

Schayer has failed to see that the language of reservoir which has been discredited in the *Abhidharmakośa* is an unique version of the Sarvāstivāda understanding of Time differentiations in terms of *avasthā* (states) whose spatial connotation should be taken in its metaphorical sense only. The idea of reservoir that Schayer is so willing to credit to some unknown pre-Ābhidhārmika sect is actually a grossly misrepresented version of some Ābhidhārmika theories of time differentiations. We will have occasion to refer to these variations of Sarvāstivādin conception of Time.[26] But it must be noted at this point that a reservoir ideal of Time is totally alien to the basic Buddhist ontological framework, and it is very implausible to attribute it even to the pre-Ābhidhārmika Buddhism.

It is not our intention to deny the possibility of a spatial understanding being the context against which the classical Sarvāstivāda formulation of temporality, in terms of "efficiency" (*kāritra*) as the distinguishing mark of the present, took place.[27] However, it is our contention that the receptum notion of Time, instead of being a remnant of pre-Ābhidhārmika Buddhism forming the immediate background of the classical Sarvāstivāda enunciation of temporality was, in reality, a misunderstood version of the Ābhidhārmika doctrine of temporal differentiation in terms of the *avasthās* of *dharmas*. It is this misinterpretation of *avasthā* theory in terms of reservoir that both the *Mahāvibhāṣā* and the *Abhidharmakośa* record as the immediate target of the Sarvāstivādin's attack.

Refutation of such misinterpretation of *avasthā* theory became all the more imminent in the later stages of Sarvāstivāda developments. Certain opponents of Sarvāstivāda tended to take a spatial interpretation of temporal differentiation as the most definitive statement of Sarvāstivāda. Thus, Saṃghabhadra vehemently rejects the following argumentation of an opponent who denies the reality of three temporal differentiation, by alluding to their spatial characteristics :

> Past and future do not really exist because, if they existed, they would resist one another. Indeed, the elements of *rūpa* must occupy a definite place. If the already destroyed elements and the elements not yet born existed really then they would resist one another. All *rūpa*-elements, if they exist, possess impenetrability (*apratighatva*) and whatever does not possess impenetrability is not a *rūpa*.[28]

This argument also presupposes that past and future are two receptacles of finite volume. However the *Abhidharma* canons anticipating this problem attempted to resolve this by suggesting that spatialization is not a necessary concomitant of *dharmas*. Thus *Mahāvibhāṣā* makes the following point of clarification :

> If a *dharma* has the nature of *rūpa*, is it *deśāstha* (localized or spatialized) ? If a *dharma* is *deśāstha*, it has necessarily the nature of *rūpa*; there exists, however, *dharmas* which have the nature of *rūpa* and which are not *deśāstha*, viz., the past and the future *rūpas* . . .[29]

This was a conscious effort on the part of the *Mahāvibhāṣā* thinkers to rectify the damage done by those Ābhidhārmikas who tended to look at the temporal differentiations of past, present and future only in terms of the differences of *avasthā*, of spatial position in one of the three Time-phases.

Moreover, it is our contention that the Ābhidhārmikas of Sarvāstivāda tradition, in their formulation of the theory of momentariness, were closer to the legacy of early Buddhism than the Sautrāntikas. Contrary to what Schayer suggests, Early Buddhism in point of fact seems to suggest a relativistic and experiential interpretation of Time.[30]

Early Buddhism avoids the two extremes of considering absolute time as the receptacle of entities and of reducing every form of experience into further indivisible moments. During the early period of Buddhism, the most dominant view of time was the one that recognized a finite segment of time as constituting the core of one's immediate experience.[31] Indeed the acceptance of this finite segment of time as a component of our temporality implied a positing of a certain duration of temporal experience no matter how infinitesimal this duration may be.[32] This stands in glaring contrast with the later Sautrāntikas who looked at the moment as irreducible and durationless.[33] Impermanence in Early Buddhism revolved round this element of finitude of existence and was not built upon an idea of durationless momentary existence which indeed received a lion's share in Sautrāntikas. In the Sarvāstivādin's formulation of the problem, which served as the paradigm for all Ābhidhārmika formulations, the moment continued to be conceived as a finite segment of time characterized by a certain duration. This finite duration, according to the Sarvāstivāda contains four stages of phenomenalization of a *dharma*, the production of birth (*jati*), duration (*sthiti*), decaying or change (*jarā*), and the cessation or disappearance (*nirodha*). This conception of impermanence does not exclude the element of finitude of phenomenal existence and still somehow aims at retaining the element of continuity. And it is precisely in this context that the enigma of Sarvāstivāda becomes all the more acute. The paradox of Sarvāstivāda consists in its concern with an articulation of the process of temporality while at the same time being also concerned with elements that go into the making of this process. Though, methodologically speaking, the distinction between the dynamic and static aspects of reality is always admissible, in the final analysis (looking at in terms of concrete actuality) the seemingly static elements are part of the dynamic nature of things. Such is the predicament that the Sarvāstivāda faces inescapably in its formulation of the problem of temporal existence.

REALITY OF PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE : ARGUMENTS FROM COGNITION AND MORAL LAW

The grounds for the reality of dharmas in the past, present, and future modes of being are to be discerned within the framework of the empirically and realistically slanted epistemology of Sarvāstivāda. A careful review of the arguments offered by Sarvāstivāda in support of their assertion will serve to highlight the nature of their orientation to knowledge. The empiricistic-realistic approach to cognitional experience and its compatibility with the soteriological goal of realizing freedom (*Nirvāna*) are reflected in their arguments. The role of epistemology is conceived here, in conformity with the general tenor of Indian Philosophy, as ancillary pursuit in the service of soteriology, and a mutually reinforcing role is assigned to them.[34]

The following arguments are offered by Sarvāstivāda to support their assertion of the reality of dharmas in the three modes of existence. The arguments are present in the *Abhidharmakośa*, the *Sphuṭārthā* as well as in the *Tattvasaṃgraha*, and they claim to be valid both in terms of experience and by means of its appeal to scriptural basis.[35]

1. *Dvayāśryam ca Vijñāna:*[36] According to Ābhidhārmikas all cognitions are contingent on two factors[37]: (a) the objective correlate (*viṣaya, ālambana*) and the (b) cognizing consciousness (*citta, vijñāna*). While sense experience relates to the cognition or consciousness of the present the mental cognition refers to the past and future objects as well. If past or future objects (*viṣaya*) were denied reality, then on this basis, argues the Ābhidhārmika, there could arise no cognition produced by the coming together of the *viṣaya* and the *citta*.

The Ābhidhārmika seeks support for this common-sense theory from the 'scripture' by referring to the unequivocal statement of Buddha to such effect.[38] The postulation of the existence of real in all the three modes is implicit in this contention of the Master and a denial of it will amount to the contradiction of the scripture *āgamaviruddha*). The upshot of the argument formulated above is the realistic conviction that whatever causes mental cognition has an objective existence or be objectively real.[39] There is mental cognition of past and future *dharmas*. The crucial datum, here, on which the Ābhidhārmika builds or constructs this theory, is the fact of the givenness of past and future *dharmas* to mental cognition. If they (past and future *dharmas*) are not objectively real, how could there be mental cognition of them. Were they not real "knowledge" of them will not be different from phantasy : their cognition will transpire to be non-cognition. A cognition by definition must have a specific real as its object.[40]

Arguing against the position that cognition is possible without the objective correlate, which is the point of view of Sautrāntika, the Ābhidhārmika argues : a consciousness (*vijñāna*) can only be defined qua 'what cognizes' (*vijanati vijñānam*) ; if there is no object to be cognized (*vijñeya*), then it necessarily follows that no consciousness as cognition can exist.

The Sautrāntika alternative is that a consciousness as cognition may be defined just by the mere fact of its being the 'illuminating accompaniment' (*bodhānugama*) of all cognitions.[41] There is no warrant, according to them, for invoking the object of cognition as part of the definition. To this, the Sarvāstivāda answers in the following way : the 'illumination' itself constitutes the objective correlate of consciousness as cognition. Cognition is defined as the coming together of consciousness (*vijñāna*) and its objective correlate (*rūpa*, *vedanā* etc.). But the two factors (the subjective *vijñāna* and objective *rūpa*, *vedana* etc.), according to the Ābhidhārmikas, stand on the same ontological footing in the sense that they are *dharmas*. As *dharmas* they carry their 'own nature' (*svabhāva*). "Illuminating' element in the cognition is the 'own nature' (*svabhāva*), consciousness (*vijñāna*) which consists of the *dharma* being objectively real. Thus, illuminating accompaniment (*bodhānugama*) in cognition too is an objective element which has an independent reality as the *svabhāva* of *vijñāna* in the three phases of its existence. This is the thesis of the Ābhidhārmika.

2. *Karmātītaṁ Ca Niḥsattvaṁ Kathaṁ Phaladmiṣyate*[42] *:* The past *karmas*, according to the authority of scripture, are assigned retributive power. Accordingly, argues the Ābhidhārmikas, past, present, and future alike must possess reality. "The past moral or immoral *karmas*, like the present ones, are really existent in as much as they, like the latter, become effective at the time of their fruition. If that were not the case, the past moral or immoral (good or bad) *karmas* would bear fruit in the present."[43] The "causal efficiency" (*kāritra*) being the criterion of reality, the past too, like the future, possessing as they do, as much causal

efficiency as the present (this is what is implied in the assignment of retributive power to *karmas*) must also, therefore, possess a reality of their own. A non-existent past could not be the cause of an effect which has yet to take place in the distant future. Admission of this would imply the denial of the moral law; good or bad acts would not produce their effects. The non-terminable character of the moral and immoral acts is the condition of the moral law being effective. This was the insight of the Buddha.

The Sautrāntikas take strong exception to this proposition of Sarvāstivāda. Denying any reality to the past *karma* as possessing any causal efficiency Santaraksita observes :

> We do not admit that a past moral cause (*vipākahetu*) gives a retribution (*phala*) : The retribution is granted only as an effect of a whole series of conscious moments (*vijñāna-prabandha*), so far as it became permeated (*vāṣita*) by the (the moral character of) this (past cause). (the whole *saṃtāna*), having been permeated or perfumed (*vāsita*) by the past karma, becomes capable of producing retribution.[44]

The Sarvāstivādins are not prepared to accept this. They refer to the statement of the great teacher, the Buddha: "A karma which is annihilated, reduced to naught and destroyed, does not, nevertheless, cease to exist."[45]

Sarvāstivādins refuse to take the Sautrāntika proposition of 'permeation' (*vāsita*) seriously on the ground that the *saṃtāna* (continuum) which seems to be perfumed (*vāsita*) by the *vāsanā*, cannot be the cause of the production of an effect (*phala*), because *saṃtāna* by its definition does not have a causal efficiency (*kāritra*) of its own. Arguing against the Sarvāstivādin postulation of the reality of past, present, and future *dharmas*, the Sautrāntikas point out that the *phala* (effect) does originate directly from moral or immoral *karma* (act). According to the Sautrāntikas the karma leaves its impression on the consciousness-continuum (*saṃtāna*). Thus permeated or perfumed (*vāsita*), the phala (effect) takes place in the continuum in its due course.[46]

Against the Sarvāstivādin's position, the argument, that is urged, is as follows : if both past and present exist or are real, then effect too co-exists with the cause (*vipāka*). What then is the relationship between the two and which of the two should be held responsible for the production (*utpādas*).[47] The Sarvāstivādin seeks to resolve the problem by asserting that it is the causal efficiency (*sāmarthya*) of the act of production which is responsible for the actualization of a pre-existent effect (*phala*). This indeed is what is implied in the assertion that the production takes place in the present. "Causal efficiency" is thus defined in the present context as the "actualization through making present" (*vartamānīkaraṇa*).[48] Actualization through making present (*vartamānīkaraṇa*) consists in a mere modification of the temporal mode of past into the present mode of existence.

3. *Atītanāgate Jñānaṁ Vibhaktaṁ Yogināṁ:*[49] A final argument for the reality of the dharmas as past, present, and future comes from the recognition of the possibility of *yogins* having the vision of past, present, and future. The argument takes for granted the validity of the scriptural statement that Buddha was omniscient in the sense that he had an intuitive access to the reality in its past, present, and future modes. This claim for the intuitive cognitive awareness of the past, present, and future implies their intrinsic reality and to question that would amount to the transgression of the truth of the *āgamas* (scriptures containing the true words of the Buddha).[50]

While the position of the Sarvāstivāda regarding the question of time and temporality thus seems clear enough, it does not of course follow that the arguments adduced to vindicate the position are conclusive. In fact, indeed, in the way that it is outlined above, it has a circular character, and the opponent, who in this case happens to be the Sautrāntika, does not hesitate to criticise it. What, however, stands under-scored in this enterprise, significant from the point of view of what it implies in terms of our understanding of temporality, is the theory of 'causal efficiency' (*kāritra*), a concept of overwhelming importance to be taken up for discussion in the next chapter.

Both the Sarvāstivāda and Sāṁkhya-Yoga argue for the reality of the present as well as the past and the future. Not only is the past as real as the present, but the future also is real, awaiting to become the actualized existence. The two traditions seek to support their argument in terms of different ontological bases. The Sāṁkhya-Yoga, as it has been shown, posits a dynamic continuant (*parināmi nitya*) which admits of being spoken of as the subject which has change as its predicate. This material continuant, also significantly called the material cause (*upādāna kāraṇa*), provides the scope for one mode to supersede another mode. It is the matrix for the criss-cross and supersession of qualities (*guṇa*). Thus is established an ontological ground which makes possible for reality to exist in all times without being unchangingly eternal. The Sarvāstivādin likewise rests his argument for the existence of the future elements which are constitutive of reality in terms of an ontology of a dynamic continuum of reals which may be described as elements existent in their very essence in all times. There is no unitary material cause into which the *dharmas* merge or from which to emerge. And yet they are in a state of continuum whereby their existence in all times is derived from the continuance of their essence in time.

The two traditions show, despite the differences in language and also the conceptualization of their respective ontological base, profound convergence over the question of the consideration which seem to have weighed in favour of according reality to the future. Both seem to say, in effect, through their varied and similar formulations of the issue, that the essence of the present consists of its being preceded by the past, its essence likewise includes in turn its relation of precedence to the future awaiting actualization. Why do they say this ? For both thought systems moral law is a fundamental requirement. Good and bad acts produce the results. Moral and immoral acts (*karma*) are continuous. Accordingly, a doctrine of the reality, that is in full accord with this requirement, must view the present as implying at once the reality of the future as well as the past. If the future is simply nothing, i.e. if the future effects of acts were simply non-existent, it is not conceivable that good acts be done with a view to perpetuation in good results. What is equally inconceivable, the absolute non-existence will come into being. Should it be the case that the future effect lies latently in the material cause so that when it becomes actualized it will not be a case of novel production out of nothing. The good or bad act (*karma*) is the efficient cause (*nimitta kāraṇa*) of the *appearance* of the future effects (sataśca phalasyanimittam vartamānikaraṇe samartham na purva janane).

In strikingly similar manner the Sarvāstivādin also argues : the past acts, moral or immoral like the present ones, are really existent, and likewise the future acts too exist in their fruition. Instead of employing the language of material cause or efficient cause the Sarvāstivādin employs the "logical" criterion of the real as causal efficiency. We can speak of something as real differently from what is not real only in terms of a difference that it makes (*arthakriyā kāritra*). To exist can be distinguished from non-existence only in terms of the difference that the former makes. In the Sarvāstivādin's language the difference is the production of effect. Employing this criterion he argues that if future *dharmas* were denied reality status, on the mere ground that future does not yet exist, then, it would mean the denial of the moral law. According to the principle of moral law (Law of *Karma*), present acts, good or bad, produce their future effects. It may thus be seen that in Sarvāstivāda as well as in Sāṁkhya-Yoga traditions, what serves as the primary concern for a doctrine of reality and a consequent theory of time and temporality is the principle of *karma*.

REFERENCES

[1] The reality of past, present and future has been accepted by some Pāli traditions also. Such a view is clearly propounded by Nāgsena in *Milindapanaha* where he rejects the alternative offered by King Milinda who suggests that only present is real. This point may go in favour of views expressed by some scholars that *Milindapanaha* is a northern text (belonging to northern school of Buddhism). However, there is one important difference between Sarvāstivāda and the position of Nāgsena. For the Sarvāstivāda the past, present and future cannot be conceived in separation from the entities (*dharmas*). They are not empty slices of time. Nāgsena, however, is prepared to accord them independent status.

[2] *Mahāvibhāṣā*, 394a, cf. Stainslaw Schayer, *Contributions to the Problem of Time in Indian Philosophy*, 1938, p. 20.

[3] ibid. p. 15.

[4] ibid, p. 27.

[5] *Kathāvatthuppakaraṇa-Aṭṭhakathā*, trans. B.C. Law, *The Debates Commentary* 1940, pp. 52ff.

[6] ibid, p. 53.

[7] ibid, p. 54.

[8] ibid, p. 54.

[9] ibid, p. 55.

[10] ibid, p. 57.

[11] Kalupahana, David J., "The Buddhist Conception of Time and Temporality," *Philosophy East and West*, Vol. 24, no. 2, April 1974, p. 187.

[12] See Inada, Kenneth K., *Nāgārjuna : A Translation of His Mulamādhyamikakārika*, 1970, pp. 117-19.

[13] Koller, John M., 'On The Buddhist Views of Devouring Time,' *Philosophy East and West*, Vol. 24, no. 2, April, 1974, p. 205.

[14] see Inada, 1970, pp. 117-19.

[15] see Kanakura, Y., 'The Questions of Time in Connection of Milindapanaha, the Mādhyamikakārika, and the Abhidharma', *Osaki Gakuho*, Vol. 115, 1962, pp. 1-17. This is one of the most illuminating papers on the subject. Its special merit consists in its ability to see the question of time as integral to the ontological question. The relationship of Milindapanaha to the Ābhidhārmika tradition has been well brought out.

[16] It is conceivable that Nāgārjuna would have opposed the Sarvāstivādin articulation of temporality in terms of the *svabhāva* of a *dharma*. (See *infra*, p. 108). But no explicit rejection of Sarvāstivāda can be discerned in the *Kālaparikṣa*, nor is there any claim that Sarvāstivādins believed in the independent reality status of time. We tend to agree with Shoson Miyamoto when he observes: "Nāgārjuna agreed with the Sarvāstivādins' denial of the existence of time, but opposed their concept of entity-realism (*svabhāvavāda*). He drew the conclusion of the non-existence of time from the Mādhyamika standpoint of non-substantiality (*nihsvabhavāvāda*), which was a restatement of the original Buddhist teaching of non-self." Shoson Miyamoto, "Time and Eternity in Buddhism," *Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies*, Vol. 7, no. 2, Tokyo, 1959, p. 824.

[17] see Bareau, Andre, "The Notion of Time in Early Buddhism," *East and West*, Roma, 1943, pp. 353-64.

[18] Schayer, Stainslaw, pp. 15-17.

[19] ibid.

[20] *Mahāvibhāṣā*, 393a, cf. ibid, p. 15.

[21] Schayer, p. 15.

[22] see Warder, A.K., *Indian Buddhism*, 1970, pp. 345-46.

[23] ibid.

[24] kimidaṁ varttamānīkaraṇaṁ nāma ? deśāntarākarṣaṇaṁ ceta *Abhidharmakośam*, III, p. 817.

[25] Schayer, p. 16.

[26] *infra*, p. 126 Ch. 10.

[27] *infra*, p. 130.

[28] *Nyāyānusāraśastra* of Saṃghabhadra, 636a, trans. Schayer, op. cit., p. 17.

[29] *Mahāvibhāṣā*, 395a, trans. Schayer, op. cit., p. 17.

[30] see Kalupahana, David J., 'The Buddhist Conception of Time and Temporality,' *Philosophy East and West*, 24, 2, April 1974, pp. 181-90.

[31] ibid.

[32] ibid, p, 185.

[33] The Ābhidhārmikas classify dharmas as eternal and non-eternal, and ascribe all *samskṛta dharmas* to the later category. But they do not make them strictly momentary. The Sautrāntikas, however, reduce all to a series of moments of coming to be. See *Tattvasamgraha* for Sautrāntika-Sarvāstivāda debate on the endurance of a moment. *Tattvasamgraha* of Śāntarakṣita with the commentary of Kamalśila, verses 1822-1833, pp. 512-13; also see Keith, op. cit., p. 107; Kalupahana, op. cit., p. 186.

[34] Thus Ābhidhārmika argued that past and future *dharmas* are real because the Buddha had taught that an enlightened disciple (*āṛya-śrāvaka*) becomes

indifferent to the past and future material objects (*rūpa*) only by concentrating on their *rūpas*: Uktaṁ hi Bhagavatā atītaṁ ched bhikṣavo rūpaṁ nābhavisyanna śrutavāhāryaśrāvako'tīte rupe'napekso'bhaviṣyat. yasmāttahryastyatītaṁ rūpaṁ tasmāchrutavānāryaśravako'tite rūpe'napekṣo bhavati. anāgataṁ cedrūpaṁ nābhaviṣyat na śrutavānārya śrāvakao'nāgataṁ rūpaṁ nābhyanandiṣyat. yasmāt-tahryastyanāgataṁ rūpamiti vistaṇaḥ. *Abhidharmakośam*, III, p. 804. also, see Sphuṭārtha on the above.

[35] see *supra*, note 34 for reference to Buddha's words. The argument offered seeks to establish the reality of the past, present and future *dharmas* by taking recourse to the testimony of the Master. Thus, appeal is made to the scriptural authority. This is an important element in the argument for it clearly brings out the ultimate soteriological concern that is constantly present.

[36] *The Tattvasamgraha* of Śāntarakṣita, verse 1788, p. 504.

[37] dvayaṁ pratītya vijñānasyotpadaḥ, ityuktaṁ. dvayaṁ katamat? cakṣū rūpāṇi yāvat manodharmā iti. asati vātītānāgate tadālambanaṁ vijñānaṁ dvayaṁ pratītya na syāt. evaṁ tāvadāgamato'styatītānāgatam. *Abhidharmakośam*, III, p. 804.

[38] The vogue of appealing to Buddha vacana for justification of the validity of statements is comparable to the Brhaminical use of śabda pramāṇa (testimony as a valid means of knowledge). Historically which is prior is very difficult to decide in this particular use, but there is a striking consensus among scholars over the question of the "priority" of the discussion of the "pramāṇa" at the hands of the Buddhist logicians like Vasubandhu, Dignaga and Dharmkīrti. It was the latter that gave rise to the pre-occupation with pramāṇa in the different sūtra commentatorial literature in brhaminical Hinduism.

[39] see Vasubandhu's Bhāṣya on *Abhidharmakośa*, Karika 24. sati viṣaye vijñānaṁ pravartate nāsati. yadi cātītānāgataṁ na syādasadālambanaṁ vijñānaṁ syāt. tato vijñānameva na syadālambanābhavet. *Abhidharmakośam*, III, p. 805.

[40] atītājātayorjñānamanyathā'viṣayaṁ bhavet; *Tattvasaṃgraha*, verse 1788, p. 504. Also see *Panjika* on it: prativast/vijñāptyātmakaṁ vijñānam, asati ca jñeye na kincidanena jneyamityavijñānameva syāt, ibid, p. 505.

[41] Bodhānugatimātreṇa vijñānamiti cocyate; *The Tattvasaṃgraha*, verse 1849, p. 518.

[42] ibid, verse 1789, p. 504.

[43] yadi cātītam na syāt śubhāśubhasya karmaṇaḥ phalamayatyāṁ kathaṁ syāt na hi phalotpattikāle vartamāno vipākaheturstīti; *Abhidharmakośam*, III, p. 805.

[44] vipākahetuḥ phalado nātitobhyupagamyate, sadvāsitattu vijñānaprabandhātphalamiṣyate; *The Tattvasamgraha*, verse 1850, p. 518.

[45] yattarhi laguḍaśikhīyakānparibrājakānadhikṛtyoktaṁ bhagavatāyatkarmābhyatītaṁ kṣīnaṁ niruddhaṁ vigatam vipariṇataṁ tadastīti, tasyakiṁ te tasya karmaṇo bhūtapūrvatvaṁ necchantisma; *Abhidharmakośam*, III, p. 812.

[46] ......tatpūrvakāt saṁtānaviśeṣādityātmavādapratiṣedhe sampravedayiṣyāmah ibid, p. 817.

Also: vāsitaṁ paramparayā phalotpādanasamarthamutpāditam; *Panjika* by Kamalśīla on *Tattvasamgraha*, verse 1850, p. 518.

[47] *Abhidharmakośam*, III, p. 817; also Sphutārthā on the above.

[48] vartamānikaraṇe tarhi sāmarthyam. Vasubandhu's Bhaṣya in *Abhidharmakośam*, III, p. 817; also vartamānikaraṇasāmarthyam iti cet; *Panjika on Tattvasamgraha*, verse 1846, p. 516.

[49] *Tattvasamgraha*, verse 1789, p. 504. The view is assigned to Vasumitra by Kamalśila in the *Panjika on Tattvasamgraha* "How can such ideas as one Mandhan Brahmdatta lived, the Chakravartti King Sankha will be the Maitreya Tathāgata etc. (cognized) distinctly by Yogins. (such cognitions) of the past and the future could not be possible (for) there is no distinction among things that are non-existent." *Panjika on Tattvasamgraha*, verse 1788, p. 505.

[50] For a Sautrāntika critique of the scriptural basis for the reality of past, present and future *dharmas*, see *Tattvasamgraha*, verses 1847-1850, pp. 517-18.

CHAPTER 7

ĀBHIDHĀRMIKA CONCEPTION OF KĀRITRA AND TEMPORAL DISTINCTION

The most significant conceptual contribution of Sarvāstivāda to Buddhism is the notion of *Kāritra*. *Kāritra* is the mark of actuality (*varttamāna*). It is that element in the Real which accounts for its "efficiency." The existent in order to be actual must be efficient. Efficiency of the real consists in its capacity to project an effect (*phala*, *kārya*). That which is not capable of, or does not possess, the potency for the projection of *kārya* is not efficient, and by the same token lacks actuality. This wanting of actuality does not reduce the real to nothingness, or inexistence. Rather actuality. is only one element of real, the other being the non-actuality This non-actuality is the mark of existents or *dharmas* which are past or future. *Dharmas* as past and future are real but they are not actual because they are wanting in *kāritra* (efficiency). This in brief is the upshot of Sarvāstivāda doctrine of *Kāritra*.

THREE STAGES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF KĀRITRA DOCTRINE

Concept of Kāritra in Mahāvibhāṣā The earliest formulation of *Kāritra* as the determinant of temporal distinctions can be discerned in the *Mahāvibhāṣā*. In this formulation an equation is made between the *svalakṣaṇa* or *svabhāva* (the specific mark) of a *dharma* and its special function (*svakriyā*, *vṛtti*, *kāritra*, *svabhāga*). This equation is further exemplified in the definitions of the Abhidharma : "the essence of a *dharma*, its *svabhava* as *definiendum* (= *lakṣya*) is defined by its *kāritra* (= *svakriyā* or *svalakṣaṇa*) as *definiens*."[1] However, the relationship between the *svabhāva* and *kāritra* of a *dharma* remains enigmatic for the authors of *Mahāvibhāṣā*, and although, accepting the equation of *svabhāva* and *kāritra* of a *dharma*, *Mahāvibhāṣā* prefers to be non-committal as to the specific nature of the relationship between the two. Further pressed with the question whether *kāritra* and *svabhāva* are the same or different, the *Mahāvibhāṣa* makes the following point :

> It cannot be said categorically whether they are the same or different. Just as the *svabhāva* of each *śāsrava dharma* possesses many *lakṣaṇas* as anitya etc., and it cannot be said categorically whether they are identical with or different from (these *lakṣaṇas*), such is the case here. Therefore : the relation between *kāritra* and *svābhāva* is not predicable.[2]

However, this unpredicability of the relationship between the two refers only to the conceptual articulation of an ontological fact. While efficiency must be grounded in the real (*dharma*), and it belongs only to the real, it does not exhaust all the possibilities of the real. Proceeding from this assumption the *Mahāvibhāṣā* makes causal efficiency (*kāritra*) the criterion of temporal distinctions :

> On what is based the distinction of Time-epochs? On the *kāritra*. The *saṃskṛta dharmas* which do not yet possess the *kāritra* are called 'future,' the *saṃskṛta dharmas* which just now possess the *kāritra* are called 'present,' the *saṃskṛta dharma* whose *kāritra* is already destroyed, are called past. Or : the *rūpa*, when it does not offer resistance just now, is called present, when it has already ceased to offer resistance, is called past, etc.[3]

Difficulties inherent in this formulation of *kāritra* as the basis of temporal distinctions are multifarious, and the Sarvāstivāda thinking had to wrestle with the issues of great variety in order to propose a coherent and comprehensive theory of temporal determination. Equation of *kāritra* with the *svabhāva* of the *dharma* and the subsequent description of the relationship as unpredicable involved difficulties that were to be overcome by the later Sarvāstivādins. If the *kāritra* and the *svabhāva* of a *dharma* were identical, then, in what sense a *dharma* is said to come to possess its *kāritra* in the present mode of existence.[4] Further, in what sense can a *dharma's kāritra* may be said to be destroyed (in the past)[5], for the destruction of the *dharma's kāritra* would amount to the annihilation of the *dharmasvabhāva* and consequently to admitting of the unreality of the *dharma* (in the past mode of existence). Moreover, if a *dharma* is considered present only on account of the performance of the special function (*kāritra*) then we may have difficulty in discerning the status of the being of eye (*cakṣu dharma*) which does not perform its special function of seeing during slumber, or when obstructed by darkness. We cannot deny that *cakṣu dharma* is present in either of the cases, but then obviously it is not performing its special function. Difficulties inherent in the simple formulation of the *kāritra* theory in *Mahāvibhāṣā* prompted the *Sarvāstivādins* to pursue the analysis of *kāritra* as the determinant of temporal distinctions further in this direction.

Vasumitra's Conception of Kāritra: Before we turn our attention to the efforts of Sarvāstivādins like Saṃghbhadra to offer a more comprehensive analysis of *kāritra*, we may consider another attempt to define the notion in the context of original Mahāvibhāṣā position. Such an attempt was made by Vasumitra. According to this position manifestation of the specific function of *dharma A* is the activity, not of this very *dharma*, but of other preceding *dharmas*, say P, Q, R, etc. by which the function of the *dharma A* is causally determined. The true activity of a *dharma*, consequently, is its facility of determining other *dharmas*, i.e., of compelling future *dharmas* to manifest their special functions. This interpretation of *kāritra* seems to draw its strength from the well-acknowledged fact that the Ābhidhārmikas accepted six different kinds of such determinations : (1) *sahabhukāraṇa* (simultaneous cause), (2) *samānāntarakāraṇa* (an immediate cause), (3) *sarvatragakāraṇa*, (an omnipresent cause), (4) *vipākakāraṇa* (a specific cause), (5) *sabhāgakāraṇa* (homogeneous cause), (6) *adhipatikāraṇa* (a general negative cause).[6] Thus, according to this way of looking at the *kāritra* of a *dharma*, in the appearance of one specific *dharma* of, say, sight (*cakṣurindriya*), the said dharma is (a) the simultaneous determinant of the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas*, (b) the homogeneous determinant of all the future *dharmas* of sight which form the continuity (*samtatati*) of an eye, and, (c) the general negative determination of all other *dharmas* whose origination it does not hinder. Given this understanding of the operation of causal efficiency of a *dharma*, the *kāritra* of a *dharma* is no more its (*svakāritra*, *svabhāga*, etc.) but its hetubhāvāsthāna, its *phalotpadansāmarthya* : its causal function and its facility of producing effects.[7]

This interpretation of *kāritra* as conceived by Vasumitra anticipates some of the elements of Saṃghabhadra, but is unable to resolve the difficulties pointed out earlier in our discussion.

Indeed, by accepting this interpretation of *kāritra*, we can explain the present character of eye (*cakṣurindriya*) even in the state of slumber or under obstruction from darkness. For, in these cases, it performs the function of being the determinant of other *dharmas*. Here the *kāritra* of the *cakṣu dharma* does not consist of its capacity of sight.[8] However, Abhidharma specifically defines *kāritra* in terms of the *svabhāva* or *svakāritra* of *dharma*, its nature which is sufficient unto itself; any attempt to interpret it relatively to the operations of some causal factors goes against its true import. Moreover, even if we accept that the *kāritra* of a *dharma* is defined by its relationship to other *dharmas*, as indeed the view under consideration does, then we will have to enforce some other restrictions on it, before it can serve the general purpose of defining the temporal distinctions of *dharmas*. For example, accepting this definition of *kāritra* in terms of a *dharma's* relationship to other *dharmas*, we may face a situation where a past *dharma* will have to be regarded as present.[9] The karmic retribution becomes ripe only some time after the act has been committed. The *karmic* cause having ceased in the moment of its appearance, stay and disappearance (*utpāda*, *sthiti* and *vyaya*), the effect (*phala*) has not arisen yet. Thus the determination of a *dharma* by another *dharma* in this case lasts beyond the moment of the appearance, stay and disappearance of the first. Should we therefore accept that a past continues to be present as long as it has not produced its effect?[10]

Apparently these considerations led to a re-formulation of the Sarvāstivādin position. They accepted the possibility of the realization of the effect of a cause in the same moment in which the cause had previously arisen, stayed and passed away, or in the immediately subsequent moment or in some distant moment in continuum (*saṃtāna*) when the original causal determinant may not be present. Under this scheme the *sahābhukāraṇa* and *samanāntarakāraṇa* belong to the first category of causal operation, *sabhāgakāraṇa* and *sarvatrāgakāraṇa* operate in the second or third manner and the effect of a *vipākakāraṇa* is realized in the third manner.[11]

Saṃghabhadra on the Concept of Kāritra : A revised version of *kāritra* theory is proposed by Bhadanta Saṃghabhadra which is in accord with the conception of causal operation just outlined. According to this theory, the *kāritra* of a *dharma* does not consist in a real production of an effect, nor is it contingent upon its relationship to another *dharma*. Saṃghabhadra zealously defends the original position asserting the constancy of the *svabhāva* of a *dharma*, and still accounting for its temporal determination with reference to the operation of *kāritra* of *dharma*.[12] But *kāritra* is conceived not as a capacity to produce an effect nor as a causal determinant but as the potency to project an effect (*phalākṣepaśakti*). It is the presence or absence of this potency of a *dharma* that determines the presentness, pastness or futurity:

> The *kāritra* of a *dharma* is projecting a *kārya*, not producing it. The past (*dharmas*) do not possess this potency of projection and therefore cannot possess a *kāritra*....*kāritra* here means *vyāpāra*, activity or operation, as seeing; (in another words) it is (the special potency) by which the eye is seeing, the ear is hearing, the nose is smelling, the tongue is tasting, etc; it is (further the special potency) by which consciousness (vijñāna) is active as cognizing; (and finally it is special potency) by which visual forms (rūpa) etc. are made objects of the corresponding sense-organs (*svendriya gocaratva*).
>
> The *kāritra* of the *dharmas* means potency (*śakti*) only of projecting results (*phalākṣepa=grahana*), not the actual generation (*jñāna=dāna*). Past causes, (*sabhāga*) etc. do not possess the potency of projecting results because the projecting takes place only in the state of presence. An (already) projected result is not, on its part, connected with (new potency of) projection, because otherwise a regresus ad infinitum would result. Therefore, no past *dharmas* can possess a *kāritra* and hence there is no confusion of time-marks.[13]

In this formulation of the *kāritra* theory Saṃghabhadra attempts to meet three specific objections raised by the Sautrāntikas against the Sarvāstivāda conception of *kāritra*. In order to present the Sautrāntika's objections against *kāritra* being the basis of temporal differentiation we may refer to its formulation in Tattvasaṃgraha:

1. If *kāritra* means *vyāpāra*, activity or operation of seeing, etc., then how can we account for the eye-facsimile (*tatsabhāga-cakṣu*) being called present when it is not exercising its function of seeing (*darśana*).[14]
2. Acceptance of the function of *phaladāna* as the *definiedum* of *kāritra* would entail confusion or co-mingling of the determining

characteristics (*lakṣaṇasaṃkāra*) of the past and the present in the same *dharma*.[15]

3. If *kāritra* is conceived as including both *phaladāna* and *phalagrahaṇ* then this would imply the semi-presence (*ardhavarttamānatva*) of the past *dharmas* as *sabhāgahetu* or *vipākahetu*. In the case of *sabhāgahetu* or *vipākahetu* at least one of the constituent factors of *kāritra* (*phaladāna* and *phalagrahaṇa*) is present. Consequently, it is past-cum-present—a contingency which is not free from the confusion or co-mingling of the characteristics (*lakṣanasaṃkara*).[16]

However, in the reformulation of the *kāritra* theory by Saṃghabhadra these difficulties are cleverly and adroitly avoided. By defining *kāritra* as the potency (*śakti*) only of projecting results (*phalākṣepa=grahaṇa*)[17] and not the actual generation of the result, Saṃghabhadra tends to overcome the objections of *lakṣaṇasaṃkara* against the *kāritra* theory. Saṃghabhadra avoids the difficulties that plagued Vasumitra's formulation by insisting that *kāritra* must be defined only as the potency for *phalagrahaṇa* (also called *phalākṣepa*, acquisition of effectivity) and that this alone must be regarded as the sole criterion of a *dharma* being called present. The past *dharmas* have no such capacity, and therefore they are not even semi-present (*ardhavarttamāna*).[18] To be present is to be vested with the potency for effectivity. The occasional coincidence of the actual generation of effects (*phaladāna*) with the acquisition of effectivity (*phalapratigraha*) does not imply a necessary concomitance of the two. The actual generation or production of effect is not the distinctive feature of presentness for it is also discerned in the past *dharmas*. But the projection of an effect (the act of throwing out) and the potency for this projection can be discerned only in the present.[19] The presence of *kāritra* and its operation is thus possible only in the present *dharmas*. This possibility being excluded from the past, the contingency of the confusion of the temporal characteristic is thus avoided.

Saṃghabhadra further makes a distinction between *sāmarthya* and *kāritra* of a *dharma*. In his response to the Sautrāntika critique that *kāritra* cannot be the basis of time-distinctions in *dharmas* because it involves a confusion or co-mingling of the time-marks (*adhvalakṣaṇanam saṃkāro bhavet*), Saṃghabhadra points out the failure of Sautrāntikas to appreciate the significance of the Sarvāstivādin's understanding of the *dharmasvabhāva*. There is a distinction between the *sāmarthya* and *kāritra* of a *dharma*. While both of them are *śaktis* of a *dharma* they are not identical. While *sāmarthya* may be obstructed by extraneous circumstances and its operation may be subject to external hinderances *kāritra* is intrinsically constitutive of the *dharmasvabhāva* and accordingly it is immune from the obstructions which may hinder the operation of the Sāmarthya of a *dharma*. All the difficulties that the Sautrāntika sees as diminishing the explanatory value of *kāritra* theory emanate from their failure to appreciate the distinction between the two. As Saṃghabhadra puts it :

> The śaktis of a dharma are of two kinds : one is called *kāritra*, the other is called *sāmarthya*. *Kāritra* has been defined as a *phalākṣepasāmarthya*, but kāritra is not always identical with *sāmarthya*. There exists also a *sāmarthya* which is different from *kāritra*. If for example, in darkness the eye sees the rūpas, its *sāmarthya* is obstructed by an *āvaraṇa*, but not its *kāritra*. The *darśanasāmarthya* is obstructed by the *tamas* and it is why, in darkness, the eye is not able to perceive the *rūpas*. But its *kāritra* (which is identical with) 'projecting an effect' (*phalākṣepa*) is not obstructed by darkness. The eye is able to project an effect also in darkness.
>
> Apart from the present condition (*avasthā*), kāritra is absent, because it arises only in dependence with the present. (A *dharma*) the *kāritra* of which is destroyed, is not absolutely inactive (*niṣkriya*): when an other *svabhāva* originates, it may become its determinant. But this (determination) is not *kāritra*, it is only *sāmarthya*. Because (a *dharma*) can project an effect only when it is present. What is (absolutely) inactive cannot project its special effect (*na svaphalam āksipati*) and only the projection of a special effect is called *kāritra*.[20]

KĀRITRA AND THE SVABHĀVA OF DHARMA

The relationship of *kāritra* to the *svabhāva* of *dharma* has been problematic within the framework of *Sarvāstivāda* ontology. Sautrāntika have capitalized upon the ambiguity and mystification that infests the Sarvāstivāda explication of this relationship. Sarvāstivāda postulates *kāritra* to be the mark of existent only in the mode of actuality, and thereby tries to account for the temporal distinctions of *dharma* as real in terms of the actual operation of the potency of projection of effectivity (*phalākṣepa* or *phalagrahaṇa*) in the present. Sautrāntika, while accepting the proposition that causal efficiency or the capacity for effectivity is the mark of real as present, (*arthakriyākāritra*), further assert that there is no other way that real can exist. Effectivity or efficiency is the mark of the present, and as such real can only be present; past and future lacking such efficiency are devoid of reality. Sautrāntikas reach at this conclusion through a comprehensive critique of the nature of *kāritra* and its relationship to *dharmasvabhāva*. Probably Sarvāstivādins too realized the difficulties involved in their formulation of the relationship and consequently settled for the unpredicability of this relationship.[21]

The Sautrāntika raised objections against Sarvāstivāda conception of Kāritra on the ground that it is neither different from nor identical with the *dharmasvabhāva*, and as such it can not be the basis of temporal distinctions. Refusing to accept any other possibility of the relationship between the *kāritra* and the *dharmasvabhāva*, the Sautrāntika proposes that the acceptance of any of the two alternative by the Vaibhāṣikas would imply consequences that are irreconcilable with the basic tenets of Vaibhāṣika thought. If we accept the substantial difference between the *kāritra* and the *svabhāva* of a *dharma* then we will have to accept the antecedent and subsequent unreality of *dharmas* because of the fact that *kāritra* has been accepted to be operative only in the present, on account of which, alone, a dharma is held to be a *hetu* and *saṃskṛta* (that which conditions and is conditioned). If on the other hand, *kāritra* is identical with the *svabhāva* of a *dharma* then *kāritra* too will be permanent and eternal like the *dharma* and as such it cannot be the basis of temporal distinctions in *dharmas*. Sāntaraksita maintains:

> These (*sarvāstivādins*) will have to admit that *kāritra* is either different from, or the same as, the *dharma*. There is no other way in which they can exist. If it is something different from the object, then the past and future states of present *dharmas* would have to be regarded without any reality, for they are causes and are embellished, and so forth like the *kāritra*. Otherwise (if they are not different) permanence will follow on account of the ever-presence of the svabhāva of a *dharma*. Indeed, besides substantial identity there is no other essential mark of permanence.[22]

The Sautrāntika formulates the following critique of *kāritra* theory: Considering that the *kāritra* in question is different from the *dharma* the unreality (*niḥsvabhāvatā*) of the present *dharma*, in its antecedent and subsequent states, will have to be accepted. Reason for the subsequent and antecedent unreality of the *dharmas* as present consists in the fact, that being different from the *kāritra*, it must contain in itself the ground for its phenomenal existence, i.e., being a cause and being contingent or embellished. In either respect the *dharma* is like *kāritra* which also functions as cause and is the ground of contingency and which is non-existent in the subsequent and precedent states.[23]

> If, on the other hand, the present *dharma* were not unreal (*niḥsvabhāva*) in the past and future states, then all the *saṃskṛta dharmas* which are defined as contingent and embellished will have to be regarded as eternal. In other words "if there were no antecedent and no subsequent unreality, then the permanence (*nityatā*) of all which is contingent (*saṃskṛta*) would arise, because the *svabhāva* of a *dharma* would continue to be always (*sarvadā vyavasthitatvāt*). Indeed, apart from the constant reality (*sadāsattva*) there is no other essential mark of permanence or eternality."[24] But according to Sarvāstivāda only *asaṃskṛta dharmas* are eternal or permanent. The thrust of the Sautrāntika's argument is that the postulation of *kāritra* as different from the *dharma* implies consequences which are not compatible with the basic tenets of Sarvāstivāda. Moreover, the admission of *kāritra* as something different from the *dharmas* will amount to the contradiction of the fundamental thesis of the Buddhist doctrine contained in the declaration of the Buddha : All things (*sarvam*), *Brahmanas*, are included in the five *skandhas*, twelve *āyatanas* and eighteen *dhātus*. Thus the reality of a *kāritra* is obviously rejected by the great teacher.[25]

Sautrāntika then analyses the second alternative that the *kāritra* is identical with the *dharma*. Here too, the primary concern is to show the incompatibility of the position with the basic tenets of Sarvāstivādins. The strategy employed is to propose two mutually exclusive alternative positions, none of which can be acceptable to the opponent. Any other alternative having been excluded the opponent's position is rendered redundant.[26]

Śāntarakṣita offers the following arguments against the proposition that *kāritra* is identical with the *dharma* ;

> If, on the other hand, the *kāritra* is not different from the *dharma*, then, being inseparable from the *dharma* it will be there at all times, just like the nature of the *dharma*. And therefore the distinctions of Time could not be made on the basis of this (*kāritra*), for there would be no possibility of distinction between the cessation, attainment or non-attainment of that (*kāritra*).[27]

Accepting the non-difference of the *kāritra* from the *dharma* implies its inseparability from the *dharma* just like the *svarupa* of the *dharma*. And in that case *kāritra* would be something existing at all times. Accordingly there cannot be any distinction of times based on *kāritra* : that which has ceased its *kāritra* is 'past,' that which has attained its *kāritra* is 'present' and that which has not attained its *kāritra* is the unarrived 'future.' It is only when the distinction of the attainment and non-attainment of the *kāritra* is made that we can make any distinction of the past, present, and future *dharmas*. But however, if *kāritra* is identical with the *dharma* then such distinctions are not possible. Conversely, if *kāritra* is non-different from the *dharma*, the *dharma* too, like the *kāritra*, will have only a reality of the middle point, i.e., of the present only. The *dharma*, being like the *kāritra*, will be devoid of the previous and later states, and as such its total reality will be condensed in the present only.[28] The unreality of the past and future will result.

The Sarvāstivādins are unperturbed by these *prasangas* proposed by the Sautrāntikas. They maintain that the two *prasangas* which accept only the possibilities of identity or difference of the *kāritra* and *dharma*, do not exhaust all the possibilities. The Sarvāstivādins propose another alternative according to which *kāritra* and *dharma* are and are not identical :

> the two *prasangas* do not exhaust all possibilities of the problem. Indeed, besides difference and identity of *kāritra* and *dharma* a third theory is possible according to which *kāritra* and *dharma* are and are not identical. This is just our standpoint. We teach that *kāritra* does not exist independently as something different from the *dharma*, but we deny that the *kāritra* is simply identical with the *dharma* and that it lasts permanently.[29]

The Sarvāstivādins are wary of the *prasanga* argument on two counts : First, they explicitly maintain that *saṃskṛta dharmas* are not eternal.[30] Eternality or permanence as opposed to the momentary existence is assigned only to *asaṃskṛta dharmas. Saṃskṛta dharmas* are subject to the four marks of impermanence or conditionedness and consequently they are not eternal. Thus the element of eternality presupposed in the aforesaid Sautrāntika argument is misplaced, for they admit all *dharmas* (except the *asaṃskṛtas*) as subject to the four characteristics of the conditioned, viz., origination, decay, continuity, and impermanence (*asaṃskṛta-lakṣaṇa-yogan na sāsravaprasangaḥ*). Thus the *prasanga*, that the non-difference of *kāritra* with the *dharma* in the middle moment of present implies eternality of the *kāritra*, is redundant. When *dharma* itself is not conceived as eternal, how can *kāritra* be eternal? The *prasanga*, in question, is misconceived, in as much as, it is based on the possibility of the eternality of *kāritra* being intrinsic to the *Sarvāstivādin* postulation of the identity of *kāritra* with the *dharma*. This tacit supposition is necessary for deducing the *Prasanga* formulated by the *Sautrāntika*. This very starting point is, however, erroneous. The Vaibhāṣikas do not teach that the kāritra possesses the three times.

The other *prasanga*, as we saw, points out that the *kāritra* and *dharma* cannot be different because their difference would imply the unreality (*nihsvabhāvatā*) of the *dharma* in its precedent and subsequent states. Otherwise, if the unreality of the present *dharma* in precedent and subsequent states is not accepted, then the permanence or eternality of *saṃskṛta dharma* will have to be accepted. Moreover, the acceptance of *kāritra*, as different from the *dharma*, will amount to the acceptance of the existence of something other than the five *skandhas*, twelve *āyatanas*, and eighteen *dhātus*.

The whole *prasanga* is misconceived, in as much as, it tends to look at *kāritra* as an entity, which is different from the *dharma*. Differentiation of the *kāritra* from the *dharma's* past, present, and future is based on the functional differentiation of the *dharmas* as past, present, and future. Present *dharma* is distinguished from the past and future precisely in terms of the operation or actualization of the potency for effectivity. *Kāritra* in operation and *kāritra* as a mere potency, *having-been-realized*, and *to-be-realized*, are basically functional terms which define the temporal distinctions of *dharmas* or *kāritra*. Moreover, Sautrāntikas can bring in the *prasanga* arguments against the *kāritra* only because they tend to confuse reality with existent. This becomes all the more apparent when they tend to define permanence in terms of constancy of reality (*naca sadāsattvavyatirekeṇ nityatvalakṣaṇamasti*). Eternality or permanence can only be defined in terms of constant existence (*sarvadāstitva*) and not in terms of the constancy of reality (*sadāsattva*). Moreover, the objection that postulation of *kāritra* contradicts the fundamental Buddhist doctrine that 'all' means *skandhas*, *āyatanas*, and *dhātus*, is also off the mark. For according to Sarvāstivādins *kāritra* is not an entity over and against the reality of the *dharma*.[31]

IMPREDICABILITY (ANIRVACANIYATVA) OF KĀRITRA

The Sarvāstivādins are aware of the difficulties involved in their characterization of *kāritra* as the ground or basis of all temporal differentiations. It is the difficulties involved in providing a more intelligible understanding of the relationship between the *dharma* and the *kāritra* that led them to describe the relationship as essentially ineffable. The four theories mentioned in the preceding chapters were partial attempts to account for the temporal variations in terms of the identity and difference of the *dharmasvabhāva* and are only partially able to resolve the issues. However, Sarvāstivādins had already realised the futility of verbal explication of the extremely evasive nature of the relationship of *kāritra* and *svabhāva* as early as the *Mahāvibhāṣā* where the relationship was described as one of identity and difference, and consequently beyond the grasp of categories of logical thinking operating in terms of either-or relationship. In *Mahāvibhāṣā* we come across the following discussion:

> Are kāritra and svabhāva the same or are they different : it cannot be said categorically whether they are identical or different. Just as the svabhāva of each *sasrava-dharma* possesses many *lakṣaṇas* as *anitya* etc., and it cannot be said categorically whether they are identical with or different from (these lakṣaṇas), such as the case here. Therefore (the relationship) between *kāritra* and *svabhāva* is not predicable.[32]

Saṃghabhadra in Nyāyānusārśastra accepts the Mahāvibhāṣā definitions of the relationship and describes them as one of identity and difference and considers them essentially ineffable. Thus he writes :

> the relation between *kāritra* and *svabhāva* is, just in the same manner, not accessible to determination as in the case with the relation between the *dharmas* and the *saṃtāna*. In other words : *kāritra* and *svabhāva* are and are not identical.[33]

Saṃghabhadra has taken strong exceptions to Sautrāntika's ridicule of the theory asserting the identity and difference of the *kāritra* and the *dharmasvabhāva*.[34] The Sautrāntikas have rejected the doctrine of identity and difference of *kāritra* and the Svabhāva as not deserving serious consideration. However, Saṃghabhadra, maintaining that the identity and difference of *kāritra* is not an instance of arbitrariness which can become the caprice of divine beings, not meriting consideration from the point of view of serious reflection.

Quoting from the earlier *Piṭakās* Saṃghabhadra points out that Buddha Bhagvāna himself has made statements like : Tathāgata is and is not *lokkottara*'; 'the *dharmatā* of the pratityasamutpāda is and is not nitya'.[35] He asks whether Buddha Bhagvāna too be made subject to ridicule for these utterances.

> We accept that *dharmas* are real always, and at the same time we teach that *dharmas* are not eternal . . . . the terms 'eternal' and 'not-eternal' are used here in two different senses . . . . The *dharma* lasts eternally but the *dharmabhāva* changes. When the *saṃskṛtadharmas* wander across the Times, they do not lose their *svabhāva*, and the *kāritra* which arises depends on *pratyayās*. Immediately after its origination, *kāritra* disappears. Therefore, we teach : the *dharma* is eternal but the *dharmabhāva* is not eternal.[36]

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

1. Three distinct phases in the development of the Sarvāstivādin conception of *kāritra* can be discerned. Earliest version recorded in the *Mahāvibhāṣā* tends to identify the *svabhāva* and *kāritra* of a *dharma*. *Svabhāva* of a *dharma* is defined in terms of its *svakāritra*. Seeing defines the *cakṣu dharma*, for it is the special function of the eye, the performance of which constitutes the very essence of the

being of the *cakṣu-dharma*. In the second phase the *kāritra* came to be understood in terms of *phalākṣepa-śakti* which included both the moments of *phala-grahaṇa* and *phala-dāna*. This formulation of *kāritra* by Vasumitra was a definite advancement upon the simplicity of the *Mahāvibhāṣā* which tends to look at *kāritra* only in terms of the specificity of the *svabhāva* of *dharma*. In Vasumitra's formulation of the *kāritra* theory the twin moment of *phaladāna* and *phalagrahaṇa* are conceived as constituting a continuum through which the *phalotpādansāmarthya* of a *dharma* operates. *Phalotpadansāmarthya* as the specific moment, which acts as the causal determinant of another *svabhāva* of a *dharma*, as the concomitant factor in the emergence of it, tends to define *kāritra* not in terms of *svakāritra* or *svabhāva* of a *dharma*. *Kāritra* here acquires a new meaning when it comes to be understood in terms of its function of concomitant determination of another *svabhāva*. Saṃghabhadra, however, goes beyond Vasumitra when he restricts the *kāritra* within the limits of a dharma's potency or capacity for the projection or conception (*phalākṣepa* or *phalagrahaṇa*) of a phala.

2. In his definition of *kāritra* Saṃghabhadra excludes the moment of *phaladāna* (actual production of the effect) and thereby overcomes the objection of *lakṣaṇasaṃkaratva* brought by Sautrāntikas against the Sarvāstivādin conception of *kāritra*. His theory also tends to retain the original *Mahāvibhāṣa* concern with the *svabhāva* or *savakāritra* of a *dharma* and thereby does away with the ontological dispersion that tends to split up internal unity of a *dharma* by distinguishing between the *svabhāva* and *svakāritra* of a *dharma*. It is the *kāritra* of a *dharma* that defines the *svabhāva* of a *dharma* in the three modes of its being. The difference between the past, present and future *dharma* does not consist in the absence or presence of its *kāritra* which also constitutes its *svabhāva*. However, the temporal distinctions reflect the state (*avasthā*) of a *kāritra* (potency for effectivity). This potency may either be latent or patent, accordingly it will determine the presentness, pastness, or futurity of a *dharma*. Thus :

> All *saṃskṛtadharmas* in the state (*avasthā*) of *phalākṣepa* are called present. This state of *phalākṣepa* is "previously" and "subsequently" inexistent. In accordance (with this previous and subsequent inexistence) the distinction of the three Times is established. Past and Future are real just as the Present. In

> brief : although the *svabhāva* of all *saṃskṛta-dharmas* remains always the same, yet the 'potencies' are different. In this manner although the *svabhāva* of (the *dharmas*) as constituting the three temporal moments is the same, yet, their *kāritra* is not without differentiation.[37]

It seems to us that the relationship between the *dharmasvabhāva* and *kāritra* can only be understood and defined as exemplifying the duality of aspects of the *dharmas.* Professor Stcherbatsky has tried to define Sarvāstivādin ontology as asserting the duality "of two different planes of two sets of elements."[38] However, we tend to see at Sarvāstivādin ontology as implying only a duality of aspects. To our way of understanding, *kāritra* cannot be considered as supplementing the *svabhāva* of a *dharma*; neither can it be considered as the second element or the second nature of the element. It is equally wrong to maintain that *kāritra* is the *dharma* itself or the *svalakṣana* of the *dharma.* Indeed, Saṃghabhadra takes great pains to reject this theory. Both *Tattvasaṃgraha* and *Nyāyānusaraśastra* record Sarvāstivādin's denial of this alternative. The duality of aspects implied in the Sarvāstivādin ontology of *dharmasvabhāva* comes out very clearly if we remember that the difference between *kāritra* of a *dharma* as the *phalākṣepśakti* (power of projecting effects) and the *svakāritra* of dharma, equivalent to the *svalakṣaṇa* of a *dharma* consisting both of *phaladāna* (projecting effect) and *phalagrahaṇa* (receiving effect), is fundamental. Undermining this fundamental difference will lead to the postulation of total identity or total independence of the *dharma* and *kāritra*; either of the two alternatives being unacceptable to the Sarvāstivādins. The only alternative that seems to be admissible within the framework of Sarvāstivādin ontology is the one which looks at the relationship between the essential nature of being and its phenomenal manifestation as one of identity in difference. Indeed *phalākṣepaśakti* is an accidental characteristic of a *dharma*, it is only *kadācikta* (adventitious). But even as *kadacikta*, when it is operative it defines the total being and cannot be conceived in isolation from the being of a *dharma*. It is only when it is not operative, i.e., when it is only a potency, that a conceptual distinction between the two is possible. However, as a potency it does not have an independent status and actuality. Though it is distinctly discernible it is not cognized as different from the dharma. This relationship we prefer to describe one of *bhedābheda* or identity in difference. Instead of characterizing it as a logically different position, different alike from identity and difference, we prefer to understand this "identity in difference" as implying the inherent character of the dual aspects intrinsic to reality. Thus, the characterization of the relationship as ineffable simply expresses the logical difficulty in expressing the relationship of *kāritra* and *svabhāva* on lines of mere identity and difference.

While Śāntarakṣita and Kamalśīla seem to have realized certain difficulties involved in the Sarvāstivāda doctrine of *kāritra*, their critique fails to see the real significance of the Sarvāstivāda formulations of the *dharmasvabhāva*. *Dharma* for Sarvāstivāda is not an eternal entity as Śāntarakṣita seems to suggest. As a matter of fact, *dharma* is neither an entity nor eternal in the usual sense of the term. Sarvāstivāda is an assertion of the reality of all *dharmas* (*sarvam asti*), but it is not the assertion of the existence of all *dharmas* in all times (*sarvadā asti*) as the Sautrāntikas would like us to believe. Given this understanding of the essential nature of *dharma* it would be wrong to postulate that *dharma* or *dharmasvabhāva* is conceived by Sarvāstivādin to be eternal or permanent. Permanence or substantial identity of *dharma* in all the three periods of time is not what Sarvāstivāda proposes. A dharma whether past, present or future, is essentially momentary (*kṣanika*). Momentary existence of *dharmas* as real specific events that go into the making of phenomenal existence at one specific moment of its life history is indubitable. The reality of *dharmas* as past, present, and future cannot be gainsaid. A *dharma*, having lost its existence and actuality as present, surely, does not lose its reality. Its ongoing influence on the phenomenal existence through *vāsanās* attests to the continued reality of *dharmas* as past. An essential overlooking of what may be described as distinction between the existence and reality, or actuality and being of the *dharma* lies at the basis of the Sautrāntika critique of Sarvāstivāda. The difficulties which, according to Sautrāntika's, beset its conception of *dharmas*, as formulated by the Sarvāstivādin, do not seem to be intractable once the significance of the above distinction is grasped. The explanatory value of a similar distinction was seen in an earlier context when we sought to interpret the Sāṁkhya-Yoga distinction of the real and the existent.

REFERENCES

[1] This double logical and ontological meaning has been discussed by Schayer in Ausgewahlte Kapital aus der Prasannapada (Krakowie, 1931, p. 2) in a remark on Chapter V of the Madhyamikakārika where the problem of the *laksya* and *lakṣana* is taken up by *Nāgārjunna* with reference to *ākāśa* and its *svalakṣana*, the *anāvaraṇatva* (quality of non-veiling). Stcherbatsky has differed with Schayer on this matter and maintains that these discussions do not have anything to do with the problem of *dharmsvabhāva* and *Kāritra*. He accuses Schayer of failing to distinguish between *lakaṣaṇa=svalakṣaṇa* and *lakṣaṇa=sams-kṛtalakṣaṇa*. (see Stcherbatsky, S., "Die drei Richutungen in der philosophie des Buddhisms," *Rocznik Orientalistyczny* 10, 1924, p. 35). However it is important to note that from the point of view of Ābhidhārmikas of Vaibhasika orientation even *asamskṛtadharmas*, e.g. *ākāśa*, also have their *svakāritra*. see L. de la Vallee Poussin, Documents d'Abhidharma, *Bulletin d l'Ecole Francaise d'Extreme Orient*, I, Paris, 1931, p. 43. also, Schayer, Stanislaw, p. 21.

[2] *Mahāvibhāṣā*, 394c; cf. Schayer, p. 25.

[3] *Mahāvibhāṣā*, 393c; cf. Schayer, p. 22.

[4] *supra*, p. 114.

[5] ibid.

[6] Kāraṇ sahabhūścaiva sabhāgaḥ samprayuktakaḥ sarvatrago vipākākhyaḥ ṣadvidho heturiṣyate *Abhidharmakośam*, I, p. 279. For further discussion of this, see Vasubandhu's *Bhāṣya* on above as well as Yaśomitra's vyākhyā.

[7] yadyevaṃ pratutpannasya tatsabhāgasya cakṣuṣaḥ kim kāritram? Phaladānapratigrahaṇam atītānāmapi tarhi sabhāgahetvādinām phaladānāt. *Abhidharmakośam*, IV, p. 808.

[8] tatsabhāgasya caksuṣaḥ kim kāritram. yadvi kāritralakṣaṇam svakarma na karoti, tat tatsabhāgah. tasya ca nāstikāritraṁ darśanalakṣaṇaṁ. kathaṁ tat pratyutpannamityabhiprayaḥ. phaladānapratigraha iti. Sphutārthā on *Abhidharmakośam*, III, p. 808.

[9] atītānāmapi tarhi sabhāgahetvādīnāṁ phaladānāt kāritraprasango'rdhakāritrasya veti lakṣaṇasamkaraḥ. *Abhidharmakośam*, III, p. 808.

[10] see Sphutārthā on the above.

[11] *Abhidharmakośam*, I, pp. 288ff.

[12] *supra*, p. 111.

[13] yataḥ samprāptakāritro varttamāna uccyate, uparatakāritro'tītaḥ, aprāptkāritro'nāgata ityadhvānaḥ kāritreṇa vyavasthitāḥ. kim punaratra kāritramabhipretam....darśanādilakṣaṇo vyāpārah, yatha, pancānāṁ caksurādinām darśanādikam—yatascaksuḥ pasyati śrotram śṛnoti ghrāṇam jighrati jihvā svādyatītyādivijnānasyāpi vijñātṛtvam vijānātīti kṛtva rūpādināmindriyagocaratvam.··· dharmānaṁ kāritramucyate phalākṣepaśaktiḥ, natu phalajanam, nacātītānām sabhāgahetvādīnām phalākṣepo'sti, varttamānatvasthāyāmevākṣiptatvāt. nacākṣiptasāykṣepo yukto'navasthāprasangāt. tasmādtītānāṁ na kāritrasambhava iti nāsti lakṣaṇasamkara iti. *Panjikā on Tattvasaṁgraha*, verse 1796, p. 506.

[14] see *Abhidharmakośam*, IV, p. 808; Sphutārthā, 1972, p. 808; and *Panjikā on Tattvasamgrah*, verse 1796, p. 506.

[15] ibid.

[16] ardhakāritrasya va (prasaṅgah) lakṣaṇasamkarah. *Abhidharmakośam*, III, p. 808. also see, Sphutārthā on the above.

[17] see *supra*, p. 127.

[18] see Saṃghabhadra cited in *Panjtkā on Tattvasaṃgrah*, verse 1796, p. 506.

[19] ibid.

[20] *Nyāyānuśāraśāstra*; cf. Schayer, pp. 38–39.

[21] see *infra*, pp. 134-35.

[22] taiḥ kāritram idaṁ dharmādanyattadrūpameva vā, abhyupeyam yadanyā'sti gatiḥ kācinna vāstavī; *Tattvasaṃgraha*, p. 506.

anyatve varttamānānāṁ prāgurdhvaṃ va'svabhāvatā hetutvasaṃskṛtatvādeḥ kāritrasyeva gamyatām; ibid, verse 1791, p. 507.

anyatha nityatāpattiḥ svabhāvāvasthiteḥ sadā naitadrūpātiriktam hi vidyate nityalakṣaṇam; ibid.

[23] ibid.

[24] anyathā yadi prāgurdhva ca niḥsvabhāvatā na syāttadā sarvasya saṃskṛtasya nityatā prapnoti, svabhāvasya sarvadā vyavasthitatvāt, na ca sadāsattvavyatirekeṇa nityatvalakṣanamasti; ibid.

[25] ibid.

[26] This method of argument is called prasanga and has been extensively employed in the later Buddhist circles, specially by the Mādhyamikas.

[27] ananyatve'pi kāritraṁ dharmādavyatirekataḥ svarupamiva dharmasya prasktaṁ sārvakālikam. ibid.

tatścādhvavibhago'yam tadvaśānnaprakalpyate na hi tasya cyutih prāp tiraprāptirvā vibhāgatah. ibid.

[28] ibid, verse 1792, p. 508.

[29] Schayer, p. 42.

[30] *infra*, pp. 86-7.

[31] We are not here concerned with the relative logical adequacy of either of the positions concerned by themselves. What has been attempted here is to vindicate the plausibility of the Sarvāstivāda position.

[32] *Mahāvibhāṣā*, 394c, cf. Schayer, p. 25.

[33] *Nyāyānusārasāstra*, 633a, cf. Schayer, ibid; also see *Panjikā on Tattvasaṃgraha*, verse 1793, p. 509.

[34] kāritram sarvadā nāsti, sadā dharmaśca varṇyate dharmān nānyac ca kāritraṁ vyaktaṁ devaviceṣṭitam. *Tattvasaṃgraha*, p. 508; svabhāvah sarvadā cāsti bhāvo nityaśca neṣyate na ca svabhāvād bhavo'nyo vyaktamiś-varaceṣṭitam. *Abhidharmakośam*, III, p. 811.

[35] *Nyāyānusāraśāstra*, 633c; cf. Schayer, p. 26.

[36] ibid.

[37] ibid.

[38] Stcherbatsky, *The Central Conception of Buddhism*, p. 42

PART III

SĀṀKHYA-YOGA AND ABHĪDHARMA BUDDHISM IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

CHAPTER 8

Temporal Becoming and the Real : The Ābhidhārmika and Sāṁkhya-Yoga Perspectives

In this chapter we will attempt to look at the question of temporal becoming in the context of its relationship to the thing which undergoes change. We will try to show that for both, the Sāṁkhya-Yoga and Abhidharma Buddhism, the question of temporal becoming is integral to the question of the reality status of that which undergoes change. However, there are important differences between the two systems' understanding of the dynamism of the temporal process. According to the Ābhidhārmika, real does not have a mode of being other than the mode of becoming. A dharma is self-subsistent; it carries its own nature (*svabhāva*). That which 'becomes', changes in its totality; there is no residuum or constancy of a self-identical substance. On the other hand, according to Sāṁkhya-Yoga, the temporal process involves only one aspect of the reality. This, the changing aspect of reality, is called *dharma* in Sāṁkhya-Yoga terminology. But this does not exhaust the real in its completeness. There is an aspect of real which is constant and self-identical. This is the *dharmin*, the common referential content which remains constant through the changing phases of the real. While for Abhidharma Buddhism temporal becoming exemplifies the constancy of the 'continuum' (*saṃtāna*), the Sāṁkhya-Yoga speaks of the constancy of the continuant (*saṃtāni*).

THE ĀBHIDHĀRMIKA DOCTRINE OF THE "MUTUAL OTHERNESS" (ANYATHĀTVA) OF TEMPORAL DISTINCTIONS

The Ābhidhārmika sources record as many as four theories of temporality proposed by the Sarvāstivādins. These four variations of Sarvāstivādin's account of temporal differentiation are confirmed by different sources, and the possibility of their having been proposed by different Sarvāstivādin thinkers at different times cannot be confirmed by any direct evidence drawn from the period. These four teachers probably belong to the period of the Buddhist Council at the time of Kanishka. The *Vibhāṣā* or *Mahāvibhāṣā*, which is assigned to this period, seem to mention these four versions of Sarvāstivāda. It seems reasonable to believe that the name of various teachers came to be associated with the different Sarvāstivāda position about the same time. While the historical question is not our primary concern, it may be of some interest to note that similarity between some of these positions and certain facets of some Buddhist positions mentioned as erroneous views on time by Vibhāṣā is quite striking.[1] It seems to us that the congruity between later records reflecting Sarvāstivādin's understanding of temporal differentiation and the earlier records in *Mahāvibhāṣā* is extremely important. It is on the basis of these passages in *Mahāvibhāṣā* that Schayer argued that pre-Ābhidhārmika Buddhism had a conception of Time as the reservoir or receptum of entities. It is our contention that not only the passages referred to do not belong to pre-Ābhidhārmika Buddhism, but also that the conception enunciated there does not involve a reservoir ideal of Time.

The whole confusion, specially with reference to Vasumitra, seems to have arisen from the ambiguity of the term *avasthā* which has both spatial and temporal connotations. *Avasthā* can be translated both as "a state of affair" or "a time span in the personal history" of an entity. A spatial reading or interpretation of the term *Avasthā* in the passages of *Mahāvibhāṣā* as well as in the context of the theories of the Ābhidhārmikas to be considered, seem to have obscured a proper appraisal of Ābhidhārmic conception of temporal determinations. It is an uncritical acceptance of the spatial rendering of the term *avasthā* that prompted Schayer, McDermott, and others to suggest that temporal determinations in these four versions of temporality involves a conception of *dharma* as a free floating entity wandering through the three periods of time. However, a careful reading of the text does not substantiate their conclusion, and it becomes clear that such spatial interpretations of *avasthā* theory are quite off the mark.

The four theories proposed by these teachers may be looked upon as different ways to account for the fact of continuity (*saṃtāna*) in the phenomenal world; despite it being the case that change is the characteristic mark. It is a commonplace doctrine, shared by the generality of all Buddhist Schools, that the phenomenon of change, characteristic of existence, must be understood as total change. At the same time they also emphasise, in the same breath, the phenomena of continuity, in keeping with the foundational insight of Buddha about the causal interconnectedness. To advert to the four theories propounded by the teachers of Sarvāstivāda. The up-shot of the theories is : the *dharmas*, in the process of becoming, maintain their own nature (*svabhāva*), and the changes, which characterise existence, relate to modes (*bhāva*) or character (*lakṣaṇa*), or aspects, (*avasthā*), or relational orientation (*anyathānyathika*) of the *dharmas*. The fact of change is acknowledged, but it is not supposed to affect the integrity of the nature of the *dharmas*. The differences within these theories refer to the specific understanding of change, but the persistence of 'own nature' (*svabhāva*) through the entire spectrum of change is allowed. Change belongs to the very nature of *dharmas* and yet does not corrode them.

This basic insight is important for a proper appraisal of the Sarvāstivāda understanding of temporal becoming. What follows in the ensuing paragraphs is purported to be a descriptive account of the views of the four Sarvāstivādin thinkers. The exposition of the different theories is followed by a review of the parallelism of ideas in this connection that exists between them and the Sāṁkhya-Yoga thesis, which also, formally stated, accords reality to the substantial permanence of things whose integrity remains unaffected by the modal changes.

Bhāvānyathātva of Dharmatrātā : According to Dharmatrātā, temporal becoming is nothing but transmutation of modes. A *dharma* acquires the character of "otherness" (*anyathātva*) by a change in its modes. It is the differences in modes that constitute the distinguishing mark of a *dharma's* pastness, presentness, and futurity.[2] A *dharma* remains identical in its own nature (*dravyataḥ*). Thus, according to Yaśomitra, Dharmatrātā prescribes only the otherness of *bhāva* through the past, future, and present mode of coming into existence; there is no otherness of the essence qua substance (*dravyataḥ*).[3] While Yaśomitra defines *bhāva* including both the form (*ākṛti*) and quality (*guṇa*),[4] Kamalśīla mentions only quality (*guṇa*) being included under the definition of *bhāva*.[5] Kamaśīla offers following rendering of Dharmtrātā's argument for bhāvānyathātva :

> When a dharma has entered into its course of actuality (*dharmasyadhvasu*) there is the otherness only of *bhāva*, not of *dravya*.

For example, the substance Gold undergoes several changes in its qualities by virtue of which it comes to be called the 'armlet', 'necklet', 'ear-ring', etc., but there is no change of gold itself. Similarly, the *dharma* is differentiated in respect of the *bhāvas* of future etc., (like gold) the *dharma*, by abandoning its 'future' *bhāva*, it attains the 'present' *bhāva*, and by discarding its present *bhāva* it acquires the past *bhāva*. And yet there is no otherness of the *dravya* (of *dharma*), for there is no absence of the (*dharma's*) *dravya* (*sarvatra dravyasyavyabhicārāt*).[6]

Kamalśīla equates *dravya* with the *svabhāvas* of *dharma*, and its translation as substance is only literal and misses the true import of the figurative use.[7] In Yaśomitra's formulation of the argument the true import of *bhāvānyathātva* is well articulated. Thus, milk, when transformed into curds, changes its qualities of taste, digestibility, etc., but its *rūpa dharma* (material nature) remains unchanged.[8] Yaśomitra's formulation of the argument clearly recognizes the continuity of the *svabhāva* or *svalakṣaṇa* of *dharma*, not without, but through the changes in its *bhāva*. Thus, though *bhāvas* of *dharma* undergoes change, "there is no otherness (temporal distinction) of the *svalakṣaṇa* of *rūpa* etc. (*dharmas*) on account of this (na rūpādi-svalakṣaṇasyanyathātvam)."[9] The *bhāva* which consists of form (*akṛti*) and quality (*guṅa*) passes away, but the rupa dharma (the material nature), in which the bhāvas find their ground, does not cease to be. "Thus, the examples of gold and milk given above refer to the transmutation of form and quality respectively and show the continuity of the *rūpa dharma*."[10]

Thus, Dharmtrātā reduces becoming to *bhāva-anyathātva* or reciprocal otherness in the bhāva (manner of being, manifestation or appearance) of a *dharma* which itself stands spanning the reciprocal distinctions.[11] The changes wrought on *dharma* are mere epistemological precipitates, its mode of manifestation to consciousness. The problem of temporal evolution is solved by assigning to it a modal status of reality, instead of making it intrinsic to it. Accordingly, temporal becoming does not touch the essential core of being.

Lakṣaṇa-anyathātva of Ghoṣaka : Ghoṣaka accounts for temporal differentiation in terms of the *lakṣaṇas* (character) of the dharma. There is simultaneity of the *lakṣaṇas* of past, present, and future in each *dharma*, and that a *dharma* is called past, present, or future tively when one of these *lakṣaṇas* are patent and other two are latent.[12] According to Ghoṣaka's *lakṣaṇa anyathātva* :

> when the *dharma* has entered into its course of existence it is said to be 'past', when it has emerged as vested with the *lakṣaṇa* of past, without however being, at the same time, deprived of the *lakṣaṇa* of the future and the present. The futurity and the presentness (of a *dharma*) are to be explained the same way (as one may explain a man's not being disinterested in other women even though he is attached to his own. The empirical applicability (*vyvahāra*) (of temporal distinctions) rest on the fact of the acquisition of the character (*vrtti*) of the specific *lakṣaṇa*.[13]

Thus, the *dharma*, as essence remains intact, while its temporal phases vary on account of the pre-eminence of the specific *lakṣaṇa* of past, present, and future.[14] A *dharma*, in the course of its existence, is vested with the character of 'past' on account of its pre-eminence; but the temporal phase of past does not totally exclude the phases of present and future. If the future were exclusive of the present and past, it would never become present or past, because what was not can never be (*na bhutvā bhavah*).[15] Significantly, it is not that the *dharmas* belong to the three time phases of past, present and future, but the *lakṣaṇas* of past, present and future belong to *dharma* itself. The future, the present and the past phases are thus found to co-exist together. The specific nature of the character of past, present, and future remain unexplored in the explications of Ghoṣaka's view in the *Abhidharmakośa* and the *Tattvasaṃgraha*. We have had occasion to dwell upon this in our exposition of the Ābhidhārmika notion of *Kāritra* and its bearing on their understanding of the temporal becoming. Suffice it to note here that the alternation in the temporal phases is not attached to the *dharma's* essence (*svabhāva*) itself, rather, change is explained in terms of a *dharma's* adjuncts.

Anyathā-anyathika of Buddhdeva : The specific purpose of Buddhdeva is to explain the temporal becoming by distinguishing and defining the past, present, and future existence of dharma precisely in the context of a *dharma* and its relationship to other *dharmas*. Temporal determinations are nothing but the expression of the relationship of one *dharma* to others. Thus a *dharma* is called differently as future or present or past with reference to the prior or the posterior *dharma*.[16] A *dharma* :

> is called future in relation to the past and the present which are prior to it; it is called present in relation to the past which is prior to it and in relation to the future which is posterior to it; it is called past in relation to the present and the future which are posterior to it.[17]

The case of the same woman being designated as mother in relation to her daughter, and daughter in relation to her mother is an instance in point. As Kamalśīla points out :

> Having entered the course of actuality a *dharma* is called one or the other in accordance with its relation to what has gone before and what is ahead. For example, the same woman is called 'mother' and 'daughter.' Similarly the usage (of temporal distinctions) is also dependent upon the past and the future (*dharmas*). A *dharma* related to an antecedent but without any subsequent is called future; that which has its antecedent as well as its subsequent is called present; that which has only its subsequent but no antecedent moments is called 'past.'[18]

Thus, according to the theory of *ananyathātatva*, temporal determination is explained in terms of the diverse orientational features or relationship of an invariant *dharma*.

Avasthā-anyathātva of Vasumitra : Most celebrated of the four variations of Sarvāstivāda theories of temporality is attributed to Bhadanta Vasumitra. Vasumitra equates *kāritra* (causal efficiency) with the *avasthā* of a *dharma* and accordingly proposes that *dharmas* are continuants, the applicability of the temporal phases (*avasthā*) of 'past,' 'present', and 'future' being due to each dharma's *kāritra*.[19] Vasumitra maintains :

> A dharma, having entered the course of actuality, it is designated variously according to the variations in *avasthā* (conditions of states) and not on account of the *dravya* (or *svabhāva*). The *dravya* remains the same in the three time variations. Just as the clay counting piece in an *abacus*, when placed in the place of units is designated as one, in the place of hundreds is called "hundred" and in the place of thousands is called "thousand,"

similarly a *dharma* (*bhāva*), when it is in the state of *kāritra*, is called present, having ceased its *kāritra* is called past, and while it has not acquired its *kāritra*, is called future. Thus the applicability of (time designations) depends on the *avasthā* (of *kāritra*) just as in the case of abacus.[20]

Thus a *dharma* is designated as future when it does not exercise its *kāritra* (causal efficiency); it gets the designation of present when it does exercise the *kāritra*; and it is designated past when it has already exercised its *kāritra*. The temporal designation of a dharma then is a derivative of the variations in the states (*avasthā*) of causal efficiency (*kāritra*). Variation is only of state not of essence. The *dharma* acquires different temporal significations only on account of the variations in its *kāritra* while the *svabhāva* of *dharma* does not undergo any change.[21]

A more elaborate treatment of the notion of *kāritra* and its relationship to the *svabhāva* (own nature) of the *dharma* must remain in abeyance at this point. But, to anticipate the difficulties that it encounters in the Vasumitra's formulation of it and its further elaboration in a later thinker, Saṃghabhadra, the following may be observed : whether the *kāritra* is defined as the capacity of giving or grasping a result (*phala-dāna-grahaṇa*) or as the potency to project a result (*phalākṣepaśaktī*), in either way, one can see it faces some unsurmountable difficulties. If the *dharma's* functionality (*kāritra*) is regarded as an aspect of the *dharmasvabhāva*, distinguishable from the *dharma*, the difficulty in explaining it adequately seems obvious. What is there in the structure of becoming that accounts for the holding of *kāritra* in abeyance at one time and becoming productive at another ? There is again the important question of the relationship between the *svabhāva* and *kāritra* of a *dharma*. Indeed these are the very issues raised in the scathing critique of the thesis of three times (*traikālyavāda*) by the Sautrāntikas.[22]

THE PARALLELISM OF SARVĀSTIVĀDA AND SĀṀKHYA-YOGA DOCTRINE OF CHANGE

The similarity of the Ābhidhārmika views of change, recorded by Vasubandhu. Yaśomitra, and Kamalśīla, to the Sāṁkhya-Yoga understanding of the problem is too striking to be ignored or even treated casually. In fact, Vasubandhu himself, while expounding the first of the four theories, namely Dharmatrātā's thesis of change as transmutation of modes, labels this view as the Sāṁkhya thesis (*Sāṁkhya Pakṣa*).[23] Likewise, the second theory, namely that of Ghoṣaka, which conceives change as the transformation of one temporal phase into another (lakṣaṇyathā) bears close affinity with the lakṣaṇapariṇāma of the *Yogabhāṣya*, both in respect of terminology and conception—and also in the manner in which the two notions are illustrated. In the same manner, the theory of change, as variation of states (*avasthānyathātva*), finds its close analogue in the *avasthā pariṇāma* of *Yogabhāṣya* by which is meant changes of states assumed by the underlying substratum and the consequent differences in the values acquired at different moments of existence. Finally, the view of change as temporal relativity associated with the name of Buddhadeva is corroborated in the Yoga thesis and illustration of different dharmas being differently designated with regard to their mutual relative positions, while the substratum itself remains non-relative, i.e., constant.

It is useful to go into this question of parallelism in some detail, and see if it is merely terminological or also conceptual. If latter, we have to face the problem of explaining how the Sāṁkhya-Yoga solution which partakes of the general *ātman* doctrine of Brahmanical orthodoxy (āstikavāda), could find its place in the heart of Sarvāstivāda school of Buddhism. It is by no means suggested that this problem will admit of satisfactory resolution merely by virtue of the fact that it is encountered in the present context. In the light of the unmistakable affinities which exists side by side with the obvious differences the issue may even serve the purpose of re-opening the question of the radical opposition between the two philosophical traditions, at least in the genetical state of their respective development. Maybe, there has been a history of interaction between the two schools that one can discern here, even though from the very nature of the case and the general paucity of historical data one is not able to substantiate it through independent sources.

Let us briefly examine the parallel ideas with respect to each of the four theories. Dharmatrātā's doctrine of *bhāvānyathātva* indeed looks identical with the *dharmapariṇāma* of Yoga philosophy.[24] What is described as modal transmutation (*bhāvānyathātva*) by Dharmatrātā is described as formal transmutation (*saṃsthāna pariṇāma*) by Vacaspati Miśra.[25] Each *dharma* gives place to the next dharma disappearing meanwhile in the common substratum.

While noting the obvious and commonplace similarity, one cannot also fail to note the dissimilarity. The Sarvāstivāda speaks of *dharmas* indeed as discrete elements (*dravyas*), but which are conditioned (*saṃskṛta*), subject as they are to origination, decay, continuity, and impermanence. The only thing the *dharmas* seem exempt from is passing into non-being; the future is replete with the possibility of all conditioned *dharmas*, which become present given the assemblage of conditions in its fullness, and in the very next moment passes into the past mode of existence to remain forever as potential of the origination of future *dharmas* in course of time. Even though, the *dharma* as discrete element, functions, as it were, as its own substratum throughout the three moments of existence in which its modes (*bhāvasa*) change. This distinction, in respect of function, is intrinsic to the structure of *dharmas* and in this respect it may be conceptually distinguishable from the Sāṁkhya-Yoga. We, therefore, do not agree with the criticism that there is, here, a distinction "between" the "dharma qua continuant" and the dharma qua transitory which is done explicitly by "different names, *dharmin* and *dharma*".[26] The Sarvāstivāda terminology of *dharma* seeks to steer clear of the distinctions of *dharmin* and *dharma* and imports in its place the notion of continuum. The Sarvāstivāda strives to verbalize an ontology of particulars that steers clear of a rigid logic of exclusion, dialectic of which leads to the Sautrāntika critique of the theory and also of a logic of inclusion of the kind advocated by the Jainas.[27]

The second theory of *lakṣaṇānyathātva* shifts the burden of change from the modes (*bhāvas*) to the phases (*lakṣaṇas*) which are temporal and because of which the modes may be conceived as changing. It is well known that the *Yogabhāṣya* speaks of the temporal characteristic of a *dharma* as *lakṣaṇa* which accounts for the ontological sequence of change between two different *dharmas* occurring in succession. The example of the sequence of clay lump and clay jar vis-a-vis the constant of clay given in *Yogabhāṣya* is a case in point. While clay lump is *present*, i.e., actual, the clay jar is *future*, i.e., that which shall arise when the clay lump passes off. This temporal sequence of change is what is described as the sequence of the transmutation of the temporal characteristic (*lakṣaṇa parināma krama*).[28]

The objection of the confusion of times, implicit in the thesis of lakṣaṇa parināma, is faced by the author of *Yogabhāṣya* in a manner which is similar to the account given by Vasubandhu of Buddhadeva's thesis. The *Yogabhāṣya* resolution of the problem in terms of a constant *dharmin* which serves as the substratum of varying *dharmas*, also serves to bring out the difference between the two theories of temporal becoming.[29] The Buddhist answer to the problem of co-mingling of times (*adhvasaṃkara*) is simple. There is no scope for a simultaneous activation of the three temporal phases in one self-identical state. The temporal phases (*lakṣaṇas*) of prior, present, and posterior occur successively subject to the fulfilment of the conditions of their appearance. The Sarvāstivādin, in terms of his ontology of particulars, does not have to face the problem of the three temporal phases existing together. In sum, we witness again to the same situation of the two theories of temporal becoming appearing terminologically similar and yet standing apart in terms of their ontological implications.

The doctrine of change as temporal relativity (*anyathānyathikatva*) defines the temporal distinctions in terms of each other. The example of the same woman designated mother in relation to the daughter, and daughter in relation to the mother, or sister with reference to the brother and vice versa, illustrates the theory according to which the past, present, and future distinctions are purely relational.[30] A possible way of distinguishing between the Sarvāstivādin's version and the version of the *Yogabhāṣya* would be with reference to the admission or the non-admission of a common non-relative substratum. What seems to be implied by the example of the same woman being designated differently because of relational differences seem to differ in the two points of view. According to the *Yogabhāṣya* it is the identity of the self-same person which makes it not contradictory to speak of the same person in different terms. Likewise, in the case of the temporal distinctions, the coincidence of the three times in one time could be explained. But according to the Sarvāstivāda, it is not the self identity of a common person, but the very matrix of relativity that permits designation of the persons in different terms. Likewise the successive moments of past, present and future are not found all at once, and yet their distinction obtains with reference to the very relationality of the prior or the posterior dharma (*purvāparama-peksyānyonyaucyate*).[31]

The basic difference between the orientation shared by the schools of Buddhism and reflected in the Sarvāstivāda theories considered earlier and the orientation of Hindu thought typified in Sāṁkhya-Yoga is obvious. The latter emphasizes substantial continuity to the point of underestimating change as qualified. Nothing can come into being afresh or pass away finally. This is the famous doctrine of identity of the effects with their cause (*satkāryavāda*). In sharp contrast to this stands the Buddhist thesis of the non-identity of the effect with cause. That is often overlooked in this way of understanding the difference between the two philosophical traditions, and this misunderstanding is prompted by the form of the contrast under which it is contemplated in the Hindu philosophical writings, the emphasis that Buddhism lays on the factor of continuity in causal relation. It is the causally dependent nature of things that constitutes the mark of the real. Keeping in mind this extreme significance of continuity that characterizes change according to the Buddhist understanding, we may restate the point at issue between the two traditions, i.e., the Sāṁkhya-Yoga and the Sarvāstivāda in the following terms. The former advocates a theory of the identity of the continuant, (*saṃtāni*) whereas employing the language of identity, the position of Sarvāstivāda may be described as a theory of the identity of continuum (*saṃtāna*).

From the foregoing account the ontological outlooks of the Sarvāstivāda and Sāṁkhya-Yoga doctrines emerge with clarity in terms both of their similarities and dissimilarities. There is no gainsaying of their convergence in their understanding of the problem of temporality despite their radical opposition as metaphysical systems. The convergence, even after making due allowance to the differences in their respective ontologies of particulars, is so striking that one may expect a similar convergence between the respective soteriologies. To this question we will address ourselves in the final chapter.

A SAUTRĀNTIKA CRITIQUE OF VASUMITRA'S AVASTHĀ THEORY

A detailed examination of the Sautrāntikas critique of Sarvāstivāda conception of *Kāritra* will be undertaken in a separate work. Currently, we will engage ourselves with the Sautrāntika's critique of Sarvāstivādin's conception of states (*avasthā*) of a *dharma* and its implications for temporal determination. It is our contention that the Sautrāntikā's critique emanates from a rejection of the basic ontological slant of the Sarvāstivāda. There are, surely, difficulties inherent to Sarvāstivādin formulations of the problem and they cannot be gainsaid. But the difficulties involved in the understanding of temporal becoming must be viewed in the context of the wider ontological framework, so that they may appear in the light of their positive significance. The Sarvāstivādin's formulation of temporal distinctions are questioned by the Sautrāntikās. The Sautrāntikās maintain that the differentiations of temporal determination on account of *avasthās* (states or conditions) or 'activity,' 'inactivity' 'cessation of activity,' etc., implies the continued existence of the self-same *dharma* in the three states. This self-same *dharma* in the three states must be undifferentiated (*abheda*). However, the possibility of the presence of 'activity,' 'inactivity,' etc., as the characteristic mark of the *dharmas* in the three states will not be without its difficulty. It amounts to asserting the co-existence of three mutually exclusive qualities in the undifferentiated *dharma* by which the distinction of successive states of future, past, and present is thought to be established.[32] The Sautrāntika argues : if, despite the presence of contradictory properties a real be considered to be identical, then all differentiation would disappear and the entire world will collapse into oneness.[33] The Sautrāntikas critique is based on the assumption that the self-same *dharma* passes from one state into another. If what is assumed were the case then surely the critique is valid. The three properties, which account for the temporal differentiations, cannot belong to the same undifferentiated *dharma* without disputing its unity.

It therefore remains to be seen whether this assumption is legitimate. The Sarvāstivāda certainly denies that the *dharma* or the *vastu* is undifferentiated. But what should not be overlooked here is that it also denies that the *dharmas* are identical (*nirviśiṣta*). In reality the dharma or vastu in the past, present, and future stand differentiated by the difference of abandoning and grasping of causal efficiency (*kāritra*); it is, therefore, not the case that it is strictly undifferentiated.[34] To the question if states are different or non-different from the *svabhāva* (being, reality) of the *dharma*, the answer is that they are not different (*abheda*). If the *dharma* were different from its state (*avasthā*), then, it is inconceivable how even in the present state (*avasthā*) the activity of the being can set in. The *dharma* as such, different from the *avastha* or state, will not be able to act as an active agent; efficient activity (causal efficiency) as it is argued by the Sarvāstivādins, belongs only to the present *avasthā* of the *dharma* :

> By virtue of the variations undergone in the process of abandoning one state and taking up another, the *vastu* in the three states is not entirely undifferentiated. If it is so, it is asked : are these states different or non-different (*abheda*)—why—because, in that case the inactivity of the being would be the consequence. Through positive and negative concomitance (*anvaya-vyatirekabhyām*), it has been ascertained that causal efficiency belongs only to the states. (Hence, by being different from the states, the vastu could not be an active agent).[35]

Some important observations can be made at this point. It is true that Sarvāstivādins are not quite unequivocal about the exact nature of the differentiation of the *vastu* as reflected in the three states of past, present, and future. They do not state clearly whether the differentiation of activity, inactivity, etc., belong to the same *vastu* which exists as past, present, and future, or that the properties of activity, inactivity, etc., are the properties of different *vastus* existing as past, present, and future. Two implications can be drawn from the statement that "by virtue of the variations undergone in the process of abandoning and grasping of the states, the *vastu* is not conceived to be entirely undifferentiated."[36]

1. The differentiation is caused in the same *vastu* on account of abandoning one state and taking up another state.
2. The differentiation in different phases of the real consists in the different *dharma's* state of abandoning the state of *kāritra* (causal efficiency) and of taking up of *kāritra* in different moments of time.

The second interpretation of the statement in question seems to be more in conformity with the overall picture of reality assumed in Sarvāstivādin ontology. According to this picture the state and *vastu* or *dharma* are one (*abheda*). From this it will follow that the *vastu* in the state of activity is different from the *vastu* in the state of inactivity. If state and *vastu* are identical and not different, then definitely the *vastu* in the state of activity is different from the *vastu* in the state of inactivity. It is not the same vastu that is both active and inactive in two different moments. Rather in the *saṃtāna* or the life continuum, one *vastu* with activity (*kāritra*) is preceded or succeeded by another *vastu* with activity, or secession of activity. *Vastu* which is active is both real and existent, but the *vastu* in the state of 'inactivity' or cessation of activity' is real but not existent. The *vastu* can be existent and non-existent. But it cannot be unreal. Reality (*satva*) and existence (*astitva*) are not one and the same thing.[37] Sautrāntika's critique of Sarvāstivāda rests on the confusion of the two which probably has its origin in the Vasubandhu's rendering of Sarvāstivāda (a theory of *sarvam asti*) as sarvadastivadā (a theory of *sarvadā astitva*).

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

It is instructive to be reminded that the '*sarvam*' has a specific connotation in the Buddhist canonical literature. *Sarvam* does not include the multiplicity of the phenomenal world as such. Rather, *sarvam* connotes only the *dharmas* classified as *skandhas*, *dhatus*, and āyatana. It is their conglomeration that constitutes the specific pluralities. "The people are saying 'all'; O Brahman! by all are meant the five *skandhas*, the twelve *āyatanas*, the eighteen *dhatūs*."[38] *Sarvam* connotes the '*dharmas*' which alone are real, specific combinations of them constitute the life continuum (*saṃtāna*). *Saṃtāna* itself is conceived to be only *prajñaptisata* or conceptually real. Momentary *dharmas* carrying their own *svabhāva* (being) alone are real. These *dharmas* come and go. Arising into existence they pass away. There is no continued existence of the *dharma*, and hence the question of the existence or continuity of same *dharma* in the past, present, and future does not arise. Sarvāstivāda is the assertion of the reality of *dharmas* as past, present, and future. It is not a doctrine maintaining the reality of the past, present and the future. Time, apart from the thing or the *dharma*, does not have any reality. From the Sarvāstivādin point of view "experiential events do not take place or flow in time. Rather, it would be more appropriate to say that events flow as time."[39] Seen from this point of view our awareness of time acquires altogether a new dimension. The emphasis shifts from the static element of existence to the very dynamism of the process. Dynamism itself, however, instead of being only a by-product of the relational thought seeing static elements in a series, is built in the very structure of the becomingness of being.[40] It is in the Ābhidhārmika Buddhism that a breakthrough is reached in the Indian speculation of time. It is here that the static concern with the time and its constituents give way to the dynamic concern with the temporality of being, the very structure of the becomingness of reality (*dharmadhvasau*). Thus what is generally true of Buddhism, accordingly is more specifically true of Sarvāstivāda :

> (Here) we are able to appreciate the deeper dimensions of being because now we must focus on the process itself, the becomingness of being. Here the sister concept of temporality seems to appear almost naturally. Temporality at least moves us in the right direction and seems to permit us to have glimpses of what Buddhists call reality. It has a profound meaning in that it runs across but retains or contains the multiple set of conditions and factors at play in the empirical process.[41]

It may not be out of place here to refer to the Sāṁkhya-Yoga understanding of process and time and its close similarity with Buddhism. According to Sāṁkhya-Yoga system also dynamism is rooted in the order of being built into it. The concept of *Prakṛti* connotes allness (*sarvam*) and, as the dynamic matrix of reality, provides the basis for the temporality of existence. There is however, a difference, and this difference is by no means viewed as inconsequential (and is in fact the basis on which the two differ in respect of their generic essence). The difference is : what would be considered as belonging to the order of existence and reality alike in Sarvāstivāda would be assigned a reality status different from pure consciousness which in itself is a-temporal. The Sāṁkhya-Yoga however, will concede that it is through the means of focusing on the temporal structure, the becomingness of being, that one can recover or re-gain the separation of pure consciousness.

REFERENCES

[1] These four variations of Sarvāstivāda is mentioned in *Mahāvibhāṣā*, where the other three are rejected in favour of Vasumitra, *infra*, p. 131. See Warder, A. K., pp. 346-47. Later we find Vasubandhu echoing this tradition and accepting the Vasumitra's formulation as the best. Thus, *trtiyaḥ* (Vasumitra's) *sobhanaḥ*, *Abhidharmakośam*, III, p. 808. The theories are also mentioned by Yośamitra, the celebrated commentator on *Abhidharmakośa* as

well as by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalśīla in *Tattvasamgraha* and *Panjikā on Tattvasamgraha* respectively. But it is important to note that while the later tradition following Vasubandhu has invariably regarded them as four representative positions within Sarvāstivāda, *Mahāvibhāṣa*, which was composed to settle the controversial issues within Sarvāstivāda tradition explicitly rejected the three in favour of Vasumitra's as the representative doctrine of Sarvāstivāda. see Warder, A.K., pp. 346-47.

[2] bhāvānyathiko bhadantadharmtrātaḥ. sa kilaha dharmasyādhvasu pravartamānasya bhāvānyathātvaṁ bhavati,..... dharmo'pyanāgatādadhvanaḥ pratyutpannamadhvānamāgacchannanāgatabhāvaṁ jahāti, na drayabhāvam...*Abhidharmakośam*, III, pp. 805-06.

[3] atītānāgata-pratyutpannasya bhāvasyānyathātvaṁ bhavatī, na tyarthaḥ dravyān-yathātvam; Sphutārthā, on the above, p. 805.

[4] yathākramamākṛtiguṇanyathātvajñāpanārtham; ibid.

[5] kaḥ punarbhāvaste neṣṭaḥ? guṇaviśeṣaḥ, yato'tītādyabhidhānajñānapravṛttiḥ; *Panjikā on Tattvasamgraha*, verse 1788, p. 504.

[6] ibid.

[7] Jha seems to have missed this and has made precisely this mistake. However, the substance language as such is inappropriate to Sarvāstivādins. see *Tattvasamgraha*, tr. Ganganath Jha, Vol. 2, p. 862.

[8] Sphutārthā on *Abhidharmakośam*, III, p. 806.

[9] ibid, p. 805.

[10] suvarṇaṁ kṣīram ceti dṛstāntadvayaṁ yathākramamākrti guṇānyathātvajñāpanārtham; ibid, p. 806.

[11] For a modern attempt to look at this doctrine in the light of contemporary logic of de-tensers see Charles, A., McDermott, The Sautrāntika Argument Against the Traikālyavāda, *Philosophy East and West*, Vol. 24, no. 2, April, 1974, pp. 193-200.

[12] lakṣaṇānyathiko bhadantaghoṣakah sa kilāha dharmo'dhvasu pravarttamāno'tīto'tītalakṣaṇayuktaḥ; anāgatapratyutpannābhyāmaviyuktaḥ. evaṁ pratyutpanno' pyatītānāgatābhyāmaviyuktaḥ. *Abhidharmakośam*, III, p. 806.

[13] dharmo'dhvasu vartamāno' tīto' tītalakṣaṇayukto'nāgataprtyutpannābhyāṁ lakṣaṇābhyāmaviyuktaḥ, yatha puruṣa ekasyāṁ striyāṁ raktaḥ śeṣāsvavirakta evamanāgatapratyutpannāvapi vācye. hyatītādilakṣaṇavṛttilābhāpekṣo vyavahāra iti purvakādbhedaḥ. *Panjikā on Tattvasamgraha*, verse 1789, p. 504.

[14] lakṣaṇānyathikasya lakṣaṇavṛttilābhāpekṣo vyavahārah. Sphutārtha on *Abhidharmakośam*, III, p. 806.

[15] vartamānam atītānāgatābhyām viyuktaṁ anāgatameva vartamānam, vartamānamevātitaṁ syāt. ibid.

[16] anyathānyathiko bhadantabuddhadevaḥ sa kilāh dharmo'dhvasu pravartamānaḥ purvāparampeksayānyo'nya ucyate avasthāntarataḥ, na dravyāntarataḥ. *Abhidharmakośam*, III, p. 807.

[17] pūrvamevātītaṁ vartamānaṁ vāpekṣyānāgata iti. purvaṁ vātītam, aparaṁ vā'nāgatam apekṣyā vartmāna iti, aparameva vartamānamanāgataṁ vā' apekṣyā-tīta iti... Sphutārthā on the above.

[18] dharmo' dhvasu vartamānaḥ purvāparamapekṣyānyonya ucyate iti. yathaikā strī mātā cocyate duhitā ceti. asya pūrvāparāpekṣo vyavahāraḥ, yasya

purvamevāsti nāparah so' nāgatah, yasya pūrvamasti aparam ca sa vartamānaḥ, yasyāparameva na purvam so' tita. *Panjikā on Tattvasamgraha*, verse 1788, p. 504.

[19] avasthā'nyathiko bhadantavasumitraḥ...advānaḥ kāritren vyavasthitāḥ. yadā sa dharmaḥ kāritraṁ na karoti tadā anāgataḥ. yadā karoti tada pratyupannaḥ yadā kṛtva niruddhastadā iti. *Abhidharmakośam*, III, pp. 806-8.

[20] Dharmo' dhvasu varttamāno' vasthāmavasthāṁ prāpyānyo'nyo nirdiśyate' vasthāntarato, na dravyataḥ, dravsya triṣvapi kāleṣvabhinnatvāt. yathā mṛdguḍikā ekaṅke prakṣipitā ekamityucyate, śataṅke śataṁ, sahastrānke sahastraṁ, tatha kāritre'vasthito bhāvo varttamānastatah prachyuto' titastadaprāpto' nāgata iti. *Panjikā on Tattvasamgraha*, verse 1788, p. 504.

[21] see Sphutārthā on *Abhidharmakośam*, III, p. 808.

[22] Charles A., McDermott, in his recent article on the question, has offered an excellent summary statement of the Sautrāntika critique of the *Kāritra* doctrine. He writes : "whether *Kāritra* be defined as, for example, the capacity of giving or grasping a result (*phala-dāna-grahaṇa*) or, again, as the potency to project a result (*phalākṣepaśakti*) insofar as a *dharma's* functionality is thereby regarded as (1) an aspect of the *dharmasvabhāva*, distinguishable from the *dharma*, cogent reasons for that functionality's being held in abeyance at one time, and becoming productive at another, cannot be given. (2) Neither is a halfway house, namely, the theory that the *dharmasvabhāva* and its *kāritra* or functionality both are and aren't identical, a congenial resting place. (3) Nor is there much solace to be derived from the evasive stance that the relationship between *svabhāva* and *kāritra* is ineffable. (4) If, finally, a *dharma's kāritra* is alleged to have a merely nominal existence (*prajñaptisat*), he will *ipso facto*, have conceded the Sautrāntika's poinṭ.", op. cit., p. 197. While the grasp of the Sautrāntika position reflected in the above passage is beyond doubt, what seems to have been overlooked is the import of Sarvāstivāda ontology and its implications for understanding the Kāritra doctrine. Moreover, by bracketing the soteriological question and its bearing on the problem of time, he tends to ignore the true import of the Sarvāstivada formulations. As we shall see, the soteriological questions which are integral to the Ābhidhārmika formulations have weighed heavily in accepting the reality of dharma—past, present and future.

[23] *Abhidharmakośam*, III, p. 807

[24] dharmasya dharmiṇi vartamānsyarivādhvasvatītānāgatavartamāneṣu bhāvānyathātvam bhavati, na tu dravyānyathātvam. *Yogabhāṣya*, 3.13, p. 112.

[25] *Tattvavaiśāradi of Vācaspati Miśra*, on the above, op. cit., p. 113.

[26] Tatia, Nathmal, *Sarvāstivāda*, Nalanda, 1960.

[27] The Jaina logic of the manifoldness of the real (anekāntavāda) asserts, contra the laws of excluded middle and contradiction, that A can be also AB, meaning by B, not—A. For an illuminating account of the Jaina logic of inclusion in its distinct form from the genre of Buddhist schools see Padmarajiah, Y.J., *A Comparative Study of Jaina Theories of Reality and Knowledge*, 1963, pp. 247 ff.

[28] piṇḍaḥ pracyavate, ghata upajāyata iti dharma pariṇāmakramaḥ, *Yogabhāṣya*, 3.15, p. 119.

[29] ibid.

[30] yathā caiktvepi strī mātā cocyate duhitā ca svasā ceti, *Yogabhāṣya*, 3.13, p. 114.

[31] *Abhidharmakośam*, III, p. 807.

[32] ......kiṁ tadevātītānāgatāvasthamāhosvidanyat. yadi tadeva, kathamekasminnirviśiṣṭe'sminrūpādike vastunyakriyādayaḥ parasparaviruddhā dharmā yujyante. *Panjikā on Tattvasamgraha*, verse 1837, p. 511.

[33] yadi hi viruddhadharmādhyāse'pyekatvaṁ syāt, utsannā tarhi bhedavyavasthā, tatasca sarvameva jagadekameva syāt. ibid.

[34] ibid.

[35] *athāpyavasthāparityāgaparigrahabhedena bhinnatvādadhvasu vastu* na nirviśiṣtamiti kalpate, evamapi kim tā avasthā bhāvādbhinnā āhosvidabhinnā iti vaktavyam...bhidyante bhāvāditi sambandhaḥ. kasmāt, bhāvasyākarttṛtāpitiṭaḥ akarttṛtvaprasangāt. anvayavyatirekābhyām tāsāmevāvasthānām kāryaṁ prati sāmarthyasiddheh. ibid, p. 511.

[36] see *supra*, p. 136

[37] When we make this statement, it has to be recognized that though the distinction is crucial, it is only implicit in the Sarvāstivāda which does not speak the language of real (*sattā*) as a constant element which is more concretely applicable to the Brahmanical tradition.

[38] sarvam sarvamiti brāhmaṇa yaduta pancaskandhā dvādaśāyatanāni, aṣṭādaścā bhava. cf. *Panjikā on Tattvasaṃgraha*, verse 1802, p. 507.

[39] Inada, Kenneth K., "Time and Temporality : A Buddhist Approach," *Philosophy East and West*, Vol. 24, no. 2, April 1974, pp. 173.

[40] see Coomaraswamy, Ananda K., *Time and Eternity*, 1941, pp. 58-59.

[41] Inada, Kenneth, 1974, p. 174.

CHPATER 9

TRANSCENDENCE AND TEMPORALITY IN SĀṀKHYA-YOGA AND ABHIDHARMA BUDDHISM

In this concluding chapter, we shall attempt to grasp the significance of reflection as a special mode of being and the central role that it plays in the transcendence of temporality. Herein it will be argued that for both, Sāṁkhya-Yoga and the Abhidharma Buddhism, reflection as a function of consciousness is the structure of the transcendence of temporality. Reflection itself is a temporal act and operates within the confines of the temporal process. But as a function of consciousness, which itself is always given as 'consciousness of,' reflection has built in structure of transcendence whereby it steps out of itself and relates itself to the object of reflection. The transcendence of temporality lies within the compass of reflection in terms precisely of its inherent capacity of stepping outside of itself. Objectification is the primary mode of being of the reflective consciousness. While this seems to be true of the structure of consciousness as part and parcel of temporal mode of being for both Sāṁkhya-Yoga and Abhidharma Buddhism, there is one important difference between the two systems' articulation of the problem. For Sāṁkhya-Yoga, the transcendence of temporality by reflective consciousness (*Buddhi-Ahaṃkāra* structure) means recovery of the pure or transcendental consciousness conceived as a mode of being, *Puruṣa*. For Abhidharma Buddhism, on the other hand, it implies a total extinction or dissolution of consciousness, conceived on the model of a drying-up of a stream or flow. This basic difference emanates from a difference of ontological orientation. However, despite this dissimilarity in their ontological perspectives they share a common trait of Indian soteriologies in emphasizing the possibility of transcendence of the temporal process in and through the moment of 'present.' This aspect of their soteriology we prefer to call "non-eschatological."

CONSCIOUSNESS AND TRANSCENDENCE OF TEMPORALITY : THE SĀṀKHYA-YOGA PERSPECTIVE

We have argued that for the Sāṁkhya-Yoga, 'to be present' is the primary mode of existence of the empiric being. But the empiric being, as the self-constituting synthesis, is also the locus of the ontological relation of the temporal modes of past, present, and future. The empiric subject (*Buddhi-Ahaṃkāra* structure) comprehends past, present, and future as distinct and yet not disjoined. By means of such comprehension is provided the order for these moments. It sees them as different, but not as disparate. Seeing it thus, it also constitutes its orderliness which comes to be grasped as objective time. Thus :

> The continuous flow of these moments, is a sequence (*krama*). However, there is no real (basis) for the combination of the moments and their sequence . . . (thus), time has no real (objective) existence, it is only creation of buddhi, and follows on account of knowledge by words . . . (However), the moment is objective (it has a basis in the real) and is the basis (a ground) of sequence; the sequence (*karma*) consists in the continuous (uninterrupted) succession of moments, and it is this that is called time (*kāla*) by yogins who know time (its real nature).

Temporal order on the phenomenal level is a conscious creation of the empiric subject (*Buddhi-Ahaṃkāra* structure). But the temporal flux or the flow of moments or events is ontologically pre-given in the objective being or the sphere of objectivity (*prakṛti*).[2] Time-order as the principle of continuity is constituted by the empiric subject (*Buddhi parikalpita*). "As a matter of fact, there is no real aggregation between the moments and their succession. Hence all such divisions of time . . . are purely subjective".[3] Time is nothing but the relational mode of being (*sambandhamātropakārī*).[4] But in the constitution of the temporal structure, the empiric subject does not act as a principle independent of the objective flow or the flux of moments or events. The empiric subject itself is, out and out, temporal.

How, then, are we to look at the temporal flow and its relationship to subjectivity as embodiment and the principle of I-ness ? It is precisely in the structure of the constitution of subjectivity, i.e., subject as lived and embodied, subject as the centre of I-ness and agent of all activity and willing that the essential structure of temporality, as the unity in difference or the suffusion of fissuration, is manifested. What we see in subjectivity is an essential drive, a lived tension, and a continuous turning to new events and activities. This is the mode of being of *rajas*,[5] the element of activity and energy, the life impetus which is continually operating in calling forth to existence that which lies dormant in the future. The constant tension of *triguna* in the manifestation and non-manifestation of existence mediated by the element of activity is most vividly operative in the structure of subjectivity as temporality. It is in the present that the subject acts and reacts and calls forth what is not present within the purview of its own field (*kṣetra*). It is not that subjectivity is located in the present through which events pass from the future to the past. Rather, the future becomes the present by the subject's act of making it present i.e., through the preponderance of *rajas*. The subject does not observe the flow of temporal events, (this, of course, is what lies under the purview of *Puruṣa* as the transcendental subject, the pure subject of witnessing) it performs it; it is not carried through time, it acts it; it does not have time, it exists temporally. The form, the order, and the course of time are the universal and necessary structures of subjectivity (subject as activity). Thus "pure or empty time as such is nothing or is non-existent. It is nothing apart from actions or events that are revealed in experience. If it is anything it is one with them."[6]

For the Sāṁkhya-Yoga the significance of the present is that it is the moment of mutation; and as such it is also the moment of the suffusion of the temporal fissuration.

> In the present there is a single moment and there are no earlier or latter moments. There is no combination of them. But those moments which are past and future are to be explained as inherent in the mutations. Accordingly, the whole world passes through a mutation in a single moment.[7]

The moment of mutation, the present, is also the moment of activity for the subject. The subjectivity, as activity in the present could not call forth that which is disjunct or independent of it. The suffusion of fissuration is possible only because the subjectivity as present is ontologically related to its past and future mode of being. The subjectivity (*Buddhi*) then exists as already-having been, presence-to, and being-possible. Over against the past, the subject exists in the present and acts in order to actualize the future.

> Had there been no past (existence of being in its unmanifest form) the existence of the present (existence of being in its manifest form) would have been impossible. And the present contains the future mode of being in its potential form (existence of being in its unmanifest form). Had it not been the case, the future never could come into existence as manifest being.[8]

The fundamental mode of the experience of subjectivity (subject as activity) is temporal. In the present the subject shoves back the former moments and makes present the future ones. This disengagement from one moment (*kṣaṇa*) and a turning toward another is what is given as the primitive phenomenon of succession (*krama*). A succession of events, however, is not the same thing as a conception or awareness of that succession. It is a pre-thematic mode of subjective being. Due to the process of making present over against 'having already been' (*bhūta*) and toward 'that which is to come' (*bhaviṣya*) life of the subject is lived as temporal flow. We live in a flux because the subjective experience is structured temporally. But the temporal subject is not aware of its temporality; to be aware of its temporality is to be self-aware, i.e., to objectify itself, to step aside and be able to look at itself as a totality, as an ordered whole. In doing this the subject does not act but reflects. This is that mode of being in which the *sattva* gets preponderance over *rajas*. Conscious reflection takes the place of purposive activity. Time-awareness emerges through self-conscious reflection upon our presence to and engagement in the world, as 'having already been' (*bhūta*) toward 'that which is to come' (*bhaviṣya*).

Through the complex interrelation of existential and conscious factors each of the temporal dimensions appear as ordered despite their differences. At the same time we become aware of the interdependence of each of the dimensions in so far as the conscious acts through which we have access to the past, present and future point beyond themselves to real aspects of a single subjective being.

Self-reflection, being the mode of 'objectification' of the self-reflecting self, is also the mode of the recovery of the transcendental subject or transcendental consciousness as the formal ontological ground of the self-reflecting self. It is in the mode of reflection that the true dialectical character of the being of the empiric subject (*Buddhi*) can be grasped. We have already noted this point. However, before bringing out the full implications of the transcendental consciousness, let us attempt to grasp the significance for the subject which is essentially temporal.

In and through reflection the essential structure of temporality as the manifold of subjective experiences discloses itself to the self-reflecting self. The self-reflecting self grasps the essential 'otherness' of the whole world of our ordinary experience. Reflection discovers our empiric existence in the self-reflecting act of subjectivity (being of *Buddhi*) as the mode of its world-involvement, of its entanglement in everyday situations and projects (*adhyavasāya* or *vyavasāya*).[9] As a structure of this 'everydayness' the self-reflecting self comes to discover the structure of temporality, i.e., the order of time, the form of time, etc.

Furthermore, in the reflective mode of being, the subject discovers that as subjectivity it is *present* to various kinds of objects in its phenomenal mode of existence. It discovers that in being *present* to the world it is out there in the world of its own past and future. Past and future constitute the existential background over and against which subjectivity as *adhyavasāya* operates as being present to the world of things which it is actively concerned with and which it uses for its own purpose. Thus, in reflection the subject comes to see that it is absorbed in the objects to which it is present, and thereby it grasps that an aspect of its existence is to be present-to and present alongside of a multitude of objects.

The subject then through reflection discovers the essential mode of being of subjectivity—it discovers as a unity which exists as already-having-been, present to objects of various kinds and as a possibility towards its own future. Through reflection, then, the subject becomes conscious of its own existence as tri-dimensional. Thus, in the mode of self-reflection the subject gains access to the structure of temporality vis-a-vis to subjectivity; it becomes aware of its own temporal experience as a lived unity of its own strivings and dispositions. Thus, the subject relates to itself as temporal. In the process, the subject sees itself as the principle of I-ness, as the temporal becoming which tends to appropriate the world as its own (*Ahaṃkāra*).

However, the dialectic of reflection also demands that by the same act that the subject objectifies itself, it also comes to grasp its formal grounding in the pure subject or the transcendental consciousness. The dispersion and fissuration of subjectivity also consists in the very ontological structuring of it.[10] While it has its existential ontological ground in the world (*Prakṛti*), its formal ontological grounding is in the realm of transcendental consciousness itself. It is precisely this formal ontological grounding in the pure consciousness that constitutes the possibility of transcendence in the mode of self-reflection. The moment of reflection for the empiric subject is also the moment of discriminative awareness (*viveka*). In the discriminative awareness, the subject discovers not only the essential otherness of its existence as subjectivity, but it also comes to recover its own original mode of being, its own formal ontological grounding in pure consciousness. In this single instance of the being of consciousness the subject-object distinction is totally obliterated.[11] Here, in the mode of discriminative awareness, the subject is precisely that which is subjectively identical with itself and, therefore, is not an independent object to itself. The Sāṁkhya-Yoga "is not concerned at all with the world in itself except so far as it is instrumental in the discrimination of the isolated or pure *Puruṣa*."[12] And we may add, here, that the Sāṁkhya-Yoga is typical of the entirety of Indian Philosophy in this attitude to the world.

Thus, in the act of reflection we can discern two specific moments; the moment of *discovery* and the moment of *recovery*. The first mode of reflection is operative within the framework of otherness, i.e., where consciousness sees itself as something out of itself, as something in and along with the world of objectivities. This is the mode of discovery of the being of the self as not-self. In this discovery of the essential being of the self as not-self (*Buddhi-Ahaṃkāra* structure), the self comes to constitute itself as of the world. Reflection as discovery (the being of *Buddhi*) is essentially the mode of the constitution of the self as not-self. Reflection as discovery is the realm of actuality and activity, and as such it belongs to the present, for present alone is the moment of activity and actuality. Activity is the mark of otherness of the subject and the object; it is the mode of subjects acting on the object. It is precisely for this reason that reflection as activity of discovery is also the mode of the self-transcendence of the reflective self. In reflection as discovery the reflective self turns to itself as an object of reflection.

However, contrasted with this is the mode of reflection as recovery. Reflection as recovery 'isolates itself from the contents of consciousness. It is the mode of the dispossession of the objective contents of reflection founded on individuality (*Ahaṃkāra*). *Viveka* (discrimination) is concomitant with *vairagya* (dispossession). While reflection as discovery is the structure of the withdrawal of the self into the original mode of its being as pure consciousness, reflection as recovery is pure contemplation and makes possible the being of consciousness in its pure form. The being of consciousness in its pure form, when seen from the perspective of temporality, manifests the very characteristics of eternity precisely in the sense of 'non-temporality' (timelessness).[13] It is the dissolution of the inner structure of reflection as activity[14] (an act of the subjectivity) in the present which comprises the past and future as an ontological relation within the structure of subjectivity. Reflection as contemplation is deliverance from activity of the present; the present itself undergoes a metamorphosis in that it comes to be a pure present or a *now* which is essentially eternity. While the now of the subjectivity as temporality is always fragmentary and incomplete, the now of the transcendental subject is essentially limitless in the sense that it is complete; it is infinite presence.

It must, here, be noted that this transcendence of the temporal now is itself a function of the present. The dialectical character of the relationship of the world and consciousness is nowhere more concretely discernible than in the structure of the present. The present, which is eminently the moment of world-involvement and subject's activity, is also at once the moment of the transcendence of the world of subjectivity. It is in the present that the self-reflecting self undergoes a complete metamorphosis—it emerges essentially as what it is—as the pure consciousness, bereft of all vicissitudes, dispersions, and contradictions of the realm of the objective being (*prakṛti*). In this sense Sāṁkhya-Yoga is a soteriology of the present. Salvation is attained in the present, and thus a soteriology which is non-eschatological. It is not without reason that the system speaks of the contemplation on the 'Moment' as the mode of the being of eternity. This 'Moment', the moment of the present on which the reflective self reflects, is also when the whole universe seems to undergo a radical change.

This is also the moment of the dawn of discriminative awareness which coincides with the transcending of the realm of temporality (the realm of limited now) into the realm of eternity (the realm of eternal now). The realm of *Puruṣa* in isolation from the world of activities is the realm of eternity—it is the mode of the being of Infinitude.

CONSCIOUSNESS AND TRANSCENDENCE OF TEMPORALITY : THE ĀBHIDHARMIKA PERSPECTIVE

We will now examine the structure of consciousness (*vijñāna*) and the pivotal role assigned to it in the Ābhidharmika scheme of things.[1] Contrasted with the Sāṁkhya-Yoga understanding of pure-consciousness in substantive terms the Ābhidharmikas propose a purely functional understanding of consciousness. Emphasis here shifts from the givenness of consciousness as a transcendental condition of all reflection and cognition to the very process of the operation of consciousness, conceived as immanent in the functions of cognition and reflection. Consciousness is not the mode of being of a self-identical self which, essentially, is a-temporal and without differentiation and fissuration. Rather, consciousness (*Vijñāna*) as a dharma is continually on the go, is never self-identical; and as the structure of becoming and causal conditioning it is essentially temporal.[15] Change, differentiation, and fissuration are built into the mode of being of consciousness as a *dharma.*[16] Temporality, therefore, cannot be overcome by consciousness as long as it is consciousness. Overcoming of temporality, i.e., transcendence of the realm of temporal existence would imply the overcoming of the fissuration, change, and becomingness of consciousness. But since these are structural to consciousness it follows that its transcendence would mean its dissolution. *Nirvāṇa* or freedom is not the recovery of an original mode of being of consciousness; it is the dissolution of any mode of being of consciousness. It is extinction of the very structure of the consciousness as flow. Contrast with the Sāṁkhya-Yoga ontology is obvious here.

Phenomenologically speaking, the distinction between the overcoming of temporality in the recovery of consciousness and the dissolution of consciousness is an extremely important distinction. Loosing sight of this distinction will lead to an underestimation of the differences between the basic orientations of the two systems. For both the systems temporality is essentially an imperfection[17] characteristic of the finitude, and ought to be overcome in the mode of being of the non-temporal. However, the mode of being of the non-temporal has drastically different implications for the subject as the structure of world involvement. While for Sāṁkhya-Yoga, subject as pure consciousness retains its individuated identity and is a case of recovering of its original mode of being, for Ābhidharmikas the subject must give up its original mode of being and its individuality in order to attain nirvāṇa. Nirvāṇa, though eternally existent and constantly present, is not an original mode of being that the subject somehow lost and regains. World (*saṃsāra*) as the structure of temporal becoming does not share the ontological character of *Nirvāṇa,* which for the Ābhidharmikas is eternally existent and beyond the operation of the forces of conditionedness (*saṃskṛtatva*).[18]

It is important to be reminded that for Abhidharma Buddhism, *Nirvāṇa* is *not* a negative concept; it is not an emptiness either in the form of an ontological nothingness without any substance or a state of being which is rendered non-existent on conceptual analysis.[19] Rather, *Nirvāṇa* is a mode of positive being, an eternal existence which is acquired or reached and possessed (*prāpti*).[20] Nirvāṇa is eternally existent and as a reality it is posited over and against the reality of temporally determined *dharmas.* Within the Ābhidharmika context it is possible to discern distinction reminiscient of the Sāṁkhya-Yoga categories of permanence (*parināmi nityatā*) and eternity (*kūtastha nityatā*). *Saṃtāna* or the continuum which, theoretically, is never-ending and is in that sense 'permanent', is not, however, a case of overcoming of temporality.[21] Endlessness is not conquering of temporality at all, but rather it is a prolongation or perpetuation of temporality's defect. *Saṃtāna* (continuum) may be described as having a temporal mode of permanence in the sense that its coming to an end is not part of its meaning as becoming. But this 'permanence' of the continuum can not be ascribed the value of eternity because it is only continuity of imperfection (conditionedness), prolongation of non-perfection. *Nirvāṇa,* on the other hand, is described by Ābhidharmika as eternal (*nitya*) in a non-temporal sense. As dharma or reality *Nirvāṇa* is eternity precisely in the sense that it transcends the mode of imperfection or conditionedness (*saṃskrtatva*). *Nirvāṇa* is unconditioned and eternal because it is not subject to the operation of the forces of conditionedness, namely *jati, jarā, sthiti* etc.[22]

As the realm of eternity *Nirvāṇa* is fullness of spiritual being, a completedness which constitutes the horizon into which the individual as subject dissolves. Overcoming of temporality in the present case also is a function of reflection as a mode of the being of the subjectivity as consciousness. As reflection subjectivity is essentially in fellowship with what is contemplated. Reflection as an act of consciousness consists of a fellowship of what is contemplated and what contemplates.[23] Contrasted with Sāṁkhya Yoga, which admits the possibility of consciousness without content, Abhidharma proposes an essential reciprocity of the consciousness and its content.

In this reciprocity of consciousness and content consists the essential imperfection of consciousness (*saṃskṛtatva*), for consciousness itself is both conditioning and conditioned by other *dharmas*.[24] Reciprocity and mutual conditioning also implies reciprocal otherness between the two. While the Sāṁkhya-Yoga makes the recognition of this otherness as the very condition for freedom, for the Ābhidharmika the otherness must be dissolved. However, the dissolution of the otherness does not consist in the discerning of an identity over-reaching the different i.e., the consciousness claiming the object or the content of it as its own (such would be a case of inveterate tendency to conceptualize in terms of being, the *satkāyadṛṣṭi*,[25] which Ābhidharmika rejects). It consists in the disclaiming of consciousness as well as its content (*visamyoga*).[26]

Thus the overcoming of temporality, the process of becomingness of the conditioned *dharmas* (*saṃskṛtatva*) is essentially the dissolution of the subjectivity in the mode of otherness. Subjectivity or consciousness which loses the other through which alone could it express itself, loses its subjecthood. Just as the objects, which become the possession of the consciousness, are not mere objects and must be described as that which belongs to the consciousness (*caiteṣika*),[27] so the consciousness, which is bereft of its content, must completely lose its existing character as consciousness.

Thus, within Ābhidharmika scheme, at least two moments in consciousness can be discerned. Cognition is the mode of claiming of object as other by the subject. Reflection is the mode of disclaiming of this otherness. It is the realization that all *dharmas* as conditioned are essentially on the same ontological footing; it is the realization that consciousness, as much as its content, is essentially impermanent and conditioned. Reflection as an act of consciousness, then, inevitably brings about as it were a perfect unity of the subject and object, but this unity is nothing other than the abrogation of the subject by its complete annulment. Temporality surely is overcome through the negation of the distinction of the subject and object. But it must not be forgotten that this in turn entails an overcoming of the subjecthood. The eternity of *Nirvāṇa* as the stillness of consciousness (*sthita*) overcomes the flow of temporality through complete extinction of consciousness as the cognitional basis of all temporality. In this lies the dialectical character of consciousness.

There is another implication of this dialectic of consciousness. Consciousness, according to the Ābhidharmikas, takes the form of the object that it cognizes.[28] Accordingly the consciousness which cognizes *Nirvāṇa* must also become of the nature of *Nirvāṇa.* Consciousness itself is temporal because it is both conditioning and conditioned. It retains this character of temporality in its encounter with the objects which themselves are temporal and conditioned (*saṃskṛta dharma*). But in its encounter with that which is unconditioned and beyond the pale of temporality and becomingness, consciousness must, of necessity, lose its own conditionedness and temporality. In other words, it must lose its character of consciousness.

Eternity of *Nirvāṇa* in the sense of constant presence or 'eternal now,' within the grasp of consciousness as reflection, brings out the true soteriological import of Ābhidharmika speculations about the structure of temporal becoming. Here too structural similarity and thematic congruity with the Sāṁkhya-Yoga soteriology are quite prominent. For both the systems freedom is not in future, but it is in the present; it is not to be realized at some distant moment, when the temporal process shall come to an end. The process of temporal becoming as the structure of world participation is a given fact, and as a fact it cannot be annihilated or terminated. It will never come to an end. The process as fact is permanent (in the temporal sense). Its termination is not conceivable. Freedom therefore, of necessity, lies in the present. It is in the temporal present that the *Nirvāṇa* can be attained. It is the present that constitutes the stepping-stone to the 'eternal now.

The realization of *Nirvāṇa* as eternity is possible precisely because it is an existent fact. It is not something previously non-existent which becomes existent in the present. It is eternally present and as such is the very opposite of the temporal now which is constantly moving. But the act of transcendence as an act of consciousness is performed within the compass of this temporal present. It is not without significance that the Buddhist canons exhort the aspirant: "Get ye across this sticky mire, let not the Moment pass (*khaṇo ve mā upaccagā*), for they shall mourn whose moments past (*khaṇṇatītā hi socanti*)."[29] Those whose "moment has been caught" (*khaṇo vo paṭiladdho*) are the fortunate ones, while those "whose moment has past" (*Khaṇātīta*)[30] are the unfortunate ones. The moment of release is sudden and "contrasts with the length of the Way, the aeonic time that is *now* and once for all escaped."[31]

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

In this final chapter we offered our interpretation of the two systems' articulation of temporality and its implications for consciousness. The thrust of the argument was to bring out the structure of metaphysical transcendentalism as represented in their conception of eternity that the two systems imply. Of pivotal importance, both to Sāṁkhya-Yoga and the Abhidharma Buddhism, was the analysis of the experience of temporality defined as finitude and to determine whether or not experiencing of temporality necessarily implied positing a transcendental time as the receptum of entities. In other words, is temporality an experience of the flow of entities and events as they are present to consciousness in the original mode of their limitation i.e., finitude, or it is an experience of the flow of entities and events as mediated through a transcendental principle of time? It was our attempt to show that in both the systems temporality is explained in terms of our experience which is radically and essentially a revelation of our immediate contact with the world of dynamic change and flow exempliyfying finitude.

In pursuit of this insight we analyzed the Sāṁkhya-Yoga attempt to ground temporality in subjectivity. Our analysis was primarily an attempt to show that the Sāṁkhya-Yoga does not tend to reduce the experience of temporality to the consciousness of temporality for an a-temporal transcendental consciousness. The two were placed in two realms of being, though with a possibility of the dialectical contact between the two. However, the dialectic of contact (*saṃyoga*) also implies the loss of the original mode of being of the transcendental consciousness, which can be regained or recovered through the dialectic of reflection, which itself, in the ultimate analysis, is part and parcel of the temporal mode of being. Thus from our point of view, the Sāṁkhya-Yoga's analysis of temporality can be regarded as an argument both, directly for the possibility of temporal experience independent of time as a transcendental condition of this experience, and indirectly for the transcendence of temporality in the realm of eternity, which we saw to be the mode of being of *Puruṣa*. The important aspect of this argument is the implicit assertion that temporality as the experience of the becomingness of the world as a dynamic flow cannot be reduced to a mere appearance for a transcendental consciousness.

The temporal differentiation is not appearance to the pure subject, but enters into awareness as a specific fact in the life-history of subjectivity as the structure of world involvement. On this specific issue we find the basic positions of both the Sāṁkhya-Yoga and the Abhidharma concurrent. In either case it can be said that any attempt to reduce temporality to appearance in and for a-temporal consciousness would be an exercise in futility. For both the systems experience of temporality for an a-temporal consciousness must be ruled out. Both of them seem to agree in maintaining that experience of temporality entails subjectivity immanent to the structure of world-involvement (*Buddhi-Ahaṃkāra*) structure in the case of Sāṁkhya-Yoga and the structure of *Skandhas* in the case of Abhidharma Buddhism). Subjectivity as immanent in this structure is always losing its autonomy precisely in the sense that subjectivity as empiric consciousness is inconceivable without the content of consciousness. In the mode of being of subjectivity, the mutual otherness of the subject and object, or consciousness and its content, is constantly and steadily overcome. It is subject to systematic disappearance. This is what is implied by becoming aware of something. Awareness or experience, then, in a sense, is this very structure of the 'disappearance' of consciousness as consciousness i.e., as entailing the otherness of subject and object. This is the mode of being of empiric consciousness which always is "consciousness of" (*citta*, *Buddhi*). Phenomenologically speaking, this structure of 'disappearance' of consciousness discernible in the experience of temporal becoming or temporality also provides the clue for the trauscendence of temporality. If empiric consciousness loses itself partially in the experience of temporality, it loses itself completely in the experience of eternity. This is accomplished through self-reflection or critical reflection as a mode of transcendence which thus seems intrinsic to the very structure of consciousness as reflection.

Thus, above is a generalized picture of this common structure between the two points of view outlined in the course of this study. The constant concern with the analysis of moments in both the systems under investigation may be understood as the exemplification of a soteriology of the present, or what we have termed as the non-"eschatological" soteriology. Sāṁkhya-Yoga, while not accepting the *kṣaṇikavāda* of Buddhism (the momentary arising and disappearance) accepts the doctrine of the moment (*kṣaṇa*) over against the more popular Brahmanical doctrine of time (*Kāla*). Whether the doctrine is originally a Buddhist doctrine or a Brahmanical one is a question that evades any easy solution. We are not quite certain if Stecherbatsky's observation that "the origin of the theory of Instantaneous Being is probably pre-Buddhist"[32] has any positive historical evidence to support it. Nor is there any incontrovertible evidence to substantiate the claim that the Yoga-Bhāṣya in its articulation of the problem of temporality agreed verbatim and accepted the doctrine of the Ābhidharmikas.[33] The historical question of the exact nature and extent of interaction between Sāṁkhya-Yoga and Abhidharma Buddhism is an important issue demanding further and fuller investigation by the historians of religions. This, however, is beyond the scope of the present work. What we have attempted in these pages is to show a significant structural similarity in the articulation of the specific problem. This raises important questions about the philosophical postulates of the two soteriologies. Are the two systems really two distinct and opposed expressions of the philosophical spirit characteristic of the religious philosophies of India, or is it not perhaps the case that despite their differences they also profoundly share some important ontological nuances and stand together in contradistinction only to the "eschatological" soteriologies of Judaeo-Christian traditions? The soteriology of the present as exemplified in Sāṁkhya-Yoga and Abhidharma Buddhism suggests a relationship of mutual reciprocity between the mundane and the transcenpent. The relationship of the word of temporality and transcendent is not of mere opposition and conflict; rather the relationship is one of opposition and cooperation, conflict and complementarity. They coalesce and interpenetrate in a way that the transcendent remains ever relevant to the mundane and that the mundane overcomes its becomingness in the transcendent. The transcendent, the unchanging ground of all change, is the ultimate identity structure, the sacred, which is secured from the onslaughts of the mundane, the profane. Permanence, continuity, a sense of togetherness, which the contingencies of the realm of temporal cannot touch, is what transcendent represents. Transcendent is the sphere of eternity (nitya) hovering on the horizon of temporality (anitya). It is the sphere into which temporal identity structure ultimately dissolves. Such is the vision of eternity and its ultimate significance that has continually provided the dynamic impetus to the religious zeals of both the Hindu and Buddhist traditions. The Hindu and Buddhist minds of all ages have incessantly sought this ideal and, in all probability, will continue to seek this ideal of transcendent in and through the temporal.

REFERENCES

[1] tatpravāhāvicchedastu kramaḥ. kṣanatkramayornāsti vastusamāhāra...sa khavalyam vastuśūnyo buddhinirmānaḥ śabdajñānānupatī...kṣanastu vastupatitaḥ kramāvalambī. kramaśca kṣanānantar yātmā. *Vyāsabhāṣya on the Yoga Sūtra*, 3.52.

[2] "We see therefore that time, space, etc., are the limitations which regulate, modify, and determine to a certain extent the varying transformations and changes and the seeming differences of things, though in reality they are all ultimately reducible to the three gunas (the constituents of prakṛti)..." Dasgupta, S.N., *Yoga as Philosophy and Religion*, p. 79.

[3] *The Tattvakaumudī* by Vācaspati Miśra, p. 215; also see Dasgupta, S.N., *History of Indian Philosophy*, I, p. 256.

[4] *Yuktidīpikā*, p. 74.

[5] *Sāṁkhyapravacanasūtra*, 6.50.

[6] Sen, S.K., 1968, p. 412.

[7] Thus, then, the present is but a single moment, there are no 'preceding' or 'succeeding' moments (in it), for there is no combination of these. The past and the future moments are, then, to be explained as inherent in the change (mutation). In that one moment (the present) the whole world experiences change (undergoes mutation). *Vyāsabhāṣya*, p. 151.

[8] yadi tu vartamānatvābhāvāt atītānāgatyaḥ sattvaṁ hantobhovartamānasyā pyaphāvo'tītānāgatatvābhāvāt. adhvadharmyaviśiṣṭatayā tu sattvaṁ trayanamapyavisistamityabhiprayena...*Tattvavaiśāradī* by Vācaspati Miśra, 4.12.

[9] see *supra*, p. 61.

[10] It is important to remember that subjectivity (*Buddhi-Ahaṃkara* structure) has a peculiar ontological character. On the one hand, being the realm of embodiment it is related to *Prakṛti*. On the other, reflecting the consciousness of *Puruṣa*, it seems to take the form of *Puruṣa*. Thus, the empiric subject has a built-in structure of fissuration. *Puruṣa* is its formal ontological basis because *Buddhi* tends to take the form of consciousness that belongs to *Puruṣa*. *Prakṛti* on the other hand, is the existential ontological basis, for subject (*Buddhi*) is essentially embodiment and operates through *Indriyas*. see *Jayamaṅgalā* : ...... buddhyādi dvāri bhavati......śeṣāṇi tu buddhīndriyakarmendriyāṇi dvārāṇi...... trailokyagataṁ puruṣasyārtha sūkṣamasthulaviṣayalakṣanaṁ prakaśyābhivyaktiṁ...*The Jayamangalā*, p. 42.

[11] Dasgupta, S.N., *Yoga as Philosophy and Religion*, p. 154.

[12] Larson, p. 222.

[13] *Vyāsabhāṣya on the Yoga Sūtra* 4.33.

[14] The Sāṁkhya-Yogā looks at reflection as an action and thus extrinsic to the essential being of *Puruṣa* as pure consciousness. For the modification of thought called "meditation" is the noblest of all modifications (incident to Soul, or pure Thought, whose blessedness, or state of emancipation, it is to have no modification at all)......meditation cannot belong to Soul essentially, because of the immobility of Soul (*Puruṣa*); whereas "meditation" is an effort......*The Sāṁkhya Aphorisms*, trans. J.R. Ballantyne, pp. 218-19.

[15] *Vijnāna* is a *samskṛta dharma*. By definition *samskṛta dharmas* are temporal (*adhva*) and impermanent : ta eva saṃskṛtā gatagacchadgamiṣyadbhāvādadhvānaḥ, adyante nityatayeti vā; *Abhidharmakośam*, I, p. 26, adyante'nityatayā bhaksyanta ityadhvāna iti saṃskṛtā evādhvaśabdena bhagvatā deśitāḥ Sphuṭārthā on *Abhidharmakośa Vyākhyā*, 1949, p. 23.

[16] "*saṁskṛta dharmas* are called temporal (*dhva*) precisely because change or impermanence (*anityata*) eats them up, ibid.

[17] This is the connotation of the term *vikṛti* characteristic of the phenomena as modification of *Prakṛti* in Sāṁkhya-Yoga. A similar understanding of the phenomena constituted of *saṃskṛta dharma* is present in the Abhidharma literature.

[18] The question of the existence of *Nirvāṇa* as a separate dharma which is not subject to the forces of conditionedness has been a matter of controversy between the Sarvāstivādins and the Sautrāntikas. While the Sautrāntikas deny that *Nirvāṇa* exists or is real, Sarvāstivāda affirms it's reality as a separate *dharma*. For the details of the argument and counter-argument, see *Abhidharma-*

kośam, I, pp. 318-28. Also see Sphuṭārthā on *Abhidharmakośa Vyākhyā*, 1949, pp. 145-52.

[19] The negativism as a philosophical doctrine (*śunyavāda*), if at all the ultimate philosophical position, is the one that is associated with Nāgārjuna. This is at least the historical truth even though it is increasingly questioned in modern times. Saṃkara criticised it as expressly a negative doctrine (see *Saṃkara's Bhāṣya on Brahma Sūtra*, 2.2.31). The other exponent of negativism as a viable philosophical doctrine is Prajnākaramati, the author of the *Panjikā on the Bodhicaryāvatāra* of Śāntideva.

As a paradigm of a negativism implying dissolution through conceptual analysis may be cited the Advaita Vedānta, according to which the state of being is rendered in retrospection non-existent by means of conceptual separation of the ground and the superimposed. see Mandana's *Brahmasiddhi*, 1932, pp. 136 ff.

[20] *Abhidharmakośam*, I, pp. 23, 211-12, 319.

[21] nityaṁ kuśalaṁ cāsti dravyāntaram. tadvisaṁyogascocyate pratisaṁkhyā (=nirvāna) nirodhasceti sarvamevāsamskrtamadravyamiti, ibid, p. 321.

[22] etāni hi saṃskṛtasya catvāri lakṣaṇāni. yatraitāni bhavanti sa dharmaḥ samskrto lakṣyate viparyādasamskrtaḥ. ibid., p. 253.

[23] According to Abhidharmakośa *citta*, *manas* and *vijñāna* are interchangeable terms used for consciousness. Consciousness is always dependent upon what it cognizes : cittaṁ mano'tha vijñanamekārtha paṁcadha *Abhidharmakośam*, I, p. 208-9; samprayuktakahetustu cittachaittāḥ, ibid, p. 306; also saman āśrayo yesāṁ te cittacaitta anyonyaṁ samprayuktakahetuḥ,ibid, p. 307.

[24] Cittacaitah sahāvaśyaṁ sarva samskṛtalakṣaṇaih prāptyā, ibid, pp. 185-86.

[25] see *supra*, p. 155.

[26] Visaṁyogaḥ kṣayo dhiyā kṣayaḥ=nirodhaḥ dhi=prajñā teṇa pratisaṁkhyānirodho visaṁyogaphalamityuktaṁ bhavati, *Abhidharmakośam*, p. I, 332.

[27] see *Abhidharmakośam*, I, *kārika*, 23-33 and *bhāṣya* on them ibid, pp. 186-211.

[28] ibid, p. 208.

[29] Cited in Coomaraswamy, p. 44 (*Sn*. 333; cf. *Dh*. 315; *Tha*. 403, 653, 1005; *The*. 5, 459).

[30] ibid, *S*. 4, 126.

[31] ibid, p. 45.

[32] Stcherbatsky, Th., *Buddhist Logic*, I, 1932, p. 108.

[33] Takagi, S., "A Comparative Study of Time in Yogabhāṣya and Abhidharma Buddhism" *Mikkyo Bunka*, Koyosan, 1963, pp. 68-83.

APPENDIX A

THE HISTORICAL AND TEXTUAL SETTING OF SĀṀKHYA-YOGA

PRE-CLASSICAL SĀṀKHYA-YOGA

The historical question is not the primary concern of this study. A precise historical investigation of the chronological relationship between the different stages of development of Sāṁkhya-Yoga thought, in itself one of the most intriguing chapters in the history of Indian thought, is beyond the scope of this study. However, drawing heavily upon the findings of previous researchers in this field we will try to present a systematic and, hopefully, coherent picture of the doctrinal development of the system under investigation.

There have been several sincere and partly fruitful attempts to trace Sāṁkhya to the earliest traditions of Indian philosophical speculations.[1] True, any systematic exposition of Sāṁkhya system is not to be found in the earlier texts of *Vedas*, *Brāhmaṇas* and *Upaniṣads*. But certain ideas and doctrines of these older philosophical literature might have been appropriated and transmited in the later Sāṁkhya philosophical tradition. Within Upaniṣadic tradition, earliest reference to Sāṁkhya-Yoga concepts may be traced to *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*.[2] However, the ideas and thought, which may specifically be said to belong to the Sāṁkhya-Yoga tradition, are reflected in rather more discernible way in the *Śvetaśvatara Upaniṣad*.[3] A more elaborate and distinctly Sāṁkhyan tradition with theistic tinge appears in the *Ahirbudhnya Saṃhitā*[4] and the *Caraka Saṃhitā*.[5] The most discernible presence of a pre-classical sāṁkhya tradition is to be noted in the *Mokṣadharma* and the *Bhagavadgītā* which form parts of the great epic, *Mahābhārata*.[6] Both the texts have been recognized by scholars as providing a basis for an understanding of the earlier phases of the development of the Sāṁkhya thought. Though the later classical Sāṁkhya tradition can be differentiated from the tradition of the epic in significant ways, their close affinity cannot be minimized. It is here for the first time in the history of Indian thought, that the

Sāṁkhya-Yoga concepts and ideas figure significantly and abundantly; and one may even suggest that these constituted the immediate contexts for the formulation of classical Sāṁkhya-Yoga.

We have tried to spell out, in briefest possible way, the pre-classical Sāṁkhya context of the later developments. However, the classical Sāṁkhya tradition considers itself as growing out of the tradition of *Ṣaṣṭitantra*, a text lost to the tradition long ago.[7] The *Sāṁkhyakārikā* claims that it represents the ideas of the *Ṣaṣṭitantra*[8]; and the *Ahirbudhnya*[9] *saṃhitā* gives an account of Sāṁkhya based on the *Saṣṭitantra*. The *Ahirbudhnya saṃhitā* and the *Yuktidīpikā*[10] assign the authorship to Kapila, the mythical sage, who is supposed to be the earliest teacher of the sāṁkhya school of thought. According to *Jayamaṅgalā*[11] Pañcaśikha was the author of this work. Vācaspati Miśra,[12] on the other hand, suggests that it is the work of Varṣagaṇya. Just as the tradition is divided on the question of the authorship of the text, it also offers varying versions of the content. Nothing definite can be said about the text on the basis of available evidences, except that probably *Ṣaṣṭitantra* was an old Sāṁkhya-Yoga text which dealt with basic Sāṁkhya-Yoga thought and divided them under sixty categories or sub-headings.

For the purpose of this study, it is crucial to make a distinction between the Classical and pre-Classical Sāṁkhya-Yoga.[13] The line of demarcation consists of the systematic exposition of the Classical Sāṁkhya thought in the *Sāṁkhya Kārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa and of Classical Yoga in the *Yoga Sūtra* of Patanjali. The treatment of Sāṁkhya-Yoga in the literature pre-dating *Sāṁkhya Kārikā* and *Yoga Sūtra* is excluded from our purview,[14] On the other hand, later commentorial literature (*Bhāṣyas* and *Vyākhyās*) on *Sāṁkhya Kārikā* and *Yoga Sūtra* are considered as representing a continuous tradition of the Classical Sāṁkhya-Yoga thought. As integral to this classical Sāṁkhya-Yoga tradition are considered other later texts and treatises following the first formulation of the basic tenets of the school of thought in the two primary texts mentioned, the justification being that they maintain allegiance to the basic ontological perspectives of the classical tradition.

THE SĀṀKHYA KĀRIKĀ AND COMMENTARIES

The *Sāṁkhya Kārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa[15] is the earliest extant systematic formulation of the Sāṁkhya thought. The *Kārikā* itself, however, does not claim to be the earliest work of the school. The text concludes by stating that the subject-matter of the *Kārikā* is actually a concise statement of the thought of the *Ṣaṣṭitantra.*[16] The *Kārikā* does not provide much information on the identity of the author except that he belonged to the tradition of the Sāṁkhya expounded by Kapila and continued by Asuri and Pañcaśikha.[17] According to a Chinese tradition, Īśvarakṛṣṇa is supposed to have belonged to a brahmin family of Kauṣika.[18] Following the Chinese tradition, based on Paramārtha, the Buddhist monk who translated the *Kārikā* in Chinese and also wrote a commentary on it during the 6th century AD, Takakusu tends to identify Īśvarakṛṣṇa with Vindhyāvāsī.[19] Both A.B. Keith and Richard Garbe also identify the author of the *Kārikā* with Vindhyāvāsī.[20] Though a little cautious in his approach to the problem of the authorship of the *Kārikā*, Radhakrishnan too does not seem to disagree with this identification.[21] However, their contentions do not seem sustainable by the evidence from the Indian tradition. Guṇaratna in his *Tarkabhāṣya* considers Vindhyāvāsī and Īśvarakṛṣṇa as two different persons.[22] The author of the *Yuktidīpikā* too mentions Īśvarakṛṣṇa and Vindhyāvāsī as two different Sāṁkhya teachers.[23] Svapneśvara suggests that Īśvarakṛṣṇa was none other than the great poet Kālidāsa.[24] This contention of Svapneśvara also finds support in Ghanaśyāma who says that the name of the author of *Raghuvaṁsa Śākuntala* and *Kumārasambhava* was Īśvarakṛṣṇa Bhartṛmidha.[25] Kumārila points out that the Sāṁkhya teacher named Vindhyāvāsī did not accept the notion of subtle body, a concept so clearly mentioned in *Sāṁkhya Kārikā.*[26] All these evidences from the Indian sources seem to run counter to the thesis of identification of Īśvarakṛṣṇa with Vindhyāvāsī. We do not, however. consider these evidences from the traditional Indian sources conclusive and incontrovertible. A final word on this matter will have to await further researches. Until a more thorough investigation of comparative nature of the writings of Īśvarakṛṣṇa, Vindhyāvāsī and Kālidāsa is undertaken we will have to remain in dark about the identity of the author of the *Kārikā.*

These conflicting claims about the identity of the author of the *Sāṁkhya Kārikā*, however, does not disprove the antiquity of the work. It obviously belongs to a period prior to the 6th century when Paramārtha translated and wrote commentary on the *Kārikā* in Chinese. At the present stage of historical research any statement beyond that will be conjectural. But, while no positive statement can be made about the exact date of the *Kārikā*, the ideas as present in the *Kārikā* seem to have been well known and assimilated by the scholars of that period. Radhakrishnan has hypothesized that the ideas of the Classical Sāṁkhya were already systematized and well articulated by the third century AD.[27] Moreover, if we take the suggestions of Keith and Dasgupta seriously then probably the date of the *Sāṁkhya Kārikā* should be placed between 200-300 AD. Both of them are of the opinion that the *Sāṁkhya Kārikā* preceded the composition of the *Yoga Sūtra* which evidently presupposes the Sāṁkhya metaphysics as articulated in the *Sāṁkhya Kārikā* itself.[28] Even on the strength of the Chinese tradition it is reasonable to assume that Īśvarakṛṣṇa was a senior contemporary of Vasubandhu and Vindhyāvāsī. Date of Vasubandhu is now almost certainly placed by the scholars in the 4th century AD[29]. The *Sāṁkhya Kārikā* then cannot be a later text. Even though one cannot be very dogmatic on this point, but considering the significant similarities between the views of early Sarvāstivādin about the nature and structure of temporal determinations as recorded by Vasubandhu and the Classical Sāṁkhya-Yoga, one is tempted to suggest that the early Sarvāstivādins like Dharmatrātā, Ghoṣaka, Buddhadeva and Vasumitra had before them the Sāṁkhya-Yoga paradigm. Vasubandhu himself had indeed yielded to such a suggestion on the extreme congruity between their views and that of Sāṁkhya-Yoga.[30] If one accepts this argument then the date of the Classical Sāṁkhya-Yoga will have to be placed during the 2nd century AD.

Through all these confusions about the identity and the date of the author one fact remains unquestionable : the *Sāṁkhya Kārikā* has continued as the principal work of the Sāṁkhya school of thought in known history. Several commentaries were written on it at different times. These commentaries, despite certain differences in their outlook and at times varying theological allegiances, have remained by and large true to the basic ontological perspective of the *Sāṁkhya Kārikā*.

Guudapāda's *Sāṁkhya Kārikā Bhāṣya*[31] is the most important and probably the earliest commentary on the *Sāṁkhya Kārikā*. For our own purposes we take his discussion of the role of *antaḥkaraṇas* in the appropriation of temporal determinations as providing an important link with the later explicit rejection of the transcendental reality of one, unitary, and single Time. His elaboration of the Īśvarakṛṣṇa's distinction between the mode of functioning of the internal and external organs in terms of their relationship to temporal conditioning, merits special attention.[32]

Regarding the identity of the author one nced not take seriously the suggestion that he and the well-known Vedāntin Gauḍapāda, were one and the same person.[33] Though there have been some attempts to find a connection between this Gauḍapāda and the Gauḍapāda who wrote a *Kārikā* on *Māndūkyopaniṣad*, it is well established that the two were different individuals. The latter shows definite Vedāntic leanings, while the former remains loyal to the classical Sāṁkhya position. The date of this work can easily be placed in the 8th century since Vācaspati Miśra shows acquaintance with this work in his *Sāṁkhyatattvakaumudi* which belongs to the 9th century.[34]

The *Yuktidīpikā* (*authorship undecided*)[35] is an extremely important work with special ramifications for this study. The commentator here has taken a specific stand on the problem of the nature and status of time and temporal relations. The text takes a decisive stand against Vaiśeṣikas by rejecting the theory assigning an independent ontological status to time as a transcendental principle. The authorship of the text remains clouded by vague claims from different editors of the text. P.B. Chakravarti thinks that it might have been written in response to Vasubandhu's *Paramārthasaptaśati*.[36] R.C. Pandey assigns the authorship to one Rājā (Bhojarāja) and identifies the work as the lost commentary called Rājavārtika mentioned and quoted by Vācaspati Miśra.[37] Both Chakravarti and Pandey are inclined to accept that *Yuktidīpikā* predates Vācaspati Miśra's *Tattvakaumudī* and Gaudapada's *Sāṁkhya Kārikā Bhāṣya*. We do not have any positive evidence either to support or contradict these contentions. Value of the work cannot be over-emphasized, specially as a source of informations on different schools and teachers of Sāṁkhya system as well on certain intricate points of debate between Sāṁkhya and Buddhist philosophies.[38]

The *Sāṁkhyatattvakaumudī* by Vācaspati Miśra[39] is a work of special significance for the present study. The author of the text takes specific stand against the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika's postulation of the reality of a single, undivided and unitary time as the trancendental reality independent of the acts of cognition and experience. Against the Vaiśeṣikas the text suggests that the temporal differentiation can be accounted for by reference to activities and events themselves. The category of Time is an unwanted reification to explain temporal determinations.[40] Modern scholarship is generally unanimous in holding Vācaspati Miśra to be the author of this text.[41] He is supposed to be the disciple of Mārtandatilaka Swāmin. A well-known treatise on Sāṁkhya philosophy *Tattvakaumūdī* itself has been subject of several commentaries on it.[42] The date of the text is fixed beyond doubt to be the 9th century AD on the testimony of the author himself.

There is another minor commentary on the *Sāṁkhya Kārikā* called the *Jayamangalā*.[43] This is supposed to have been written by Śaṃkara. This Śaṃkara is not to be confused with the great Vedāntic thinker, Śaṃkarāchārya. The commentary in certain respects follows the *Yuktidīpikā* reading of the Kārikā and differs from both Gauḍapāda and Vācaspati Miśra on certain points.[44] It is one of the minor commentaries of lesser doctrinal and philosophical value.[45]

The *Suvarṇasaptati*[46] is a commentary on *Sāṁkhya-Kārikā*. It is not available in original Sanskrit. It has been recently restored to Sanskrit from its Chinese translation by Professor N. Aiyaswami Sastri. Belvalkar suggests that *Suvarṇasaptati* is the same as the Māṭharvṛtti.[47] Professor Sastri on the other hand is inclined to give it an independent status.[48] But R. C. Pandey finds some striking similarity between the *Suvarṇaspatatī* and *Māṭharvṛtti* and agrees with Belvalkar in holding that the two texts are identical.[49] One important point to be noted in this commentary is the absence of the kārika 63 (*rūpaih Saptabhireva tu* etc.) from the text.[50] It also suggests that the kārika 72, which says that the *Sāṁkhya Kārikā* presents the basic doctrine of the *Ṣaṣṭitantra*, is interpolated by some intelligent person (*iha medhāvi kaścidāha*).

Māṭharavṛtti[51] is yet another original commentary on *Sāṁkhya Kārikā* on which scholars have made contradictory claims about the authorship of the work. According to Belvalkar this is probably the original Sanskrit text of which the Paramārtha's commentary in Chinese is only a translation.[52] It has been suggested that Gauḍapāda's bhāṣya is an abridgement of this text. But Radhakrishnan differs from this contention. He points out that Māṭhra's is a *vṛtti* which traditionally is preceded by a

Bhāṣya.[53] Moreover, it is important to note that Gauḍapādabhāṣya does not comment on the last three kārikās whereas *Māṭharavṛtti* does. It is conceivable that the *Māṭharavṛtti* is a later work.

THE SĀṀKHYA SŪTRA AND COMMENTARIES

Sāṁkhya Sūtra by Kapila.[54] Besides Sāṁkhya Kārikā and commentaries on it enumerated above the Sāṁkhya Sūtra or the *Sāṁkhya Pravacana Sūtra* and commentaries on it are our chief sources of important philosophical issues that concern the Sāṁkhya school of thought. The tradition attributes the authorship of Sūtra to Kapila which for reasons to be seen presently need not be taken seriously. Nor do we think that the claim of Svapneśvara is well grounded when he assigns the *Sāṁkhya Pravacana Sūtra* to Pañcaśikha and traces its attribution to Kapila to the fact that the latter initiated the tradition.[55] The authorship of the *Sāṁkhya Sūtra* remains a mystery and subject to educated guess only. The text has generally been assigned to 14th century AD. Various considerations have weighed in dating the text during this period. Gunaratna, writing in 14th century, does not refer to the *Sāṁkhya Sūtra* although he takes into consideration most of the existing Sāṁkhya literature.[56] Vācaspati Miśra does not show any acquaintance with the Sūtra literature. Alberuni, who did most of his work in India during the second half of 11th century, shows familiarity with works of Īśvarakṛṣṇa and Gauḍapāda but is totally unaware of *Sāṁkhya Sūtra*. Mādhava in his *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* does not make any reference to *Sāṁkhya Sūtra* and bases his account of Sāṁkhya thought exclusively on the *Sāṁkhya Kārikā.*[57] Equally important is the fact that no *bhāṣya* (commentary) on the *Sūtra* appears before 16th century. Moreover the text shows unmistakable familiarity with most of the existing philosophical systems against which it also takes stand. This goes to show its lateness.

The work itself contains six chapters. The first three chapters are essentially expository and are concerned with articulating basic Sāṁkhyan position. The fourth chapter contains some illustrative stories and parables; fifth chapter is primarily polemical, directed towards other schools of thought; and sixth chapter offers a summary of the basic position. On the basis of this structure of the text Dasgupta tends to suggest that the text may be based on a late edition of the *Ṣaṣṭitantraśāstra* mentioned in the last but one verse of the *Sāṁkhya Kārikā.* Dasgupta writes :

> It is said at the end of the Sāṁkhya Kārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa that the kārikās give an exposition of the Sāṁkhya doctrine excluding the refutations of the doctrines of other people and excluding the parables attached to the original Sāṁkhya works—the *Ṣaṣṭitantra-śāstra*. The Sāṁkhya Sūtras contain refutations of other doctrines and also a number of parables. It is not improbable that these were collected from some earlier Sāṁkhya work which is now lost to us. It may be that it was done from some later edition of the Ṣaṣṭitantra. . . . .[58]

The lateness of the text, however, does not minimise its value as an important sourcebook of the basic Sāṁkhya position. It is true that this text does show some leanings towards Upaniṣadic thought, but in essential it has preserved the Classical Sāṁkhya ontological perspective. Even the glimpses of Upaniṣadic monism in Sāṁkhya Sūtra are only minimal and marginal, and emanates from its concern to relate itself to earlier Brāhmanical scriptures. But still it does not accept the scriptural injunction uncritically and unequivocally. It is only in the commentorial literature on the Sūtra that these concerns are more conspicuously present. There too the commentators on the *Sūtra* face the uphill task of reconciling the distinctly atheistic position of Sāṁkhya with the theistic Vedānta. As Dasgupta points out about Vijñānabhikṣu, who wrote his commentary on the Sūtra, that he "could not avoid the distinctly atheistic arguments of the Sāṁkhya Sūtras, but he remarked that these were used only with a view to showing that the Sāṁkhya system gave such a rational explanation that even without the intervention of Iśvara it could explain all facts."[59] We will have more to say on Vijñānabhikṣu when dealing with his *Sāṁkhya Pravacana Bhāṣya*.

It is true that the cosmological interests of the pre-classical Sāṁkhya find themselves reiterated in the Sūtra literature. But despite these concerns with the doctrine of the periodic creation and destruction of the universe the *Sūtra* does not look at the Sarga doctrine in cosmological terms alone as it has been suggested by some scholars who have based their arguments solely on the authority of Vijñānabhikṣu's commentary on the *Sūtra*.[60] We will be adverting to this topic later on.

In the Sāṁkhya Sūtra itself we can distinguish two distinct tendencies: a concern with the cosmological evolution and involution and a truthful allegiance to *Sāṁkhya Kārikā's* conception of *Buddhisarga* as non-cosmological understanding of man's world. Here again commentatorial literature display significant differences. On many issues the two major commentators, Vijñānabhikṣu and Aniruddha, give quite different interpretations; and one is left in confusion as to whose words are to be taken to represent the classical Sāṁkhya tradition. The only plausible norm by which to resolve the issue is by the extent of its compatibility or congruity with the Sāṁkhya ontology as developed in the *Kārikā.* Using this criterion one can hope to see whether the commentator on the *Sūtra* is expounding a classical Sāṁkhya position or whether he is succumbing to the temptation of providing a rationalization for some other metaphysical or theological tradition to which he may be predisposed. For the purposes of this study we have considered *Sūtra* literature as constituting a continuum with the classical Sāṁkhya of the *Sāṁkhya Kārikā.* This is not to suggest that there are no important differences between the *Sāṁkhya Kārikā* and the *Sāṁkhya Sūtra.* We have already made allusions to some of the points of disagreements. However, the degree of agreement on the issues of fundamental importance weigh heavily against the points of divergences. Accordingly, in our evaluation of the philosophical and doctrinal value of the *Sūtra* literature we, therefore, tend to agree with Dasgupta when he observes : "there is no reason to suppose that the Sāṁkhya doctrine found in the *Sūtra* differs in any important way from the Sāṁkhya doctrine as found in the *Sāṁkhya Kārikā.*[61] It is equally reassuring to note that Keith too, despite his reservations about the claim of the *Sūtra* being a pure exposition of Sāṁkhya, concedes that "the Sūtra is a source of considerable importance and may contain a good deal of old matter.[62]

Coming to the commentatorial literature on the *Sāṁkhya Sūtra* we have informations about at least four commentaries on the *Sāṁkhya Sūtra* :

1. Aniruddha's *Sāṁkhyasūtravṛtti* belonging to the fifteenth century;
2. *The Sāṁkhya Vṛtti Sāra* of Mahādeva Saraswati also known as Vendānti Mahādeva of 1600 AD. This is primarily an abridgement of Aniruddha's work and contains some original remarks by the author;
3. *The Sāṁkhya Pravacana Bhāṣya* written by Vijñānabhikṣu sometime during the 16th century AD;

4. *Laghusāṁkyasūtrvṛtti* by Nāgesa Bhatta Upādhhyāya. This is an abstract of Vijñānabhikṣu's work and is not of much philosophical value.

Aniruddha's[63] commentary along with Vijñānabhikṣu's *Sāṁkhya Pravacana Bhaṣya*[64] are the two most important works on *Sāṁkhya Sūtra* that we have taken into consideration in the present study. Vijñānabhikṣu, as it is well known, inclines with deliberation in his understanding of the doctrine toward a theistic Sāṁkhya or Yoga. In the words of Radhakrishnan he tends to "minimize the distinction between the Sāṁkhya and the theistic Vedānta, which he regards as the genuine Vedānta, while the Advaita Vedānta is its modern falsification."[65] The theistic leaning of Vijñānabhiṣku accounts for some important differences between his interpretation of Sūtra and that of Aniruddha's. It may be instructive to refer to one significant example of the differences between their approach to the *Sūtra*. Sūtra 3.10 reads : "there is distinction of individuals, through the diversity of dessert (*Vyaktibhedaḥ karmviśeṣāt*)."[66] Commenting on this Sūtra from Vedānta position Vijñānabhiṣku observes : "Although, at the beginning of the creation, there was but one Subtile Body in the shape of that investment Hiranyagarbha, still subsequently, moreover, there becomes a division of it into individuals, a plurality, partitively in the shape of individuals. . . . ."[67] Thus Vijñānabhikṣu finds in Sūtra an occasion to legitimate his own Vedāntic leanings and his hope to reconcile the Sāṁkhya-Yoga with the scriptural utterances. Aniruddha, however, does not find the Sūtra problematic at all[68]; and he contents himself with simply reading in Sūtra what is in conformity with the classical sāṁkhya position—that the differences among the individuals may be accounted for by the differences in the karma (actions) of each individual.

The point at issue is that in approaching the Sūtra literature one has to exercise a certain amount of discretion and has to be extra cautious in interpreting them. It is for these reasons that in the present study we have subjected the commentatorial literature on the Sūtra to a more rigorous analysis and have refused to accept the statements of the commentators simply at their face value. In each case, the operating criterion had been the reconcilibility of the statement to the classical Sāṁkhya ontological perspective as presented in the *Sāṁkhya Kārikā*.

THE YOGA SŪTRA AND RELATED LITERATURE

Coming to the Yoga literature we find ourselves, luckily, in a less controversial region. Both the tradition and the modern scholarship is unanimous in regarding Patanjali to be the author of the *Yoga Sūtra.*[69] While the text is the earliest attempt to systematize the principle of Yoga it would be wrong to assume that Patanjali was the initiator of this school of thought. Vācaspati and Vijñānabhikṣu who have extensively commented on the *Vyāsabhāṣya* on *Yoga Sūtra*, are in agreement in considering Patanjali to be the codifier of the *Yoga Sūtra*. According to Dasgupta, an analysis of the *Sūtras* also brings the conviction that the *sūtras* do not show any original attempt, but a masterly and systematic compilation which was also supplemented by fitting contributions. "The systematic manner also, in which the first three chapters are written by way of definition and clarification, shows that the materials were already in existence and that Patanjali only systematized them."[70] It is important to note that Patanjali himself describes his work as "Anusāsana," implying that his work is not the earliest or the first formulation of the system.[71] The text itself is divided into four sections or parts. The first three sections are purely expository in nature, describing the doctrine of the Yoga system with little polemical material. First section deals with the nature and goal of concentration or contemplation (*Samādhi*); the second part discusses the ways of attaining this goal (*sādhanā*); and the third section describes the supernatural powers (*vibhūti*) that the incumbent or the practitioner of Yoga may achieve. The fourth section deals with the nature of liberation (*kaivalya*). It is here that we find the polemical stance, an attempt to deal with other systems of Indian thought on the terms of Yoga's own metaphysical position.

It is interesting to note that the word "iti', implying the end of the work occurs at two places in the text, first at the end of the third section and secondly at the end of the fourth section. On the basis of this and the fact that most of the criticisms of other schools of thought take place in the fourth section, Dasgupta suggests that the fourth section on liberation is a later addition, and does not constitute an integral part of the text. According to Dasgupta, "the most legitimate hypothesis seems to be that the last chapter is a subsequent addition by a hand other than that of Patanjali......"[72]

Be as it may, we do not find any reason to dismiss the significance of this section for the excellent reason that we find that the general slant of *Sāṁkhya-Yoga* ontology is strictly maintained. Moreover, the discussion relating to the problem of time in this section is in continuity with the position spelled out earlier. Sūtra 4.12 and 4.13 is in thematic continuity with the sūtra 3.13; and sūtra 4.33 is a reaffirmation of tne sūtra 3.52. The possibility of it's being a supplementary to the original work by the same author cannot be ruled out unless a very precise analysis of the style and the content proves to the contrary.

The Date of the work as well as the identity of the author has been the centre of great controversy especially in view of the celebrated author of the grammatical work in *Mahābhāṣya* of *Pāṇini Sūtra* being also known by the same name. Woods is of the opinion that the two are not the same. He convincingly shows that there is no evidence to show any significant congruity between the language or the doctrinal position of the two Patanjalis.[73] Keith too has expressed his reservations about the possibility of the two Patanjali's being identical persons.[74] Radhakrishnan, agreeing with Woods, maintains that there is no incontrovertible evidence to prove the identity of the grammarian Patanjali with the author of the *Yoga Sūtra.*[75] Dasgupta however, is inclined to admit the possibility that the two Patanjalis were the same person. Thus he writes: "I have not been able to discover anything. ... which can warrant us in holding that the two Patanjali's cannot be identified."[76]

The following findings made in the course of our study could have some significant bearing on this issue. On the issue of the identity of two Patanjali's the present author would like to present an important evidence against the possibility of the two Patanjalis being identical. While Dasgupta and others have based their case on claims made by some later Indian writers[77] that the two Patanjalis are identical, we have found evidence going back probably to the 7th century where the tradition does not identify Patanjali the grammarian with the author of the *Mahābhāṣya.* We would like to distinguish this evidence from the already noted fact that the great grammarians like Bhartṛhari, Kaiyata, Vāmana and Nāgeṣa do not refer to grammarian Patanjali as being also the author of the *Yoga Sūtra.*[78] While both Radhakrishnan and Dasgupta noted this they somehow overlooked a significant fact within the tradition of the Bhartṛhari which tends to distinguish between the two Patanjalis. In Helaraja's commentary on the celebrated work of Bhartṛhari, the *Vākyapadīya*, we find that he maintains a distinction between the traditions of Patanjali the grammarian and of Patanjali the expounder of

Sāṁkhya Yoga thought. In his commentary on Kālasammudeśa, whichis the ninth section (sammudeśa) of the third part (kānda) of the Vakyapadīya, Helraja, while analysing and elaborating the Sāṁkhya Yoga view of time refers to the views expressed in the *Yoga Sūtra Bhāṣya* as that of the tradition of Patanjali.[79] But in the same work, when referring to *Mahābhāṣya* on Pāṇini he desists from using the name of Patanjali altogether. He always refers to it as *Bhāṣya* or *Mahābhāṣya*,[80] almost as if taking special precaution not to confuse between the two Patanjalis. This may not be in itself very decisive, but it clearly shows that the confusion between the two Patanjalis is perhaps only a creation of later period.

Regarding the controversy on the date of the work the findings of historical research seems to weigh heavily against Woods, who is inclined to place this work towards the close of 14th century.[81] Woods' main argument rests on the assumption that Vasubandhu's thought is criticised in the *Yoga Sūtra* and that Nāgārjuna does not make any reference to Yoga in his Kārika. Dasgupta opposes Woods on this point. He points out that :

> . . . . the supposed Buddhist reference is found in the fourth chapter which . . . . is a later interpolation; even if they were written by Patanjali it cannot be inferred that because Vācaspati describes the opposite school as being of the Vijñānavāda type we are to infer that the sutras refer to Vasubandhu or even to Nāgārjuna, for such ideas as have been refuted in the sūtras had been developing long before the time of Nāgārjuna.[82]

Concurring with Dasgupta on this point Radhakrishnan has conclusively shown that the text definitely belongs to a period earlier than 300 AD.[83] He points out that since Umāsvāti, who seems to have carried his work during third century AD, refers to *Yoga Sūtra* 3.22 the text in question must have been in existence before that. Moreover, on the question of Nāgārjuna's unawareness of Yoga, Radhakrishnan points out that Woods' argument does not carry us very far in view "of the admitted fact, the Chinese translation of Nāgārjuna's *Upāyakauśalyahṛdayśāstra* mentions Yoga as one of the eight schools of Philosophy."[84] This argument is cogent, provided, of course, that the two Nāgārjunas are the same. To all these evidences against Woods, we would again like to point out that Bhartṛhari, who is generally assigned to 5th century AD, is well aware of the Yoga theories of time and temporality determinations. He makes clear reference to the views of Yoga on time distinctions, and seems to consider them as integral to the general slant of Sāṁkhya thought.[85] Thus by the 5th century, view of *Yoga Sūtra* were well known and clearly assimilated by the philosophers of that period.

Vyāsa Bhāṣya on Yoga Sūtra[86] is the earliest commentary on *Yoga Sūtra* and of inestimable value in providing an intelligible understanding of the thoughts of the author of the Sutra. Vyāsa is unanimously accepted as the author of this work. His date has been assigned to fourth century AD.[87] Like the Sūtra itself the *Bhaṣya* too assumes the general metaphysical slant of the *Sāṁkhya Karika* and interprets the *Yoga Sūtra* within this framework. Of course, there are important differences between *Yoga Sūtra* and *Sāṁkhya Kārikā*, and the *Bhāṣya* only accentuates those points on which they tend to differ. But in its presentation of the classical Sāṁkhya-Yoga understanding of the time and temporality we do not find evidence of their fundamental difference. It accepts the basic Sāṁkhya position that the Buddhi has a significant role in the constitution of temporal order, and that the transcendental reality of time does not have any independent objective status. These and allied points has been the subject-matter of the preceding chapters. In our treatment of these problems we have chosen to rely on the *Bhāṣya* and the *Yoga Sūtra* as well as on the Sāṁkhya texts, for the views expressed in the bhāṣya are both in congruity with and a continuation of the classical Sāṁkhya-Yoga tradition.

Vācaspati Miśra's *Tattva Vaiśāradī* is a commentary written by Vacaspati on *Vyāsa Bhāṣya.* We have already noted the significance of the contributions of this great commentator to the classical Sāṁkhya-Yoga tradition. There is general concensus among scholars about his identity and the period to which he belonged.[88] In essentials he tends to agree with Vyāsa's understanding of the constitution of temporality or the subjective experience of the temporal order. He agrees with Vyāsa that "moment" alone is real, and that a sequence of moments do not have an objective reality. It is a product of rational construction through abstraction. His interpretation of the "omniscience" resulting from concentration on the "moment" is of special significance. His distinction between omniscience implying a "knowledge of all without remainder" and omniscience as "the knowledge proceeding from discrimination" is particularly illuminating.[89] It is in this qualitative distinction between omniscience and the knowledge resulting from contemplation on the "moment" consists the true import of the soteriological significance of Sāṁkhya-Yoga conception of time and temporality.

Vijñānabhikṣu's *Yoga Sāra Saṃgraha* is a very useful manual of Yoga thought. Both Radhakrishnan and Dasgupta have recognized Vijñānabhikṣu's contribution to Sāṁkhya-Yoga tradition in general and to Yoga thought in particular.[90] As noted earlier he belongs to 16th century AD and displays an unmistakable leaning towards theistic Vedanta, especially as expressed in the Upaniṣads. He tends to disagree with Vācaspati on certain specific issues and makes heroic efforts to reconcile Sāṁkhya-Yoga thought with the monistic theism of Upaniṣads.[91]

On the specific question of time and temporality we find some contradictions between Vijñānabhikṣu's *Yoga Sāra Saṃgraha*[92] and his *Sāṁkhya Pravacana Bhāṣya*. While in the later work he suggests that Sāṁkhya admits a distinction between eternal and empirical time, in the former he clearly maintains that Sāṁkhya expressly denies transcendental or eternal time. Moreover, in the *Yoga Sāra Saṃgraha* he also tends to make a distinction between Sāṁkhya and Yoga conception of time and temporality.[93] However, we tend to disagree with his interpretation on this point. In the present work we incline to accept, based on careful study of the relevant texts, the homogeneity of the Sāṁkhya-Yoga tradition on the issue of time. On the fundamental ontological questions it is a common place that they agree, and the question of time and temporality is no exception in this regard. We have advanced our arguments for not accepting Vijñānabhikṣu's interpretation at its face value at the appropriate place. This is, however, not to gainsay the important place that Vijñānabhikṣu occupies within the Sāṁkhya-Yoga tradition. The specific brand of theological affiliation in particular must not be lost sight of in any interpretation drawing upon Vijñānabhikṣu.

Over the question of the homogeneity of Sāṁkhya-Yoga tradition, which is the presupposition of the present work, it may not be out of place to make some comments. True, the exact relationship between the pre-classical Sāṁkhya and Yoga remains a matter of pure conjecture. While Sāṁkhya itself contains the two trains of thought; theistic and non-theistic, Yoga always seems to retain the theistic slant. There is no such a thing as atheistic Yoga. However, it is our contention that despite its unmistakable theistic leaning the classical Yoga did not differ fundamentally on the basic question of the nature of *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* and their interrelationship. The present investigation concentrates primarily on this dimension of Sāṁkhya and Yoga systems. The question of temporality, i.e., the determination of man's existence by the consciousness of the temporal distinctions and its consequences for the reflecting self, falls within the realm of the interrelationship between *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti*. And in this respect the differences between the two systems is inconsequential. Radhakrishnan, after a careful analysis of the evolutionary scheme of the two schools came to the conclusion that the "distinction between the Sāṁkhya and the Yoga account of evolution is not a serious one."[94] Dasgupta finds the congruity between the two schools extremely significant :

> The affinity of the systems of Sāṁkhya thought generally ascribed to a mythical sage, Kapila, to that of Yoga of Patanjali is so great on most important points of theoretical interest that they both may be regarded as two different modifications of one common systematic ideas.[95]

The internal evidence within *Yoga Sūtra* too weighs in favour of considering it as a continuum with the basic philosophical postulates of classical Sāṁkhya. The fact of fundamental convergence between the two systems was accepted by Vyāsa who wrote his commentary on Yoga Sūtra. He concludes his commentary on the *Yoga Sūtra* by acknowledging at the end of the Bhāṣya that Patanjali's Yoga system indeed is expressive of the words of Sāṁkhya (*iti śrī Pātanjale Yogaśāstre sāṁkhyapravacane*). The description of the Vyāsa Bhāṣya on the *Yoga Sūtra* as *Sāṁkhya Pravacana Bhāṣya* "brings out the intimate relation between the Sāṁkhya and the Yoga."[96]

Basing their conclusions on historical evidences available on the date of the compilation of Yoga Sūtra both Keith and Dasgupta conclude that the probability of Patanjali having modelled his *Yoga Sūtra* on *Sāṁkhya Kārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa is extremely high Keith writes :

> It is, however, not at all unlikely that the production of the Yoga Sūtra was more or less directly motivated by the revival of the

Sāṁkhya and its definite setting out in the Sāṁkhya Kārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa who was an earlier contemporary...[97]

Concurring with this statement of A.B. Keith, J.G. Larson maintains that "the final reduction (of *Yoga Sūtra*) is roughly contemporary with the composition of the Kārikā, and... its final compilation may have been occasioned by the appearance of Īśvarakṛṣṇa's work Dasgupta goes even to the extent of suggesting that the Yoga as presented by Patanjali is basically Sāṁkhyan in character. He even labels the Yoga as the "Patanjali school of Sāṁkhya":[98]

> *Of the Pātanjala school of Sāṁkhya*, which forms the subject of the Yoga ......Patanjali was probably the most notable person for he not only collected the different forms of Yoga practices, and gleaned the diverse ideas which were or could be associated with the Yoga but grafted them all on the Sāṁkhya metaphysics, and gave them the forms in which they have been handed down to us.[99]

For purposes of this study we have justifiably considered the systems of Sāṁkhya and Yoga as integral, and have not addressed ourselves to the question of the possibility of the differences which may be derived from terminological or nominal distinctions. The Sāṁkhya system under investigation includes the thought of *Sāṁkhya Kārikā* and *Sāṁkhya Sūtra* and various commentaries thereon. This is what has generally been considered by scholars as representing the Classical Sāṁkhya. Yoga, in the present study refers primarily to the classical yoga or Rāja-Yoga as developed in the Patanjali's *Yoga Sūtra* and the various commentaries on it. Historically, the philosophy of Sāṁkhya as a systematic exposition of the main tenets of the school must have preceded the systematic exposition of Yoga. While surely there is a general paucity of historical evidence in this area the close connection in the classical period of their development is transparent to keen and diligent students of Indian Philosophical thought,[100]

REFERENCE

[1] Larson, G.J., *Classical Sāṁkhya*, Delhi, 1969; Rao, K.B. Ramakrishnan, *Theism of Pre-Classical Sāṁkhya*, Mysore, 1966; Sen Gupta, Anima, *The Evolution of the Sāṁkhya School of Thought*, Lucknow, 1959; Frauwallener, E., *Geschichte der Indischen Philosophie*, Salzburg, 1953; Johnston, E.H., *Early Sāṁkhya*, London, 1937; Dasgupta, S.M., *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Cambridge; 1922, Keith, A.B., *The Sāṁkhya System*, Calcutta, 1918; Van Buitenen, J.A. B., "Studies in Sāṁkhya", *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 77, 1957, pp. 15-25, 88-107.

[2] Johnston, pp. 81-82; also Keith, pp. 5-19.

[3] ibid; also, see Rao, pp. 297-339; and Johnston, E.H., "Some Sāṁkhya and Yoga Conceptions in the Śvetaśvatara Upaniṣad," *Journal of Royal Asiatic Society*, 1930, pp. 855-78.

[4] see Dasgupta, pp. 220ff; Sengupta, pp. 103-10.

[5] Dasgupta, pp. 213ff; Rao, op. cit., pp. 403-16; Sengupta, pp. 112-19.

[6] Sengupta, pp. 70-88; Rao, pp. 139-97; Keith, pp. 29-53; and Johnston, *Early Sāṁkhya*, pp. 6-7.

[7] For place of Ṣaṣṭitantra within Sāṁkhya Tradition, see Dasgupta, S.N., pp. 220-222; Keith, pp. 59-65; Hiryana, M., "The Ṣaṣṭitantra and Vārsaganya," *Journal of Oriental Research*, Madras, 3, 1929, pp. 107-112; V.M. Bedekar, "The Development of the Sāṁkhya and the Problem of the Ṣaṣṭitantra", *Journal of the University of Poona*, 11, 1959, pp. 37-49.

[8] *The Sāṁkhya Kārikā*, 72.

[9] see Keith, p. 74.

[10] see *infra*, p. 164.

[11] see *infra*, p. 165.

[12] see *infra*, p. 165.

[13] In this work we have followed the classification laid down by Mircea Eliade, *Yoga: Immortality and Freedom*, Princeton, 1969. There have been other attempts at classification; S.N. Dasgupta makes a threefold classification of Sāṁkhya: 1. the first stage is a theistic one, details of which are lost, but is preserved in a modified form by the Patanjali School of Sāṁkhya-Yoga; 2. the atheistic Sāṁkhya as represented by Pañcaśikhā; and 3. finally the atheistic modification of Sāṁkhya in the orthodox Sāṁkhya System (see Dasgupta, S.N., *A History of Indian Philosophy*, I, Cambridge, 1951). S. Radhakrishnan tends to disagree with Dasgupta and maintains that both Asuri and Pañcaśikha adhere to a theistic Sāṁkhya and believe in the supremacy of Brahman. According to Radhakrishnan there are important differences between Pañcaśikha and Sāṁkhya (see Radhakrishnan, S., *The Indian Philosophy*, New York, 1927, p. 252). In a recent study, J.C. Larson makes a fourfold classification: 1. the earliest speculations as contained in the speculative Vedic hymns and oldest prose Upaniṣads; 2. proto-Sāṁkhya speculations, including the middle Upaniṣads, Caraka Saṃhitā, Buddha Carita, the Bhagavadgītā, Mokṣadharma and Mahabhārata; 3. Classical Sāṁkhya consisting of Sāṁkhya Kārikā, the Yoga Sūtra and the related commentaries; 4. and finally later Sāṁkhya

thought present in Sāṁkhyapravacan Sūtra and the commentaries of Aniruddha, Mahādeva and Vijñānabhikṣu together with the Tattvasamāsasūtra. (see Larson, J.G., *Classical Sāṁkhya*, Delhi, Motilal Banarsidas, 1969).

[14] For a comprehensive study of pre-Classical Sāṁkhya see Johnston, E.H., *Early Sāṁkhya*, Sen Gupta, Anima, *The Evolution of the Sāṁkhya: School of Thought*; Ramakrishna Rao, K.B., *Theism of Pre-Classical Sāṁkhya*, Mysore. Also see relevant portions of S.N. Dasgupta, op. cit.; Larson, J.G., op. cit.; and Keith, A.B., *The Sāṁkhya System.*

[15] All the references to the text are from the *Sāṁkhya Kārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa*, with Gauḍpādabhāṣya (ed. & trans.) T.G. Mainkar, Poona, 1972. There are several excellent translations of this text.

[16] There is controversy among scholars on this Kārikā. The tradition itself is divided on the authenticity of this Kārikā. According to *Suvarnasaptati*, a commentary of *Sāṁkhya Kārikā* (see *infra* ch. 2) the kārikā is an interpolation by some intelligent person (iha medhāvi Kascidāha aryam. *Yuktidīpikā* (see *infra*, p. 164) too introduces the kārikā with 'aha ca' implying that, the kārikā in question has been uttered by someone else. But all other commentators have accepted the kārikā to be the part of the original text.

[17] *Sāṁkhya Kārikā*, 71.

[18] Takakusu, M.J., "A Study of Paramartha's Life of Vasubandhu," *Journal of Royal Asiatic Society*, London, 1905, p. 48.

[19] ibid, pp. 47-51.

[20] Keith, pp. 68-69; Garbe, Richard, *Die Samkhya Philosophie*, Leipzig, 1917, pp. 77-83.

[21] Radhakrishnan, S., pp. 254-55.

[22] Guṇaratna in *Tarkarahasyadīpikā*, pp. 102, 104 (vide ibid, p. 254, n. 8)

[23] *Yuktidīpikā*, ed. R.C. Pandey, Delhi, 1967, pp. 3 and 91.

[24] Iśvarakṛṣṇanāma Kālidāsena Kṛtah kārikāḥ, vide Radhakrishnan, p. 255, n. 1.

[25] Ghanasyām's commentary on Bhavabhuti's *Uttararāmacarita*, vide Mainkar, p. 30.

[26] Radhakrishan, S., p. 225.

[27] see Keith, p. 69. He is of the opinion that the *Kārikā* belongs to the 4th century AD. This, of course, is based on the assumption that Iśvarakṛṣṇa and Vindhyavāsi were identical persons and that Vasubandhu is supposed to have written a refutation of the Kārikā authored by Vindhyavāsi. Radhakrishana places the *Kārikā* in the third century AD. He maintains that Iśvarakṛṣṇa definitely preceded Vasubandhu, and date of Vasubandhu is now assigned by scholars to the 4th centruy AD. Dasgupta also believes that the Kārikā was composed somewhere about 200 AD. Suggestions of Belvalkar and others that the *Kārikā* belongs to an earlier period does not seem to carry much weight.

[28] Both Keith and Dasgupta maintain that the composition of the *Yoga Sūtra* seems to have followed the crystalization of classical Sāṁkhya thought as found in the *Sāṁkhya Kārikā*. The assumption seems to be well founded in as much the general ontological presuppositions of the *Kārikā* are clearly discernible in the *Yoga Sūtra*. See Keith, pp. 54-59; also Dasgupta, pp. 228-29.

[29] Frauwallner, E., "On the Date of the Buddhist Master of the Law Vasubandhu," *Roma*, 1951; Takakusu, J., "The Date of Vasubandhu, the Great Buddhist Philosopher," *Indian Studies in Honour of Charles Rockwell Lanman*, Cambridge (Mass), 1929, pp. 79-88; and Peri, N., "A Propos de la dak de Vasubandhu," *Bulletin de l'Ecole Francaise d'Extreme*, Paris, 11, 1911, pp. 339-90.

[30] *Abhidharmakośam*, ed. D. Shastri, Varanasi, 1972, p. 807.

[31] There are several editions of this text. All the references are to the *Sāṁkhya Kārikā of Iśvarakṛṣṇa with Gauḍapāda's Bhāṣya*, (ed. and trans.) T.G. Mainkar.

[32] ibid, pp. 136-38.

[33] Radhakrishnan, p. 255; Eliade, p. 370; Keith, p. 69; Ray, Amarnath, "The Māndūkhya Upanisad and the Kārikās of Gauḍapada," *Indian Historical Quarterly*, XIV, 1938, pp. 564-69; Krishnamurti, B.N.S., "New Light on the Gauḍapāda Kārikās," *Review of Philosophy and Religion*, II, Poona, 1931, pp. 35-56.

[34] Radhakrishnan, p. 255.

[35] *Yuktidīpikā*, ed. R.C. Pandey. Also see *Yuktidīpikā*, ed. Pulinbehari Chakrvarti, Calcutta, 1938. There are some differences in readings in the two editions.

[36] Chakrvarti, Pulinbehari, *Origin and Development of Sāṁkhya System of Thought*, New Delhi, pp. 160-62.

[37] Pandey, R.C., p. xv.

[38] ibid, pp. 68, 73, 132.

[39] *The Tattva-Kaumadī*, (ed. and trans.) Ganganath Jha, Poona, 1965.

[40] ibid, pp. 112.

[41] Radhakrishnan, p. 255; Dasgupta, p. 212; Keith, p. 70.

[42] For different commentaries on *Tattva-Kaumudī* see T.G. Mainkar, pp. 6-7.

[43] *Jayamaṅgalā*, ed. H. Sharma, Delhi, 1926.

[44] Pandey, R.C., p. xvi.

[45] Eliade, p. 369.

[46] *infra*, note 48.

[47] Belvalkar, S.K., *The Māṭharavṛtti and the Date of Iśvarakṛṣṇa*, in Bhandarkar Commemoration Volume, Poona, 1917, pp. 171-284.

[48] The *Suvarnasaptati*, ed. N. Aiyasvami Sastri, Tirupati, 1944.

[49] Pandey, p. xvii.

[50] N. Aiyaswami Sastri maintains that the Kārikā 63 is not genuine since it has not been translated by Paramārtha. See N. Aiyaswami Sastri p. xliii.

[51] *Māṭharavṛtti*, ed. V.P. Sharma, Varanasi, 1922.

[52] Belvalkar, S.K., pp.171-84.

[53] Māṭharavṛtti is a work of Sāṁkhya philosophy of which Gauḍapāda Bhāṣya is reported to be an abridgement. But as a rule, vṛttis come later than the bhāṣyas, and that the Māṭharavṛtti comments on the last three verses of the S.K. makes for its later date." Radhakrishnan, p.255, n.2.

[54] *Sāṁkhya Aphorism of Kapila*, (ed. & trans.), J.R. Ballantyne, Varanasi, 1963.

[55] Svapneśvara in Kaumudiprabhā, vide Radhakrishnan, op. cit., p. 255, n.3,

[56] vide Dasgupta, p. 222, also Radhakrishnan, op. cit., p. 255 n.4.

[57] Keith, pp. 90-91; also Radhakrishnan, pp.255-56.

[58] Dasgupta, p. 222.

[59] ibid, p. 223.

[60] Keith is a case in point. His entire account of Sūtra literature is primarily based on Vijñānabhikṣu. See Keith, op. cit., pp. 92ff.

[61] Dasgupta, p. 223.

[62] Keith, p. 92.

[63] *The Sāṁkhya Sūtra Vṛtti*, (ed. and trans.) Richard Garbe, Calcutta, 1888.

[64] *The Sāṁkhya Pravacana-Bhāṣya*, ed. Richard Garbe, Cambridge (Mass.), 1943.

[65] Radhakrishan, p. 256.

[66] *Sāṁkhya Aphorism of Kapila*, p. 231.

[67] *Sāṁkhya Pravacana Bhāṣya*, p.90; "*yady api sargā dāu Hiraṇyagarbha—pādhi-rupam ekam eve lingam, tathā'pi tasya paścād vyaktibhedo vyaktirūpeṇā'naśto nānātvam bhavati...*"

[68] *Sāṁkhya Sūtra Vṛttih*, op. cit., p.112.

[69] *Pātanjala Yogadarśanam, Tattvavaiśāradisamvalit-Vyāsabhāṣyasametam*, ed. Ramasamkara Bhattacharya, Varanasi, 1963. All references are from this edition.

[70] Dasgupta, p. 229.

[71] Radhakrishnan, p. 341.

[72] Dasgupta, p. 230.

[73] Woods, J.H., *The Yoga System of Patanjali*, Varanasi, 1966, . pp. xv-xvii.

[74] Keith, p. 57.

[75] Radhakrishnan, p. 341, n.4.

[76] Dasgupta, p. 232.

[77] Dasgupta, pp. 230-31; Radhakrishna, p. 340; and Woods, pp xii-xv.

[78] Dasgupta, ibid, p.231; Radhakrishnan, p. 341.

[79] *Vakyapadīyam Helarājakṛtaprakāśākhyātīkāyuktam*, ed. G.D. Sastri, Varanasi, 1928, pp. 361 and 365. It may also be noted that while introducing the kārikā 54 as presenting the view of Samkhya-Yoga, Helaraja uses the term "matantare." This reading has been found in Varanasi edition. The Trivendra edition gives it as referring to the opinion of Mahābhāṣya. We tend to think that Varanasi edition gives a correct reading on this (p.362), for no where else the commentator identifies Patanjali's tradition as that of Mahābhāṣya (on Pāṇini).

[80] ibid, pp. 373, 375.

[81] Woods, p. xix.

[82] Dasgupta, p. 233.

[83] Radhakrishnan, p. 341, n. 3.

[84] ibid, p.341.

[85] Vākyapadīyam, op. cit., Kārikās 49-61.

[86] All references are to the *Pātañjali Yogadarśanam*, ed. Ramasamkara Bhattacharya, 1963.

[87] see Radhakrishnan, p.342.

[88] see *supra*, p. 29

[89] *Tattvavaiśāradī in Patanjala-Yogadarsanam*, ed. Bhattacharya, pp. 150-52.

[90] Dasgupta, pp. 223, 229; Radhakrishnan, p. 342.

[91] Radhakrishnan, p. 342.

[92] *Yoga Sāra Samgraha*, ed. and trans., Ganganath Jha, Madras, 1933.

[93] ibid, pp.73-74.

[94] Radhakrishnan, p. 342.

[95] Dasgupta, S.N., *Yoga as Philosophy and Religion*, Delhi, 1973, p.ix.

[96] Radhakrishnan, p. 342.

[97] Keith, p. 57.

[98] Larson, op. cit., p. 167.

[99] Dasgupta, *History of Indian Philosophy*, p. 229.

[100] The position or point of view that is here adopted is in conformity with the vogue of modern expository writings on the subject to treat the two as embodying 'differentiations in what was originally a single doctrine' (Horiyanna, *Outlines*, p. 268). The *Gita* advocates the idea of oneness of Samkhya and Yoga as representing true insight (*ekaṁ sāṁkhyam ca yogam ca yaḥ pasyati sa pasyati*, V, 5); though it is true that the terms do not so much refer to the scholastic versions of the two schools of thought as to their respective stress on gnosis and action. However, for a very detailed analysis of the difference between Sāṁkhya and Yoga in specific terms, i.e. *inter alia* of will and its place in spiritual life, see Bhattacharya, K.C., *Studies in Philosophy*, Calcutta, 1956, p. 221. The difference is carefully delineated starting from the differential stress on buddhi and ahaṁkāra, through a difference in the presentation to consciousness of becoming and in the understanding of 'becoming' itself as continuing of the cause into the effect in a finalised form, and finally, how their difference about the understanding of causality is reflected in their views on the nature of time. The treatment is, at its best, plausible and even illuminating, but lacks in textual support. So far as the Sāṁkhya account goes, it is mostly an argument from silence aside from the problematic posed by *Yukti-dīpikā* in this regard through suggesting that time is the causal process itself (*karana parispauda*) II, 8-9, and Vijñānabhikṣu's very debatable reconstruction of one *Sāṁkhya Sūtra*, II, 12. As for the yoga account, the textual basis is the reference in the *Yoga Sūtras* and the *Bhāṣya* where in there is a clear statement of the two aspects of time *viz*. kṣaṇa and krama, i.e., constant and sequence of instants: III, 52; IV, 32. All these textual materials are utilised and explored at appropriate places in the body of our present study but we have tended, in the absence of clear textual mandates against it, to imply a homogeneous understanding of the issue of temporality in relation to consciousness.

APPENDIX B

ABHIDHARMA BUDDHISM: ITS HISTORICAL AND TEXTUAL SETTING

SCHOOLS OF BUDDHISM AND THE ABHIDHARMA TRADITION

Traditional Buddhist sources give varying and, at times, conflicting accounts of the sects of Buddhism that emerged during the first phase of its development.[1] Modern Scholars have tried in vain to create a systematic and coherent picture of the internal development of Buddhist tradition in its early stages. It is extremely difficult to discern with any clarity the exact number of schools and their historical and doctrinal interrelationship. This study does not intend to investigate this larger and certainly historically significant question, which lies outside the range and scope of the present work. However, leaving the larger historical question aside, we are obligated to define and delimit that area of Buddhism which has been described as Abhidharma Buddhism, and to that extent it becomes imperative to address ourselves to the task of delineating the historical and textual context of Abhidharma tradition.

According to the Buddhist tradition, three different Buddhist councils took place at different times to settle important questions pertaining to the basic tenets of the order.[2] The primary factor responsible for the rise of different sects of Buddhism may be seen in the contexts of varying interpretations of the word of the Buddha. All these schools claimed to be true to the original teaching of the Master and claimed themselves to be the true representatives of the doctrine. The oldest Pāli accounts of schism within Buddhist order provide a list of at least eighteen schools.[3] These sources tend to present conflicting accounts of the various doctrinal positions held by each of them.[4] But it is difficult to construct any definite historical or chronological order out of this list. Pāli versions too differ among themselves on the question of the antiquity of one or other of schools as indeed they differ from the claims that is made by the Sanskrit tradition.

The Pāli sources including Buddhaghosa's commentary on the *Katthāvatu*, *Dipvaṁsa* and *Mahāvaṁsa* though differing on details of the schisms, agree in maintaining that the first schism, took place during the Council of *Vaiśāli*, when the *Mahāsanghikas* seceded from the *Therāvādins*.[5] From within Mahāsanghikas arose the schools of *Gokulikas* and *Ekabbohārikas*. The Gokulikas were further subdivided into *Paññativādins* and *Bāhulikas*, and the *Ekabbohārikas* gave rise to the school of *Cetiyavādins*. On the other hand, the Therāvāda itself is reported to be subdivided into *Mahiṅsāsakas* and *Vajjiputtakas*, as indeed it was on account of their differences with the *Vajjiputtakas* on the important questions of discipline that *Mahāsānghikas* separated. The *Vajjiputtakasa* gave rise to four branches : *Dhammuttariyas*, *Bhadrayānikas*, *Channāgarikas* and *Sammitiyas*. *Mahiṅsāskas* on the other hand, were further divided into the *Sabbātthivādins* and Dhammaguttikas. From within *sabbātthivādin* tradition arose the schools of *Kassapikas*, *Sañkāntikas* and *Suttavādins*. This accounts for the original eighteen schools mentioned by Pāli sources. Buddhaghosa, however, mentions six more schools.[6]

A Sanskrit tradition also gives a list of eighteen schools. The list is given in Mahāvyutpatti.[7] The text belongs to Sarvastivāda, and was probably composed in the fifth or sixth century AD. But this does not minimise the value of the classifications as it is quite obvious that it draws upon older materials extant at that time.[8] The arrangement of schools here is not chronological; rather they are grouped under the original schools to which they belonged :

1. *Sarvāstivāda*: Mula-Sarvāstivāda, Kāśyopīyas, Mahiśāsakas Dharmguptas, Bahuśrutīyas, Tāmraśātīyas, Vibhajyavādins.
2. *Sammaṭīyas*: Kaurukullakas, Āvantakas, Vātsīputrīyas.
3. *Mahāsanghikas*: Pūrvaśailas, Aparaśailas, Haimvatas, Lokkottaravādins, Prajnāpativādins.
4. *Sthāviras*: Mahāvihāravāsins, Jetavanīyas, Abhayagirivāsins.

It is extremely difficult to determine much from these names about the doctrinal positions of these schools. Names given are sometimes after the original teacher of the school; sometimes, it applies to the geographical location, and occasionally, to doctrinal allegiance.

It is important to note that, according to Pāli sources, the Sabbāthivādins (Sarvāstivādins) come within the broader group of Therāvādins as opposed to the schools which emerged from the original secession of Mahāsanghikas.[9] The Sanskrit sources also label Vibhajyavādins as a school of Sarvāstivādins,[10] while the Pāli sources consider the Vibhajyavādins to be the precursor of Therāvādins who later came to be known by that name. This shows that initially there was great affinity between Sarvāstivāda and Therāvāda. But there are important differences between the two. Therāvādins, as it is well known, preserved their canon in Pāli. Prof. Kern and Rhys Davids[11] among others agree in maintaining that the Pāli canons contain the doctrines of the Sthaviras or Therāvādins. The Therāvādin tradition of Sri Lanka tends to identify them as Vibhajjyavādins.[12] But it seems probable that the Vibhajjavāda was a more comprehensive term and was also applicable to Sarvāstivādins. The Sarvāstivādins later came to be called Vaibhāṣikas on account of their allegiance to Vibhāṣa, a commentary on Jñānaparsthāna, the earliest Abhidharma text.[13] In the words of Yamakami Sogen :

> In later times, the so-called Vaibhāṣikas came to be identified with the Sarvāstivādins; and the two names became mutually interchangeable, although, properly speaking, the Sarvāstivādins originally formed a section of the Vaibhāṣikās.[14]

Both Therāvāda and Sarvāstivāda acquired significant place in the early stages of development of Buddhism and their contribution to the propagation and development of Buddhism outside India cannot be underestimated. Though Therāvāda later flourished in the south, there is no doubt that, for long, both Therāvāda and Sarvāstivāda developed in north India at the same time. The Sarvāstivāda was chiefly confined to the western centers of Mathurā, Kāshmir, and Gandhāra, while the Therāvādins operated from Magadha and Kosala, the two earliest centers of Buddhism.

The split between the Sarvāstivāda and Therāvāda (also called Vibhajyavāda) seem to have taken place during the reign of Asoka. "It appears that Aśoka sided with the Vibhajyavādins, and that in consequence the Sarvāstivādins went North, and converted Kāshmir, which remained their centre for more than a thousand years.'"[15] However, the basis of division in the present case was, instead of being the rules of discipline (*vinaya*), the philosophical or metaphysical stand taken by Sarvāstivādins. Thus Conze rightly observes :

the split between Sarvāstivādins and Vibhajyavādins was occasioned by the pan-realistic ontological doctrine of Katyāyaniputra, who taught that not only the present, but also past and future events (*dharmās*) are real.[16]

This indeed is a decisive issue on which the Therāvādins and Sarvāstivādins disagreed fundamentally. It is not surprising that the Abhidharmā texts of both the schools containing their basic philosophical positions, take different stands on important philosophical issues. Conze therefore is probably correct in holding that :

> the Abhidharma books were clearly composed after the third division of the schools. The contents of the seven Abhidharma books of Sarvāstivādins differ from those of the seven books of the Therāvādins, who are an offshoot of the Vibhajyavādins.[17]

THE TWO ABHIDHARMA TRADITIONS

For long Buddhist scholarship was led to believe that the original Buddhist canons existed only in Pāli. However, the evidence brought in from Tibetan and Chinese sources, as well as the discovery of manuscript fragments in Eastern Turkey, Nepal and Gilgit, confirmed the existence of Buddhist canons in Sanskrit. It is now well established that Sarvāstivādins used Sanskrit as the medium of their literary activity, and that their canon was entirely in Sanskrit. Sarvāstivādins too like Therāvādins divided their canon into three Pitakas (literally baskets) : the *Sūtras*,[18] the *Vinayas*, and the *Abhidharmas.* Despite some differences in the arrangements and classification of treatment there is substantial similarity between the Pāli and Sanskrit *Vinaya* and *Sutra* literature. Scholars, who have made comparative study of the two sets of *Vinaya* and *Sutra* texts, have noted substantial agreement between the two traditions.[19] However, special significance attaches to the *Abhidharma Pitaka* because it is precisely here that the differences between the Pāli and Sanskrit traditions seem to be remarkable.[20] This dlfference between the two sets of *Abhidharma* texts raises an important historical question regarding the relationship between the two traditions. One may legitimately surmise that the *Abhidharma* texts were composed and compiled at a time when both the traditions had been separated for long. It is quite probable that the two traditions developed their *Abhidharma* texts independently. However, any definitive statement on this issue will have to wait a thorough and comprehensive analysis of the *Abhidharma* literature of the two traditions. It will be interesting to investigate if the content and the structure of the texts provide any basis for a reasonable conclusion about the chronological order of the two sets of the *Abhidharma* texts. Though such an investigation is beyond the scope of this project we will bring in, wherever possible, evidences that may be useful in resolving this important historical question.

There are seven *Abhidharma* texts of Sarvāstivāda schools which were originally composed in Sanskrit :

1. *The Jñānaprasthānasūtra* of Ārya Kātyāyanīputra.
2. *The Sangītiparyāya* of Mahākauṣṭhila.
3. *The Prakaraṇpāda* of Sthavira Vasumitra.
4. *The Vijñānakāya* of Sthavira Devśarman.
5. *The Dhātukāya* of Pūrna.
6. *The Dharmaskandha* of Ārya Śāriputra.
7. *The Prajñāptiśāstra* of Ārya Maudgalyāyana.

While manuscript fragments of Sūtra and Vinaya literature of Sarvāstivāda have been discovered in Sanskrit originals, no Sanskrit originals of these *Abhidharma* texts, except fragments of *Sangītiparyāya* by Mahākauṣṭhila, is available. It is interesting to note that while the whole of Vinaya literature and some other later *Abhidharma* treatises are found in Tibetan, none of the Sanskrit *Abhidharma* texts, except the *Prajñāptiśāstra* of Ārya Maudgalyāyana, is available in Tibetan translations.

During the reign of and at the instance of Kaṇiska of Kusana dynasty, a council of Buddhist monks was called in the first century BC. At this council, the commentary on *Jñānapıasthānasūtra* called Vibhāṣa was composed.[21] It is from this Vibhāṣa that the Vaibhāṣika derive their name. Since the Vibhāṣa belongs to this period it is quite safe to conclude that *Jñānaprasthāna* belonged to a period earlier than first century BC. Though there is no conclusive evidence to settle the date of this text, there is no doubt that this is the oldest and most important of the seven Abhidharma texts. According to the Chinese sources it was first translated into Chinese by Sañghdeva and Dharmapriya (Ku Fo-nien) who brought it to China from Kashmir during 4th century AD.[22] Fiuen Tsang also translated it in the 7th century AD.[23] The tradition considers *Jañānaprasthāna* to be the principal text, while the other six are regarded as supplementary or ancillary. Yaśomitra in his *Sphuṭārṭhabhidharmakośavyākhyā* compares the *Jñānaprasthāna* with the body of a being and the other six to its legs or Pādas.[24] It is this relationship between *Jñānaprasthāna* and other *Abhidharma* texts that led Takakusu to suggest that "it stands to the other treatises in such a relation as the Veda to the six Vedāñgas".[25]

Keith has expressed his doubt about the antiquity of the *Abhidharma* texts, and is inclined to believe that the entire body of *Abhidharma* texts belong to a period much later than what is suggested by the traditional sources. According to Keith, we cannot form any "definite idea as to the date of *Jñānaprasthāna* and its supplements, no faith can be placed on the alleged authors, the titles being manifestly intended to convey the impression of extreme antiquity."[26] The views expressed by Keith on the dates of the text, in question contradict the claims of the tradition and echoes an attitude towards tradition best described in Conze's words as "superciliousness that belongs to a phase in the treatment of subject nations which has now passed."[27] We tend to agree with Frauwalleners's observation that in the matter of historical research the importance of tradition should not be undermined unless the internal evidence completely contradicts it, or that we have overwhelmingly valid reasons against it.[28] In our opinion, the antiquity of the primary sanskrit Abhidharma texts is beyond doubt and, as we shall show, they are in all probability older than the Pāli *Abhidharma* texts.

The *Sangītiparyāya* is the first of the six auxiallary texts (*pada*). The Chinese sources assign the authorship to Sāriputra, but Indian and Tibetan traditions mention Mahākausthila of Sarvāstivāda school as the author of the text.[29] According to Takakusu, there are some points of similarities between the *Puggalapaññatti*, a Pāli *Abhidharma* text, and the *Sangītiparayāya*.[30] He further suggests that the *Sangītiparayāya* is modelled on the *Sangīti Sutanta*.[31] The *Prakaranapāda*, the second of the ancillary Abhidharma texts, is attributed to *Vasumitra*.[32] According to B.C. Law, the *Prakaraṇapāda* is the counterpart of the *Vibhangaprakaraṇa* of the Pāli *Abhidharmapiṭaka*.[33] Nyayantiloka, however, maintains that the *Vibhanga* bears a closer affinity with *Dharmaskandha*.[34] The *Vijñānakāya* is attributed to Devaśarma of Srāvāsti, and is supposed to have been composed during the second hundred years of Buddha's parinirvana.[35] Authorship of the *Dhātukāya* according to the Chinees source, is attributed to Vasumitra in the 2nd century AD. Against this Chinese tradition we have the authority of Yaśomitra and Bu-ston who regard Pūrna to be the author of this work.[36] N. Dutt is inclined to give greater weight to the Chinese tradition specially "in view of the fact that this pada (*Dhātukāya*) is only an enlarged treatment of the topics contained in section 4 of the Prakarnapāda of Vasumitra."[37] Poussin is prepared to accept the antiquity of this *Abhidharma* text and thinks that it, probably, is the source of Pāli *Dhātukathā*.[38] The *Dharmaskandha* is attributed to Maudgalyāyana by Chinese tradition, while Yaśomitra and Bu-ston mention Sāriputra as the author of this work.[39] Takakusu attaches great importance to this text and considers this to be "the most important of the Abhidharma works and the fountainhead of the Sarvāstivāda system.[40] The *Prajñaptiśāstra* is attributed to Maudgalyāyana, and is the only Abhidharma text which seems to have been translated into Tibetan.[41] It might be construed from this fact that the *Prajñānpatiśāstra* is, probably, a late text which survived in its original form in Sanskrit, and was available to Buddhist scholars who worked in Tibet during the 7th century when Buddhism was introduced in Tibet.

The Pāli canons of the Therāvādins also contain seven *Abhidharma* texts. However, the relationship among the Pāli *Abhidharma* texts is not one of mutual complementariness, nor do they bear a relationship of primary and secondary texts like the Sanskrit *Abhidharma* texts.[42] The Pāli *Abhidharma* texts are:

1. *Dhammasaṅgani*
2. *Vibhaṅga*
3. *Puggalapaññatti*
4. *Yamaka*
5. *Katthāvatthu*
6. *Dhātukathā*
7. *Paṭṭhāna*

In Pāli *Sutta* and *Vinaya* literature there is no reference to Abhidhammapitaka.[43] This has created some question about the authenticity of the tradition which considers the *Abhidhammapitaka* to be the original words of Buddha. Scholars have widely differed on the date of *Abhidhamma* texts. Prof. Rhys Davids thinks that in terms of subject-matter and the style, the *Kathāvatthu* belongs to

Aśokan period.[44] According to Mrs. Rhys Davids the *Dhammasaṅgani* is dated back to about 385 BC. She bases her contention on a comparison of form and content[3] of the *Dhammasaṅgani* and the *Katthāvatthu* which is dated back to 247 BC. Keith however disagrees with this estimate of the date of *Abhidhamma Piṭaka.*[45] He thinks that the texts are quite late, and probably a late addition to the other two *Piṭakas* which definitely are of older origin. We tend to agree with Keith when he observes:

> that the Abhidhamma has no claim to the antiquity asserted for it. This is supported by the undeniable fact that, while the Sutta and Vinaya Pitakas have parallels in other schools, based on a common tradition, the Abhidhamma of the Sarvāstivādins, of which we now have information, utterly disagrees with the Pali Abhidhamma.[46]

There is more than one reason to consider Pāli *Abhidhammas* to be later than the Sanskrit *Abhidharma* texts. First, the earliest archeological evidence that we have about the existence of an *Abhidharma* text as the third *Piṭaka* comes from Kausika inscriptions. It is in an inscription belonging to the period of Kuṣāṇa king Kaniṣka, we come across the term *Tripiṭaka.* But there is no conclusive evidence that the *Tripiṭaka* referred to here applies to the Pāli Canon. On the other hand, we are certain that the *Abhidharma* texts of Sanskrit tradition belonging to the Sarvāstivādins or the Vaibhāṣikas existed at the time of Kanṣika Council. It is, therefore, conceivable that the term under reference related to Sanskrit *Abhidharma.*[47] The only available evidence about the existence of Pāli *Abhidhamma* only points to the vogue of the study of the *Abhidhamma Piṭaka* in Sri Lanka during the third century AD.[48] It is also fairly certain that *Abhidhamma Piṭaka* came to be considered authoritative about 5th century AD when Buddhaghosa wrote the *Aṭṭhasālini,* a commentary on the first book of *Abhidhamma Piṭaka,* the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi,* and also the *Katthāvatthuppakrṇa-Aṭṭhakathā,* a commentary on the Katthavatu. Beyond this, nothing certain can be said about the Pāli *Abhidhamma* texts.

It is equally important to note that within the Pāli tradition, the relationship between the *Milindapañha* and the *Abhidhamma* texts[49] also point to the possibility of the latter being later in chronological order. It has been suggested by some scholars that *Milindapañha* was originally written in Sanskrit or Prākrit dialect and was later rendered into Pāli. Even if we deny this possibility there is little doubt about its northern origin and its possible affinity with the northern Sarvāstivāda tradition. One can take Keith's suggestion about the chronological order of *Milindapañha* and *Abhidhamma* texts quite seriously. His contention that the reference in *Milindapañha* to *Abhidhamma Piṭaka* can be discerned only in the passages and sections which are definitely later interpolations or addition[50] is confirmed by Winternitz's excellent analysis of the form and style of this text.[51] T.W. Rhys Davids' contention that at the time of *Milindapañha*, which can easily be dated between 100 to 200 BC, all the three Pāli *Piṭakas* were existent does not stand the test of historical research.

Conze has tried to date the texts of the Sarvāstivāda and the Therāvāda in terms of the traditional account of the separation of the school.[52] According to the Buddhist tradition both the schools separated during Aśoka's reign. Conze maintains that the passages in which the texts of Therāvādins and Sarvāstivādins agree almost word by word, we can assume that they were composed at a time preceding the separation of the two schools, which took place during Aśoka's rule, i.e., about 250 BC. Applying this criterion, it may be discerned that both Pāli and Sanskrit versions of *Sūtra* and *Nikāya* literature antedate the separation of the schools. Continuing influence of the common tradition on the two schools is quite possible during the subsequent one hundred years. It is during this period that both the Sanskrit *Abhidharma* literature and the Pāli *Milindapanaha* may have been composed. The discongruity between the two *Abhidharma* literature must have emerged with the passage of time. Employing Conze's criterion, one can see not only the post-Aśokan origin of Pāli *Abhidharma* literature, but also discern the fact that time-lag existed between it and the time of the separation of the two schools. If the Pāli *Abhidharma* texts were composed immediately after the separation of the two schools we would expect some similarity between *Abhidharma* texts of the two traditions. But this is not the case.[53] On the other hand, as it has been mentioned earlier, there is close affinity between the Pāli and Sanskrit *Sūtra* and *Vinaya* literature. No such affinity, however, exists in the case of *Abhidharma* literature.

Takakusu, on the basis of a comparative analysis of the two sets of *Abhidharma* texts, came to the conclusion that there is no real connection between the two.[54] Nyanatiloka, pursuing the lead provided by Takakusu, concluded that the Sarvāstivādin and Therāvādin *Abhidharma* texts have considerable dissimilarity, a significant exception being the *Dharmaskandha*, which seems to have closer affinity with the Pāli *Vibhaṅga*.[55] N. Dutt too arrived at similar conclusions and suggested that the two schools worked out their *Abhidharma* texts independently.[56] This contention of Dutt finds support in McGovern's statement that "there is no connection between two sets of works, that the Sarvāstivādin writing were composed by persons (who), it is scarcely possible to conceive, could have seen the Pāli works.[57]

It is equally important to note that we rarely come across any early Sarvāstivādin work which shows any acquaintance with the Pāli works, or takes a stand against Therāvādins.[58] On the other hand, we do have evidences within Pāli *Abhidharma*, specially Katthāvatu, where Sarvāstivādins are vehemently attacked.[59] All this seem to corroborate our contention that Pāli *Abhidharmas* are later in origin. However, the present author will like to qualify this by adding that a more thorough comparative analysis of the content and the structure of the two sets of *Abhidharmas* should be undertaken before the two *Abhidharmas* can be placed in their proper mutual historical relationship. It is our belief that a more comprehensive comparative account of the two *Abhidharma* traditions with special reference to the specific issues that concern them will greatly enrich our understanding of the historical and doctrinal developments of the two traditions on the Indian subcontinent. Till now, no such enterprise, at the scale demanded by the nature and scope of the study, has been undertaken and we anxiously await the results of any such study that might be under progress.[60]

ABHIDHARMA PHILOSOPHICAL LITERATURE AND THEIR PLACE WITHIN THE TRADITION

The *Abhidharmakośa*[61] of Vasubandhu is the most important text where the basic doctrinal position of Sarvāstivāda is clearly brought out. This is basically a digest of the seven primary *Abhidharma* texts mentioned earlier. At the time of the composition of the text, the Vaibhāṣika or the Sarvāstivādins seem to have a pre-eminent place within Buddhist tradition. In the *Kośa* itself Vasubandhu claims it to represent the views of the Kashmir Vaibhāṣika.[62] According to Yaśomitra the text is primarily based on the earlier works of

Sarvāstivāda, the *Jñānaprasthāna*, etc., which provided the scriptural basis for its authenticity as a Vaibhāṣika text.[63] The *Kośa* is primarily expository, and Vasubandhu never takes a partisan stand *vis-a-vis* the Vaibhāṣika position enunciated there. But Vasubandhu seems to have been influenced by the Sautrāntika school and in his Bhāṣya on the *Kośa* he occasionally takes his stand against the Vaibhāṣikas. Sarvāstivādins of the period expressed their unhappiness with Vasubandhu's *Bhāṣya* and offered rebuttals to Vasubandhu on certain points of controversy between Sarvāstivādins and the Sautrāntikas.[64]

For long, the original Sanskrit version of the text was supposed to have been lost to the Sanskrit tradition. However, the text was recently discovered by Rahul Sankrityāyana in Tibet. The main text contains 600 Kārikās and has eight chapters or sections on : 1. Dhātus; 2. Indriyas; 3. Lokas; 4. Karmas; 5. Sanuśayas; 6. Āryapudagalas; 7. Jñānas; 8. Samādhis. The 9th chapter on Pudgala, containing a refutation of ātmavāda, is in prose and appears to be a later addition to the main text.

Vasubandhu's date has been a subject of great controversy. Takakusu on the basis of Chinese evidence, placed him during 420-500 AD.[65] But the suggestion has been challenged from many quarters. Frauwallener has suggested that there were two Vasubandhus: First the Stahvira Vasubandhu, the younger brother of Asanga, the Yogacarin, who belonged to 320-380 AD. and second Ācarya Vasubandhu, who is supposed to have belonged to 400-480 AD. According to Frauwallener, the first Vasubandhu was originally a Hinyānist Sarvāstivādin who later became converted to Mahāyāna under the influence of his brother Asanga. The second Vasubandhu, according to Frauwallner, was Sautrāntika, and is the author of the *Ābhidharmakośa*.[66] However, the suggeston of Frawallener, though quite ingenious, does not seem to carry much weight. His assertion that Vasubandhu, the author of *Ābhidharmakośa*, belonged to 400-480 AD, is not corroborated by any strong evidence from Indian sources. Basing his observation on Indian sources Peri has convincingly demonstrated that Vasubandhu must have belonged to early fourth century.[67]

In this connection, we will like to bring in one important evidence from the Indian tradition which seems to have escaped the notice of many Buddhologists. The evidence comes from Bāṇa Bhatta's *Harścaritra* belonging to the 7th century. Here we have reference to the fact that Dignaṅga was propagating and defending Vasubandhu's Kosa in various *śastrārthas* (debates).[68] This shows that Bana Bhatta in 7th century was aware of the traditional legend about Vasubandhu and Dignāṅga. This confirms the traditional Indian belief that Vasubandhu was a predecessor of Dignāṅga. If we accept this evidence then Vasubandhu, the author of the *Kośa*, could not have belonged to 5th century, as Frauwallener suggests. We tend to agree with Prof. Nakamura's suggestion that Dignaṅga's date should be 400-480 AD.[69] Vasubandhu, being an older contemporary of Dignāṅga could not have belonged to fifth century, as suggested by Frauwallener.

The whole confusion about the identity and the date of Vasubandhu seems to arise from varying doctrinal positions taken by this philosopher in different works. We can discern three distinct phases in the development of Vasubandhu's own thought. In the first phase he subscribed to Sarvāstivāda-Sautrāntika thought; the *Abhidharmakośa* belongs to this period. Second phase is a transitional phase when, still Sautrāntika, he displays Yogācārā leanings. His *Karmasiddhi prakarṇa* belongs to this transitional period in his intellectual history. And to the final phase belongs the *Viṁśatikā* and the *Trimsika*, where the Mahāyāna influence is present in its full-blown form. Considering his close affiliation with his Yogācārin brother Asaṅga, this gradual movement towards Mahāyāna does not seem to be surprising. It is quite probable that he was an open-minded thinker and that the different works relate to different stages in the intellectual history of this great mind.

The *Abhidharma Nyāyānusāra*[70] of Saṃghabhadra is another important work where the basic tenets of Sarvāstivāda has been enunciated. Saṃghabhadra was a contemporary of Vasubandhu who disagreed with him on some important points pertaining to his interpretation of the Sarvāstivāda. He noted Vasubandhu's Sautrāntika leanings and attempted to offer a corrective to Vasubandhu wherever he felt that Vasubandhu had contravened the spirit of Vibhāṣa. His *Abhidharma Nyāyānusara* also called *Nyāyānusarśāstra*, is purported to be a critique of Vasubandhu's interpretation of Sarvāstivāda, and for this very reason, within Buddhist tradition, it was also called the thunderbolt for the *Kośa* (*Kośakarakā*).[71] He agreed with Vasubandhu's formulation of Sarvāstivāda in the *Abhidharmakośa kārikā*, but differed with Vasubandhu's *Bhāṣya* on it, where, according to Saṃghabhadra, Vasubandhu took partisan stand in the Sarvāstivāda-Sautrāntika debate on issues of fundamental import. The Chinese tradition informs us that Saṃghabhadra intended to discuss his work with Vasubandhu but was prevented by Saṃghabhadra's sudden demise.[72] Vasubandhu, on learning about Saṃghabhadra's work, in recognition of its great merit and non-partisan orientation, called it the treatise in accordance with logical canons (*Nyāyānusāraśastra*). The text contains references to many old schools and works of early Buddhism, and is a useful source book for the study of doctrinal development of Buddhism.

The *Sphutārthā Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*[73] by Yaśomitra is another important commentary on Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośa*. Yaśomitra belonged to the 9th century AD. His commentary is the only commentorial literature available to us in original Sanskrit. This commentary mentions other two commentaries by Guṇamati and Vasumitra which preceded it. Neither of the two is available to us now.[74] This work is not available in Chinese, though a Tibetan translation by Depal-brtsegs is extant. Being the only Sanskrit commentary on *Abhidharmakośa* available to us, the importance of this text for Ābhidharmic studies cannot be gainsaid.

In the present work we have used Abhidharma Buddhism to connote the school of Buddhist thought whose ideas were systematically expounded in the *Abhidharmakośa* of Vasubandhu. The school of Buddhism under investigation has generally been described as Sarvāstivāda or Vaibhāṣika. An examination of certain philosophical postulates of this school constitutes the subject-matter of this work. However, we define it as Abhidharma Buddhism precisely to distinguish it from its diffusion discernible in other schools of Buddhism. The appelation Abhidharma Buddhism is indicative of the fact that in our treatment of the problem of time we depend on the Vasubandhu's *Abhidharma*. In connection with heavy dependence of the present work on Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośa* and the commentaries thereupon, as distinguished from the earlier Sarvāstivāda literature which is lost to the Sanskrit tradition and are mainly preserved only in Chinese translations, it is important to note that Vasubandhu himself mentions the views of Vaibhaṣika and Sarvāstivādiṇs as that of Ābhidharmikas. It is for the first time in *Abhidharmakośa* that we find a systematic, concise and coherent exposition of Sarvāstivāda or Vaibhāṣika. Of course, *Abhidharmakośa* itself is supposed to be based on the primary *Abhidharma* texts, which as we noted earlier, are lost to the Sanskrit tradition.

Place of Vasubandhu, the author of *Abhidharmakośa*, within Buddhist tradition is a controversial issue. However, it is now widely recognized, on account of the valuable researches of Poussin, Stcherbatsky, Takakushu and Schayer that the *Abhidharmakośa* of Vasubandhu offers a reliable index to the philosophical postulates of the Sarvāstivāda. In calling Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma Buddhism we are in the good company of Buddhist scholars like Murti[75] Conze,[76] and Keith.[77] In the present work we have assumed the validity of the historical researches in Buddhist study on this specific issue.

Our articulation of Sarvāstivāda or Abhidharma Buddhism zeroes upon the account of the school as presented in Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośa*, his *Bhāṣya* on it, Saṃghabhadra's commentary on Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośa* as well as Yaśomitra's *Sphutārthā* on *Abhidharmakośa*. In addition, we have also stepped out of line of self-restriction and have referred to those Buddhist texts which are not basically Ābhidharmika in orientation. The justification for this departure is that in those texts a discussion of Sarvāstivāda position, as articulated in *Abhidharmakośa*, provides the context of debate. *Tattvasaṁgraha* of Śāntarakṣita along with Kamalśīla's Panjika on it and the Mādhyamakakārikā of Nāgārjuna along with Chandrakirti's Vṛtti on it fall in this category.

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[1] For the details of conflicting traditional accounts of early Buddhist sects see Keith, A.B., *Buddhist Philosophy in India and Ceylon*, 1923, pp. 148-59; Dutt, Nalinakṣa, *Early History of the Spread of Buddhism and the Buddhist Schools*, 1925; Thomas, E.J., *The History of Buddhist Thought*, 1933, pp. 27-42; Conze, Edward, *Buddhist Thought in India*, 1962, pp. 119-26; Warder, A.K., *Indian Buddhism*, 1970, pp. 288-351; In our discussion, we have generally followed the evidences brought in by these scholars which are largely based on the Pāli and Sanskrit material. For Tibetan sources, readers may also refer to *Taranatha's History of Buddhism in India*, (trans.), Lama Chimpa and Alaka Chattopadhyaya, 1970; and Bu-ston, *History of Buddhism*, (trans.) E. Obermiller, 1931-32.

[2] The first Council is reported to have taken place at Rajagaha (modern Rajgṛha) just after the demise of the Buddha on the issue of *Vinaya* (the rules of discipline) as laid down by the Buddha. The second Council was summoned by the monk Yas a, abouta hundred years after Bạddha's death, at Vaisālī in

northern Bihar. This was probably the occasion for the great schism between the Sthaviras and Mahāsanghikas, which was to later shape the growth of Mahāyāna Buddhism in India. The third Council is assigned to the period of Aśoka's reign, about two centuries after Buddha's death, the basic issues of controversy being more of doctrinal nature, rather than rules of discipline which was the case in the first two Councils. It seems probable that the division between Therāvādins and Sarvāstivādins may have originated at this Council. Scholars have widely differed both on the fact of the Council as well as what transpired there. Most of the evidences are quite late and sometimes very confusing. See Thomas, E., pp. 27-41; also, Keith, pp. 148-56.

[3] see *The Debates Commentary* (*Kathāvatthuppakarna-Atthakatha*), trans. B.C. Law, 1940, pp. 2ff.

[4] Keith, p. 148.

[5] The *Debates Commentary*, pp. 2-4.

[6] ibid.

[7] *Mahāvyutpatti*, vide Thomas, E.J., pp. 37-41.

[8] ibid, p. 38.

[9] *Dīpavaṁsa*, vide Keith, pp. 148-49.

[10] *Mahāvyutpatti*, vide Thomas, E.J., p. 38.

[11] Kern, H., *Manual of Indian Buddhism*, Strassburg, 1896; Rhys Davids, T.W., "Schools of Buddhist Beliefs" in *Journal of Royal Asiatic Society*, 1892, pp. 409-22

[12] Keith, pp. 148-49.

[13] see p. 186.

[14] Sogen, Yamakami, *Systems of Buddhist Thought*; cf. Banerjee, A.C., p. 4.

[15] Conze, Edward, *A Short History of Buddhism*, 1960, p. 20.

[16] ibid, p. 20. For elucidation of the said ontological doctrine see ch. 6, p. 85ff.

[17] ibid, p. 21.

[18] In Sarvāstivāda tradition, *Sūtras* are called *Āgamās* whereas Pāli tradition uses *Nikāya* for *Sūtra-piṭaka*.

[19] For an excellent discussion and summary of the findings of such comparisons see, Banerjee, A.C., *Sarvāstivāda Literature*, 1957, pp. 18-50. Our own account of Sarvāstivādin literature draws heavily upon this work.

[20] see Takakusu J., "The Abhidharma Literature of the Sarvāstivādins, *Journal of Pali Text Society*, 14, 1904-5, pp. 67-146; Dutt, N., *Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism and its Relation to Hīnyāna*, 1930, pp. 5-6; Nyantiloka, *Guide Through the Abhidhammapiṭaka*, 1938, pp. 1-2; and, Keith, p. 152.

[21] Keith, p. 155.

[22] Nanjio, op. cit., no. 1273.

[23] ibid, no. 1275.

[24] śastramiti jñānaprasthānam tasya śarīrabhūṭasya śaṭ pādaḥ prakaraṇpado vijñanakāyo dharmaskandhaḥ prajñāptiśastraṁ dhatukāyaḥ sangītiparyāya iti *Abhidharmakośa Vyākhyā of Yaśomitra*, ed. N.N. Law, 1949, p. 10.

[25] Takakusu, p. 74.

[26] Keith, p. 154.

[27] Conze, Edward, *Buddhist Thought in India*, p. 10.

[28] Frauwallener, E., "On the Date of the Buddhist Master of the Law Vasubandhu," *Serie Orientale Roma*, 3, 1951, pp. 36-37.

[29] Takakusu, op. cit.

[30] ibid.

[31] ibid.

[32] Keith, p. 154.

[33] Law, B.C., *A History of Pāli Literature*, I, p. 340; vide Banerjee, A.C., p. 63.

[34] Nayantiloka, pp. 1-2.

[35] Banerjee, A.C., p. 64.

[36] Nanjio, no. 1282.

[37] Dutt, N., p. 293.

[38] Poussin, La Vallee, vide Banerjee, A.C., p. 65.

[39] Nanjio, no. 1296.

[40] Takakusu, pp. 3-12.

[41] Keith, p. 154,

[42] see p. 186ff.

[43] The *Sutta* and *Vinaya* Piṭakas do not mention *Abhidhammapiṭaka* as a separate piṭaka. The division recognized by the Pāli Canons is that of Dhamma i.e., *Sutta* and *Vinaya* with *Mātika*. It is the *Mātika* (literally means lists) which probably later, was elaborated into *Abhidhamma*. According to Keith, the *Abhidhamma Piṭaka* is a work of Vibhājyavādins of Therāvāda tradition..."the *Abhidhamma Piṭaka*, as we have it in the Pāli canon, is the definite work of this school, a systematic scholasticism based on the Suttas," Keith, p. 153.

[44] vide Keith, p. 22.

[45] Keith, p. 23.

[46] ibid.

[47] Keith, p. 23.

[48] Hardy, *Eastern Monachism*, p. 156; vide ibid, p. 24.

[49] *Milinda's Questions*, I & II, tr. M.A. Horner, 1964.

[50] Keith, p. 23.

[51] Winternitz, *A History of Indian Literature*, II, 19.

[52] Conze, Edward, *Buddhist Thought in India*, pp. 31-32.

[53] see p. 191.

[54] Takakusu, op. cit.

[55] Nyanatiloka, pp. 1-2.

[56] Dutt, N., *Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism and its Relation to Hinayāna*, pp. 5-6.

[57] McGovern, W., *A Manual of Buddhist Philosophy*, p. 17.

[58] ibid.

[59] see *Kathāvatavatthuppakarna-Aṭṭhakathā*, pp. 52-60.

[60] There have been some attempts at a comparative analysis of Therāvādin and Sarvāstivādin Ābhidharmika thought. See *Philosophy and Psychology in the Abhidharma*, H.V. Guenther, 1957; and *A Comparative Study of the Abhidharmakośa with Pāli Abhidhammapiṭaka*, Choudhary Sukomol, Calcutta,

University (Ph.D. thesis in progress). Both these studies have concerned themselves primarily with comparing certain themes as expounded in the *Ābhidharmakośa* of Vasubandhu, on the one hand, and Atthaśālini and Kathāvaṭṭhu on the other. No intensive comparative work on the primary Ābhidharmika texts seems to have been undertaken, and the Buddhist scholarship has not gonė beyond Takakusu in this matter.

[61] The Sanskrit original of this text was discovered by Rahul Sankrtyayana in a Monasatry in Tibet. He brought photo copies of the text which was later published by K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute, Patna. All the references in the present work are to *Abhidharmakośam* ed. Swami Dwarikadas, Sastri, I, 1970; II, 1971; III, 1972; IV, 1974.

[62] Kāśmiravaibhāṣikanitīsiddhaḥ prāyo mayāyaṁ kathito bhidharmah. ibid, 8.40.

[63] Yo'bhidharmo jñānaprasthānādiretasya madiyasya śāstrasyāśrayabhūtaḥ. Tato hyarsadabhidharmadetanmadiyam sastram nirakrstam. Yaśomitra's *Sphutārthā*, ed. N.N. Law, p. 11.

[64] see pp. 193-94.

[65] Takakusu, "A Study of Paramartha's Life of Vasubandhu and the Date of Vasubandhu," *Journal of Asiatic Society*, London, 1905, pp. 33-53.

[66] Frauwallener. E., *On the Date of the Buddhist Master of the Law Vasubandhu.*

[67] Peri, N., "A propos de la date de Vasubandhu," *Bulletin de l'Ecole Francaise d'Extreme—Orient*, Paris, II, 1911, pp. 339-90.

[68] Samarabhārasaṁbhāvanābhiṣekamiva cakār diṅnāgakuṁbhakūtavikatasya bāhuśikharakośasya vāmaḥ pānipallavaḥ. *Harsacaritra*, quoted by Narendra Deva, *Abhidharmakośo*, (Hindi), 1958, p. 10.

[69] Nakamura, Hijiona, vide *Bibliography of Indian Philosophies*, ed. Karl H., Potter, 1970, p. 51.

[70] This work is not available in Sanskrit, All the citations are from fragmentary translations in Schayar, Stanislaw, *Contributions to the Problem of Time in Indian Philosophy*, Cracovie, 1938. We acknowledge our great indebtedness to this work for making available the relevant materials.

[71] see Upadhyaya, Baldeo, *Buddha Darsana*, Varanasi, 1954, p. 178.

[72] vide *Abhidharmakośa* ed. Narendra Deva, 1958, p. 8.

[73] There are different editions of this text. All the references in this work are from *Sphutārthā & Abhidharmakośa Vyākhyā* of Yaśomitra, ed. N.N. Law, I, 1949; II, 1957; and ed. Shastri, D., *Abhidharmakosam*, III, 1972.

[74] guṇamati vasumitrādyaivyārkhyakāraih padārtha-vivṛtirya sukṛtāsābhimata me likhita ca tathāyamartha iti. ibid, I, p. 1.

[75] The first attempt to synthesise the teachings of Buddha was the Ābhidharmika system...Internal evidence of the Mahāyāna systems themselves and historical evidence unmistakably point to the Sarvāstivāda as the matrix from which the Buddhist systems developed as departures and deviations. Murti, T.R.V., *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism*, 1970, p. 56.

[76] Conze, Edward, *Buddhist Thought in India*, pp. 120, 130 and 131.

[77] Keith, pp. 154-55 and 165-66.

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Braj Mohan Sinha was born in 1943 at Mongher, Bihar. He graduated from the University of Bihar, where he received his M.A. and B.L. degrees and subsequently obtained his Ph.D. degree from McMaster University, Canada. He has taught at various educational institutions of India and North America. He is currently teaching at Patna University, Bihar.

Recipient of many academic honours and distinctions, Dr. Braj Mohan Sinha is associated with several international organizations and academic projects in varying capacities. He has travelled and lectured extensively in India, Europe, U.S.A., Canada and Mexico. He has organized, participated and contributed to a number of national and international conferences, seminars and symposiums. His scholarly writings include several research papers and studies : *Time-Consciousness in Edmund Husserl* and *Surdas, Devotional Songs to Rama.*

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Nandalal Sinha

The Samkhya of Kapila has influenced every school of Indian philosophy. Among the treatises explaining its teachings, only two have survived intact, the rest being either in fragments or totally lost. One of these, the *Samkhya-Pravachana Sutram* with two commentaries by Aniruddha and Vijnanabhiksu form the body of this book, and the others *Kapila Sutram, Samkhya-Karika* of Isvarakrisna and *Panchasikha Sutram* are given in appendices.

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